Office of the Historian

222. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, June 21, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Telephone Call to General Torrijos (S)

Cy and I both recommend that you phone General Torrijos and urge him to stop the transfer of arms to the Sandinistas. (Talking Points are at Tab A.)2 (S)

We have received word from Somoza that he recognizes that the end is near, and would be prepared to step aside if he can be assured of two things: (1) asylum in the U.S. and a promise that we will not extradite him; and (2) that his departure would not lead to a political vacuum that could be filled by the Sandinistas. He has conveyed the second part of this message to the Andean Pact countries through the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, and their thinking is running parallel to our own. The Andean Pact Foreign Ministers are meeting in Caracas now, and will fly to Washington Thursday morning to press for an OAS resolution calling for a ceasefire, a transitional government of national reconciliation, and a Foreign Ministers’ mission to Nicaragua [Page 562] to work out the details with Somoza. We expect the resolution will be accepted by the OAS and by Somoza. They are not contemplating a peacekeeping force yet, but Venezuelan President Herrera has indicated to us that he is absolutely opposed to a Sandinistas victory. (S)

It is therefore all the more urgent for Torrijos to turn off the faucet of arms to the Sandinistas. We have reports now that the Panamanians are sending at least one airplane a day to the Sandinistas, and landing it outside of Managua. If we can cut that supply, we may gain sufficient time to insure a democratic transition. (S)

Torrijos is coming from a very different direction than we are. He believes the Sandinistas will win, and he is positioning himself alongside the more moderate faction in order to try to assure some influence over the new government. Torrijos wants you to do something “audacious”—like drop bombs on Somoza, and he recommends that you make a symbolic gesture to put the US in a better position to deal with a future Sandinista government.3 (S)

You need to be very blunt and firm with Torrijos. We do not see the Sandinista provisional government as a friendly one; we believe that it will ultimately align with the Cubans. We do believe there is time—if Torrijos stops shipping arms to the Sandinistas—to structure a non-Somoza, democratic solution. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you phone General Torrijos. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/21–24/79. Secret. Sent for action. Carter wrote: “not done. J.” in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote “Pastor” at the top of the page.↩
  2. Attached but not printed are the June 20 taking points.↩
  3. In telegram 158440 to San José, June 20, the Department noted that Moss had met with Torrijos. Torrijos had asked Moss to deliver a “special message to President Carter.” Torrijos “wanted to propose qte a crazy idea unqte which qte will convince President Carter that I’m crazy, but maybe in the middle of the night he will reconsider it and think that I was not so crazy unqte.” The Department elaborated upon the proposal: “Torrijos’s idea was that the U.S. Air Force should launch two strikes against Somoza and drop a few bombs symbolically to rout the Somoza forces in support of Eden Pastora’s forces.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790005–0241)↩