213. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
2653. For Assistant Secretary Vaky from Charge. Subject: (S) OAS Action on Nicaragua. Ref: State 153522.2
1. (S)-Entire text
2. Summary: The OAS initiative described reftel appears to be based on the assumption of Somoza’s and/or the FSLN’s willingness [Page 547] to quit fighting. We believe that greatest emphasis of the proposal should be placed on interdicting resupply. Costa Rica is the key and should be pressured to accept an OAS peacekeeping force to include observer forces at all airports which might be used for resupply. End summary.
3. Somoza and the FSLN are in a death grip and unlikely to relax their grasp until one or the other is finished. The diplomatic initiative contemplated reftel is an attempt to stop the fighting by asking both sides to accept such an initiative. The recent visit to Somoza by the Andean reps seemed to confirm this.
4. We do not want to see either Somoza or the FSLN win, but that appears to be the only outcome available except in the unlikely prospect that an OAS force could be constituted and inserted and would be prepared to use sufficient force to militarily neutralize either or both of the contending forces.
5. We believe that the focus of our energies should be on interdicting the flow of weapons and warriors and on facilitating the flow of foodstuffs and medical supplies to the civilian population. From here it appears that the USG is having some success in interdicting openly conducted resupply to the Guardia Nacional, but little or no success in stopping the clandestine flow to the Sandinistas. Hence, we are, in net effect, supporting the FSLN and squeezing the GN. Witness the current FSLN attack at the Costa Rican border, and reports of flights in to Nicaragua to resupply the Sandinistas.
6. A peaceforce would be effective if it were at the border with Costa Rica and present at airports from which supplies and FSLN forces might be sent.
7. ForMin Quintana apparently has called for an OAS force. We are not suggesting a force which will only strengthen Somoza’s hold, but rather one that can stop the war, and allow the emergency food and other assistance that will be required, probably urgently.
8. These views are shared by all substantive and intelligence officers at Embassy Managua.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/1–16/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- See Document 212.↩
- In telegram 156558 to Managua, June 17, Vaky noted: “We agree that arms shipments to either party to the fighting should be stopped, and have repeatedly sought every feasible means to do this. If we have been less successful in preventing arms from reaching the FSLN it is not for a lack of persistent effort on our part. Nor is OAS physical interdiction now feasible. We will, however, continue every pressure to achieve this objective. We fully agree that there is a need to provide the kind of humanitarian assistance you describe and will be urging this upon the OAS.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790275–0614) In telegram 156358 to San José, June 16, the Department instructed the Embassy to “point out to him [Carazo] in the strongest constructive terms the need to halt arms supplies to the contending forces in Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790273–0590)↩