207. Telegram From the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Defense Intelligence Agency Current Intelligence, the Agency for International Development, and [addressee not declassified]1

9892. Subj: DIA Defense Intelligence Notice (DIN). (U)

Nicaragua: Violence Continues. (U)

1. (C/NOFORN) Violence and unrest continue in Nicaragua. The tempo, incidence, and scale of guerrilla action against the Somoza government appear to have reached the highest point since the September 1978 offensive, when five large cities were seized almost simultaneously.

2. (C/NOFORN). Numerous casualties have been incurred in recent action by both sides, but the guerrilla-National Guard contest has not yielded a final victory to either side and casualty counts differ. In the latest and largest scale activity, from 300 to 500 guerrillas moved into the city of Jinotega on the 19th, attacking the guard headquarters, seizing public buildings, interrupting telephone service, and erecting barricades. They later occupied three smaller towns nearby. This action is typical of the most recent larger scale Sandinista operation. The National Guard, also following its recent pattern, has moved in troops and supplies by air and ground and deployed armor, helicopters, and rocket-armed Cessna’s to the area. While the guard claimed to have recaptured most of the city by the 21st, heavy fighting is still reported. The guerrillas now claim to have liberated Jinotega and the northern rural section of the country, but this is probably an exaggeration. On the 21st, they also conducted similar operations in the town of Diriamba, where fighting also is believed to be in progress.

3. (C/NOFORN) Despite their claims of success, the guerrillas will probably eventually suffer heavy losses and be routed, as occurred in the onslaught against Esteli last month and at Nueva Guinea in early May. Their most successful tactics are still their highly professional ambushes of the guard, against which they inflict casualties and fade away unscathed before reinforcements arrive.

4. (C/NOFORN) Meanwhile, Somoza’s opponents continue to hope for a successful general strike that would set off a countrywide [Page 538] economic collapse.2 They would also welcome a National Guard refusal to back Somoza, or a popular uprising against him, either of which they believe would topple the President. In the interim, the guerrillas continue their war of attrition, attempting to stretch the Guard’s capabilities beyond the breaking point. However since neither side can eliminate the other, the situation is likely to continue unresolved for the near term. The war of attrition will, however, make it increasingly difficult for the Guard to make up its losses through recruitment, which is already lagging. Should the guerrillas stick to ambushes and concurrently timed short-duration strikes against cities in widely scattered areas, they could eventually win if at least one of the aforementioned hoped-for developments is realized. At present, however, there are only faint and very incipient trends toward one or more of these situations evolving.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Telegrams, May 1979. Confidential; Noforn.
  2. In telegram 2479 from Managua, June 4, the Embassy reported that the FSLN and the FPN were promoting a general strike and predicted that “the general strike may be partially successful” due to the likelihood of violent confrontations between the National Guard and bystanders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790253–0935)
  3. A June 9 memorandum prepared in INR reported on the status of fighting in Nicaragua between the Sandinista forces and the National Guard, noting that “major clashes” had begun on May 29 and that fighting had “spread across Nicaragua to include the important cites of Leon and Granada; towns which have previously been involved in the conflict, Masaya and Matagalpa, important areas around villages in the south, El Ostional, El Naranjo, and Los Mojones; and in some areas of Managua.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda Jan.–July 1980)