Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

190. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Bowdler) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, January 15, 1979

Nicaragua

The latest round with Somoza has left the Negotiating Group with the impression that he is confident he can see the crisis through and complete his term until 1981. As Somoza sees it:

—the FAO is disintegrating and it is in his interest to accelerate the process;

—disappearance of the moderate opposition will leave the field to him and the extreme left which he will exploit to make the choice appear to be between himself and communism;

—polarization and radicalization does not represent that much of a danger: the OAS observers on the Costa Rican border reduces the external threat and the expansion of the National Guard allows effective internal control;²

—the danger of political pressures from the US or the OAS are not that imminent or serious.

The FAO presents a mixed picture. Robelo, disappointed by his trip to Washington and traumatized by the assassination of Luis Medrano, was personally highly negative to continuation of the mediation.³ On the other hand his Political Committee colleagues, Cordova Rivas and Sanchez Sancho showed themselves more realistic and practical. They see the mediation as their only hope and want it to continue but are caught in the dilemma that prolongation of the negotiations with further concessions in the NG plan makes them vulnerable to attack and erosion from the extreme left. Under these circumstances they prefer that the negotiation proceed between the NG and Somoza, with sufficient pressure brought to bear on Somoza to force him to agree to the NG plan with minimum changes.

The Negotiating Group is not without its problems. The Dominicans have virtually opted out of the mediation unless Somoza accepts the NG plan without further major revision. They went along with the National Plebiscite Authority change, but I am doubtful they will accept any more. Their clear preference is to let things stand where they are so that any further weakening of the FAO cannot be attributed to NG pressures. Guatemala shares this view but with less firmness, perhaps because they do not have the same internal political problems with the mediation. Another factor is that during the course of the mediation Obiols personally has become increasingly concerned over the impact of the Nicaraguan crisis on the stability of the Central American area. He believes there is an urgent need for a peaceful settlement.

It is hard to predict how Somoza will answer the NG response to the PLN counter-proposal. I doubt very much that he will accept the revised NG plan because it does not give him the necessary control over the electoral process to influence the outcome. I expect him to avoid rejection because stretching the negotiation out gains him time and he wants to avoid responsibility for terminating the mediation. We can look for an intermediate position perhaps building on the NPA concession and probably focussing on the voter inscription question which is key to influencing the vote and on which his lieutenants have placed so much emphasis in their recent coversations with us.

The basic decision we need to make is whether we want to try to maintain a democratic third force against the day when Somoza might be more amenable to a settlement or back off and let nature take its course in Nicaragua. If our objective is the former we need a strategy for (1) holding the FAO together and (2) increasing the pressures on Somoza. If the decision is to follow the other alternative, we should suspend, but not terminate, the mediation and disassociate ourselves from Somoza to the degree necessary to preserve USG credibility.

The FAO still represents a not insignificant coalition of forces: the three principal elements of the Conservative Party, the major labor organizations, and the private sector represented by COSEP. Their preference is to maintain themselves as a separate, moderate third force, resisting pressures or blandishments from Somoza or efforts of the far left to have the FAO join a new Patriotic Front.⁴ In order for them to hold an independent posture and continue on the mediation track some outside encouragement is essential. They must see that they have not been abandoned by those outside who share their views and that their internal efforts will have external backing.

To have any hope of success in persuading the FAO to maintain its independence we would have to:

—make publicly clear that there are to be no further concessions on the NG plan. Whatever Somoza’s response to the NG’s January 12 letter. We would have to insist on acceptance in principle as the FAO has done;

—start implementing the measures we have warned Somoza we would take. We should start with the four measures mentioned to him in the demarches and proceed to tougher economic measures, if he refuses to accept the NG terms for the plebiscite;

—consider convening an MFM to review the Nicaraguan situation in the light of the IAHRC and the Negotiating Group reports. Among the actions the MFM might take are: express concern over violation of human rights and call for respect of those rights; find that the internal conflict in Nicaragua represents a threat to the peace and stability of the Central American area and is therefore a matter of concern to the government of the OAS; and note the report of the NG and express regret that one of the parties has not accepted the recommendations for a peaceful settlement. The votes for suspension of diplomatic relations are probably not available. A substitute would be for the professed democratic governments following the MFM to announce they are withdrawing their ambassadors until Somoza agrees to the NG plan for a plebiscite and follow-on action.

Looking at Central America in general I see indications of serious instability during 1979. Despite Somoza’s expressed confidence, I believe that the situation in Nicaragua will degenerate into greater violence. The confrontation between the government and the violent opposition in El Salvador, when added to the serious demographic problems and socio-economic imbalances, presents another explosive situation. President Lucas told me he expected the present calm in Guatemala to last only until the end of the month. As the Sandinistas operate from safe-havens in Costa Rica and Honduras, it would not be surprising to see border incidents heightening the general tensions in the area and aggravating the problems of an already battered Common Market. All these factors argue for continuing our efforts to pressure Somoza to accept the NG settlement as an important step toward defusing the critical panorama in Central America. A solution of the Nicaraguan crisis could open the door for tackling other problems (e.g. the Salvador-Honduras dispute) on an individual and regional basis.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, January 1979. Secret.
2. Telegram 11997 to Managua and San José, January 16, noted that following weeks of OAS discussions the OAS Permanent Council authorized the departure of the first five civilian observers for the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border area. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790022–0667) According to Pastor’s January 16 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, the OAS could find only six countries (Paraguay, Panama, Jamaica, Honduras, Surinam, and Grenada) that were willing to send observers to insure “the integrity of the frontier.” Pastor wrote: “Though seven had been authorized, the OAS Permanent Council Chairman broke the impasse by proposing that five observers would be sufficient, at least initially, and that Surinam would hold its nominee in abeyance pending the naming of a seventh member.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 67, Nicaragua: 10/78–7/79)
3. Telegram 11840 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 16, stated: “Luis Medrano, Secretary General of the AIFLD-Affiliated Confederation of Labor Unification was shot and killed on January 9 while distributing leaflets urging attendance at the events relating to the Chamorro anniversary. The police have arrested a suspect who has reportedly confessed to the shooting, claiming it was accidental. It is as yet unclear as to whether the killer had any GON connections other than friendly relations with a police officer who had loaned him a rifle.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/1–16/79)
4. Telegram 268 from Managua, January 16, reported that the National Patriotic Front was near formal launching and noted that the Embassy expected this “new opposition super-coalition” to “be heavily influenced by leftist, radical groups and to adopt a confrontational strategy,” and that “the FAO appears to be resisting the mounting pressure (including that of Alfonso Robelo) to join the FPN.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/1–16/79)