Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

317. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, October 21, 1980

SUBJECT

• Possible Coup in Nicaragua (S)

We have been receiving reports for over two months of plans by a group of Sandinistas to overthrow the Marxists in the FSLN Directorate. I have not brought this to your attention because I didn’t think there was anything to it—an assessment shared by Pezzullo and Bowdler. Pezzullo, in particular, felt that the Cubans were probably responsible for spreading the word about a coup in order to flush out dissidents, and then at the appropriate moment, their allies in the FSLN would get rid of the coup plotters and tighten their control over the government. This interpretation struck me as much more plausible than the CIA report.² (S)

CIA has just sent me a report, which caused me to reassess my earlier interpretation (Tab A).³ This report names names of those involved in the coup plans, and these people are credible coup plotters, i.e., they are moderate nationalists and possess a fair amount of support in the Sandinista army. An interesting aside is that they plan to get in touch with General Gutierrez. (He and his counterpart, General Jam, seem to be flowering simultaneously.) The most important point in this report is that they are planning to launch the coup between October 25 and November 5. (S)

Though I still think the possibility of such a coup is remote, if it does come off, that will unquestionably be everyone’s October surprise. It could also present us with the most serious challenge that we have faced in Latin America. The President is on record as reaffirming JFK’s declaration in 1963: “That we would not permit any troops from Cuba to move off the Island of Cuba in any offensive action against any neighboring country.” The chances of Cuban involvement in assisting the Directorate to resist a coup is probably about 90 percent not only because of the number of security advisers there today, but because Castro will not let Nicaragua veer from his sphere of influence. Therefore, a confrontation of some sort would be inevitable. (S)

I have asked CIA to continue to monitor this issue closely and to keep me fully informed. I would appreciate it if you would also share any information you receive on this.⁴ I understand Newsom will meet with Bowdler on this tomorrow, and I will try to insert myself in that meeting to brainstorm a little on what we ought to be thinking about doing if the reports become more and more credible.⁵ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 10/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page on October 22: “Important.”
2. In an August 15 memorandum to Bowdler, Spiers, Tighe, and Pastor, McMahon reported on the “alleged plan of middle level Sandinista Armed Forces officers to overthrow” the FSLN National Directorate. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 10/16/80–10/31/80)
3. Tab A, attached but not printed, is an October 21 memorandum from McMahon to Bowdler, Spiers, Tighe, and Pastor reporting on the “preparations by a group of Sandinista armed forces officers to overthrow the Sandinista National Liberation Front.”
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left hand margin next to the first two sentences of this paragraph and wrote in the margin: “Let me know.”
5. In an October 23 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor wrote: “The chances of a coup occurring in Nicaragua soon are very small.” He also noted: “There are already 5,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, and many in controlling positions in the Interior Ministry. These Cubans will unquestionably fight to preserve the Sandinista Directorate.” Brzezinski indicted that he agreed with Pastor’s suggestion that, upon receipt of more information from the Central Intelligence Agency, Aaron should chair a “small meeting” with Carlucci, Davis, Newsom, Bowdler, Cheek, and Pastor. Brzezinski also added the following on the first page of the memorandum: “DA mini-SCC. ZB.” An unknown hand indicated that an “ad hoc” meeting took place on October 27. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 80, Sensitive X: 10/9/80–10/31/80) Under an October 27 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor transmitted a summary of the “small meeting.” According to the summary, the group felt that a coup might begin as soon as November 2 and agreed that, after receiving information from the CIA, Aaron would convene another meeting to “discuss Cuba’s capability to intervene, the message we ought to send to Castro if a coup begins, and whether we want to alter our current neutral position is asked by the coup plotters.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 37, Nicaragua: 10/80)