Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua¹

Washington, June 30, 1979, 0007Z

168715. For Ambassador Pezzullo; San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: Nicaraguan Scenario.

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Following decisions were taken by SCC today:

—You should not rpt not try to establish a specific departure date at this time. What follows after Somoza’s departure is too uncertain as yet. Hence Somoza should stay in place until this is determined.

—You should continue to press exploration of the follow-on committee to a constitutionally selected successor, or some other successor arrangement which can constitute a credible caretaker. The problem we see is that a Quintana-led regime or other Somoza-appointed regime would probably not constitute one with which the FSLN and other opposition elements would deal. Nor is it likely to constitute a sufficiently legitimate regime to warrant our and other L.A. backing. Please continue to seek some coalescing of opposition elements willing to take up the baton.

—You should urgently explore ways of preserving some kinds of effective but reconstituted Guard presence so as to avoid leaving the FSLN as the only organized military force. The analysis you indicated you were preparing in Managua 2889 will be very important and is urgently required.²

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1815. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Drafted and approved by Vaky; cleared in S/S–O and NSC.
2. In telegram 2889 from Managua, June 29, Pezzullo reported to Vaky that Gutierrez’s “suggestions on reconstituted Guard leadership demonstrate that he is badly out of touch or attempting to create his own power base.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850036–1797) In telegram 167616 to Managua, June 29, the Department informed Pezzullo of Gutierrez’s suggestions for officers to who “might be key in any reconstitution of the National Guard.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2063)