Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

28. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Cohen) to the Acting Secretary of State Christopher¹

Washington, August 19, 1978

SUBJECT

• Tear Gas for Guatemala

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Should we sell tear gas to Guatemala?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The President, Vice President, and Foreign Minister of Guatemala have separately requested that the USG approve the sale of 5,000 rounds of tear gas to Guatemala on an urgent basis.² This new administration (inaugurated July 1) has been issuing permits to demonstrate to any group which applies for one, but has announced it will break up all unauthorized demonstrations. On August 4 the police, armed only with tear gas and night sticks (no guns), dispersed a demonstration of 12,000, whose organizers deliberately refused to request a permit. Since then the Government has issued two permits for demonstrations to protest the break-up of the earlier demonstration. The Guatemalan Government believes the organizers of the August 4 demonstration plan other demonstrations in the near future for which they will not request a permit. The Government has only about 250 cannisters of tear gas left.

The Guatemalan Vice President emphasized that if Guatemala runs out of tear gas the police may resort to guns in dealing with illegal demonstrations with the real risk of injuries and death.

An intelligence report confirms our Ambassador’s judgment that the U.S. response to the Guatemalan request for tear gas is seen by the new Guatemalan administration as an important test case of U.S. attitude towards it.³

It has been our policy since March to allow the export of equipment including bullets to the military, but to deny the export of all equipment including tear gas, for police use.⁴

ARA POSITION

ARA recommends you approve the sale of tear gas to Guatemala because:

—A major issue here is what kind of relationship we will establish with the new Guatemalan Government; this request has been made a major political test of that relationship by the GOG, and our refusal of it exposes us to a “mini-Argentine” potential of misperception of our position and an assumption by the GOG of US hostility and rejection.

—Refusing the request will damage our access to and leverage with the GOG and hence our capacity to influence them precisely in advancing our human rights goals, as well as in such important matters as the Belize dispute.

—A refusal will prejudge the GOG guilty of human rights violation, when its record is thus far good; to charge it with the record of the past ten years or tax it with no progress after two months in office is too harsh.

—The GOG is not denying the right of assembly. It has committed itself to grant permits when asked (and has done so) but has said it will not permit demonstrations which do not have permits (a practice the US, Venezuela and Colombia all follow); the refusal to seek a permit is obviously intended by the opposition precisely to provoke a clash.

—To deny the request would be to deprive the GOG of accepted crowd control methods, and risks the danger that the authorities may resort to guns if they have our tear gas; we would be exposed to criticism in that case, for having sold Guatemala ammunition but not tear gas.

HA POSITION

HA recommends disapproval because:

—The human rights record of Guatemala is poor. The security forces have a record of arbitrary arrest, killing, and torture that goes back over 10 years. Last May, government forces killed over 30 Indian peasants in Panzos.⁵ Wealth is highly concentrated, with 10 percent of the population owning over 70 percent of the land.

—Although a new government is now in power, its election was marked by fraud and recent reports indicate that, if anything, it plans to take a tougher line on internal dissent than its predecessor. It has characterized itself as a “law and order administration” and has intensified its policy of arbitrary arrest.

—Despite Guatemala’s claim of emergency need, there is no evidence of any attempt to obtain tear gas from other sources, and it could probably be obtained elsewhere. But the Guatemalan Government does appear anxious for U.S. tear gas, as a demonstration of U.S. support.

—Such association with internal security forces in a country with a serious record of human rights violations could be contrary to Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and paragraph six of PD–30,⁶ absent exceptional circumstances.

—The critical public issue at this time in Guatemala is the right of the opposition to demonstrate. Last week, tear gas was used by the police to break up an opposition demonstration. Thus, the supply of U.S. tear gas at this juncture would be perceived as U.S. acquiescence in the GOG’s position on denial of the right to assembly.

—Given Guatemala’s bad record on human rights, our post policy of refusing police exports, and the lack of real progress from the new government, HA believes that the desire for political influence does not justify approval.

—We also believe that the proper way to avoid loss of life is for the government to ease its repressive practices and not to interfere with peaceful demonstrations.

Recommendation

ARA recommends that you authorize the sale of tear gas to Guatemala.⁷

HA recommends that you not authorize the sale of tear gas to Guatemala.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780140–2254. Confidential. Sent through Newsom. Drafted on August 18 by Pfeifle and Cohen.
2. In telegram 4723 from Guatemala City, August 11, the Embassy reported that Villagran Kramer had stated: “‛In the name of human rights,’ he said, ‛we appeal to you to try to help us get some tear gas,’” arguing that, from the human rights point of view, tear gas was better than bullets for crowd control. Boster endorsed the request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0376) In telegram 4766 from Guatemala City, August 15, the Embassy reported that Lucas had renewed the request for tear gas saying that “he supposed he would become a target of human rights criticism when police find it necessary to resort to clubs and ultimately firearms to disband unauthorized demonstrations and strikes because tear gas had run out.” Boster commented that the request had assumed some symbolic importance to Guatemala and should be approved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780333–0947) The Embassy reported Castillo Valdez’s reiteration of the Guatemala’s request for tear gas in telegram 4822 from Guatemala City, August 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780358–0252, D780337–0266)
3. See footnote 2 above for Boster’s views. The intelligence report was not further identified.
4. Mendoza asked Vance about the commercial sale of spare parts for military vehicles on February 3; see Document 25. The following week Bushnell, after consulting HA, informed Guatemalan Ambassador Lamport of the approval of export licenses for truck and armored car spare parts. By April 6, all pending export license applications had been resolved. In general, export licenses for items destined for the Guatemalan Army were approved and those for items destined for the police force were denied. (Briefing Memorandum from Todman to Vance, April 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780072–1482)
5. On May 29, a clash between peasants and the Guatemalan military resulted in the death of thirty-four peasants, according to initial reports described in telegram 3145 from Guatemala City, May 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780226–0858) Subsequent reports disputed the Guatemalan military’s account of an attack by the peasants and described the killing of unarmed peasants, including women and children, who had gathered to air land rights grievances. (Telegram 150258 to Guatemala City, June 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780247–0795 and telegram 3612 from Guatemala City, June 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255–0960)
6. For information about Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act and PD–30, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Documents 17 and 119.
7. Christopher indicated his approval of ARA’s recommendation on August 21. In telegram 212560 to Guatemala City, August 22, the Department transmitted approval of the export of up to 5,000 canisters of tear gas, “because of the emergency situation the GOG faces,” and instructed Chargé d’Affaires Shuler to inform the Guatemalan Government. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 24, Guatemala: 2/77–12/78) Shuler indicated his compliance in telegram 4906 from Guatemala City, August 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780343–0504)