229. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher1
SUBJECT
- Nicaragua
John Murphy telephoned me shortly after midnight last night to say that Somoza was prepared to accept our proposal, as I had outlined it to him, with one quid pro quo: there must be a peacekeeping force in place before Somoza leaves.2
You will recall that I spoke to Murphy earlier, along lines we had agreed, saying that we wanted to end the war and prevent the take [Page 586] over of Nicaragua by pro-Castro forces.3 We felt it important to preserve the institutions of the Guard and the government. We were prepared to provide asylum to Somoza. In response to a question about the future of the Liberal Party, I said the important thing was that Somoza and his family leave; as far as I knew, there was no intention to disband the party. Murphy asked me whether any members of the Liberal Party would be included in the transition government. I said that I believe the name of one former member, Callejas Deshon figured in our thinking. Murphy asked who might command the Guard when Somoza’s son left. I said I did not know; I knew we were thinking about some contact with General Guitterez. (He commented that he was not sure about General Guitterez; he had refused to fire on Latins in Santo Domingo.)
In the later conversation, Murphy said the names I had mentioned to him were satisfactory to Somoza. He was prepared to work within this formula, but he must be sure the members of his party and his government are protected against the possible reprisals from the Sandinistas.
I told him the OAS had already turned down the idea of a peace force. I said that Luis Pallais was on his way back to Managua and that you had spoken to the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister in the afternoon. Ambassador Pezzulo would shortly go to Managua. I suggested that further discussions on this matter be left to these channels, but that I would report his conversation to you.
Murphy then spoke at some length about the nature of the revolutionary forces which were not really Nicaraguans. Nicaraguans he claimed were rallying to Somoza after seeing the atrocities of the invaders. He said most of the dead, from their papers, proved to be Costa Ricans, Panamanians, Mexicans and Cubans.
Murphy wanted me to get back to him this morning with a report on our reaction to the peace force idea.
COMMENT: Unless, for reasons of our other relations with Murphy, we need to keep him directly involved in this matter, I would suggest that, in any further calls, I suggest that the situation is moving rapidly and that the negotiations should be left to those directly involved.
Somoza’s concern about retaliation against his people may have some basis. In the absence of a peace keeping force, could we seek, as part of a cease fire, a broad pledge of amnesty?
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 36, Nicaragua: 7/1–4/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Vaky and Brzezinski. Newsom did not initial the memorandum.↩
- Christopher wrote to Vance in telegram Tosec 60052/165196 to the Secretary’s delegation, June 26, to report that he had met with Murphy, who insisted that Somoza did not want to leave Nicaragua “until the essential safeguards are in place.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1747)↩
- See footnote 7, Document 223.↩