Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, January 13, 1979, 0505Z

219. Subj: Nicaraguan Mediation No. 293: NG Conversations with FAO.

1. (Confidential-Entire text)

2. NG, with Pedro Padilla pinch hitting for Fon Min Jimenez, arrived Managua morning of January 12 and proceeded to the Dominican Embassy for a meeting with the FAO political committee at 11:00 am.²

3. We explained purpose of our trip and read them proposed response to PLN counter-proposal.³ The immediate reaction of all three was negative, with Robelo being the most emphatic. They said the FAO plenum had met yesterday and decided not to accept any change in our December 20 proposal.⁴ If we pushed them for a response to the national plebiscite authority now, it would have to be a rejection.

4. Robelo went into a long and rather emotional explanation of the pressures which the FAO was under and how their position is eroding as groups defect to join the Patriotic Front. He argued that continuation of the mediation weakened rather than favored the FAO. He personally considered the mediation at an end and now regretted that the FAO had not said so publicly on December 27 after seeing the PLN counter-proposal.

5. We explained that our purpose was not to undercut the FAO. We had come to consult them in advance in order to avoid taking actions that would put them in the position of rejecting the NG plan. We frankly thought that the NPA concept as circumscribed in our communication had the advantage of meeting a PLN criticism of our plan without conceding on the essentials underwriting confidence and credibility of the plebiscite process.

6. After this explanation Cordova Rivas, and especially Luis Sanchez Sancho, took a more conciliatory line. Latter asked for recess so that they could consult among themselves. When we resumed Sanchez reported their view in these terms:

A) They stood by their Dec. 21 letter accepting the NG proposal.⁵

B) It was for the NG to persuade the PLN to accept the NG plan.

C) They would refrain from passing judgement on the NPA concept until NG had the PLN’s response.

7. I told them that it was important for us to know whether the FAO was going to reject the NPA variant to our draft even if Somoza were to accept the totality of our plan as contained in the letter. Sanchez, replying for the group, said FAO would not give us a green light at this stage on NPA because the PLN had not accepted the essential of the NG plan. The FAO did not want to make piecemeal judgements on changes such as NPA until there is a clearer indication of PLN willingness to accept our version of the plebiscite. In saying this he gave us to understand that the FAO position on NPA would not rpt not be negative if the other major conditions remained as stated in the December 20 proposal.

8. With this statement of position we decided to modify the last three paragraphs of our response to the PLN in order to delete the requirement that the FAO respond on the NPA variant in the same time frame as the PLN. The FAO representatives understood that we will be asking them to concur if the PLN is willing to accept the other aspects of our proposal.

9. Tonight I talked with Adolfo Calero about this evening’s FAO plenum. He reported that Robelo had briefed the group on our reply to the counter proposal and at the same time introduced a motion of non-approval of the NPA. He did not get support for the motion, according to Calero. Almost all the delegates indicated they personally thought the variant was acceptable on the basis presented in our document. The plenum decided that each delegate should consult his organization in order to discuss the matter further on Monday.⁶ Calero thought the outcome would be to support NPA but the FAO would not communicate its position until the PLN answered the NG letter.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790017–0766. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Caracas, Panama City, San José, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.
2. In telegram 205 from Santo Domingo, January 11, Bowdler noted that he “feared the FAO would not rpt not find the National Plebiscite Authority (NPA) acceptable,” and that Padilla believed that the pursuit of a reply to the PLN would diminish the standing of both the FAO and the Negotiating Group. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790015–0928)
3. See Document 169.
4. See Document 180.
5. Telegram 6745 from Managua, December 22, 1978, contained the Spanish-language text and the English translation of the FAO’s “favorable response to the Negotiating Group’s plebiscite proposal.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/21–22/78)
6. January 15.