252. Message From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Sitto 77/WH 91434. This is a retransmittal of Managua 2914.2 Subject: (S) National Guard Survival.
1. Secret-Entire text
2. Some national security forces must remain to maintain order after Somoza’s departure. Otherwise the vacuum we all wish to avoid will be filled by the FSLN, with all the negative consequences that would bring. What is the reality of the GN and what are the prospects of it holding together after Somoza leaves? Certain factors must be taken into account in our own analysis and planning.
A) Despite the reality that Somoza’s prospective departure is widely known within the GN, it has not collapsed as some feared it would.
[Page 628]B) We believe a majority of its officers have accommodated to the prospect of serving in a post-Somoza force. They expect a radical change of leaders.
C) The FSLN has not defeated the GN. The GN remains a strong fighting force, though somewhat enfeebled by shortages of essential material.
3. These factors lead me to conclude that we can preserve a reorganized and reconstituted GN security force. We don’t have much time, however, or anything to offer on the material side until the GN becomes the security force of a government of national reconciliation. But we can do the following things now:
A) Once identified, we can help the new leader build a staff and provide the logistical support to get himself organized before d-day.
B) Set the stage for negotiations between the GN and the FSLNJN which optimally should begin before d-day. Torrijos, Carazo and CAP should be asked to help in this.
C) Attempt to identify the potential new leaders, most importantly the new commander.
D) Get the Venezuelans and others (such as Colombia, Peru, etc.) to join us in influencing Torrijos, CAP and Carazo to restrain any FSLN inclination to destroy the GN.
4. With careful orchestration we have a better than even chance of preserving enough of the GN to maintain order and hold the FSLN in check after Somoza resigns. The most difficult variable to weigh is the extent of public repudiation of the GN.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35: Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Secret. Sent through Gates with a request to deliver at the opening of business.↩
- Telegram 2914 from Managua, June 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1802)↩