Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

183. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• The Mediation Effort in Nicaragua: At the Brink? (S)

We have reached a critical point in the mediation effort in Nicaragua, and your comments yesterday on the draft response of the Mediators prompted me to draft this memo and place the current decision in a broader context.² Let me review briefly the history of the mediation effort; describe the current situation; and then identify the options which you have at this time. (S)

I. History of the Mediation

On August 25, 1978, the business community in Nicaragua took the lead in initiating a General Strike. Within a week, the people of Managua and a half dozen other towns in Nicaragua set in motion what can only be described as a full-scale insurrection, demanding that Somoza and his family leave Nicaragua. The repression which followed has been documented graphically by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The issue of political succession has always been the central issue in Nicaragua, and we have recognized that when Somoza began to lock up and kill members of the moderate opposition in late September, we decided it was time to act. Together with mediators from the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the U.S. in early October joined an effort which was blessed—if not sanctioned—by the O.A.S. Our principal concern at that time was to try to preserve (and then to strengthen) by peaceful and overt means the political middle in Nicaragua as a “legitimate alternative” to both Somoza and the Sandinistas. Our fear was that if we didn’t succeed, Somoza would prevail over the Sandinistas in the short-term but that he would eventually fall. The longer it took the more radical the outcome. (S)

Our goal was to create a process which would facilitate and legitimate the involvement of the moderate opposition in a process and ultimately in a new governmental arrangement. When Somoza suggested the idea of a plebiscite on November 10, we grabbed at it as a way to legitimize the succession, which we knew was the only solution to the problem. The opposition (FAO) saw the plebiscite idea as a ruse, either a delaying tactic or a fraud which Somoza would perpetrate. The FAO knew that with total control over the National Guard and local judges and administrators, it would be impossible to have a free election. (S)

We weighed in very strongly with the FAO, trying to persuade them to accept the proposal. There were some who viewed the proposal as a “tar baby” which would engage us in protracted, sticky negotiations with Somoza, but we overcame the skepticism of most of the FAO by pledging our full support through an international mechanism for a free and fair election. (S)

As negotiations on specific conditions bogged down, the moderates in the FAO were increasingly pressed by radicals who saw the whole exercise as a delaying tactic by Somoza. The Mediators moved to develop a proposal which they viewed as a compromise on the major issues, but in order to guarantee that the election would be fair, they felt compelled to recommend that it be administered by an international authority.³ In addition, their proposal (Tab A) recommended a simple question on whether Somoza should continue in power so that all the Nicaraguans could easily understand the issue.⁴ The Mediators decided against prior registration because they felt this could lead more easily to voter intimidation by Somoza’s local party apparatus. These points were included in the mediator’s proposal, which was submitted to both sides on December 20. (S)

One week later, on December 27, Somoza responded. There are about eight differences with the Mediators’ proposal. Two are probably acceptable to the FAO; about two are negotiable, but about four are fundamental. (Bowdler’s analysis is at Tab B.)⁵ The most fundamental is who should organize the plebiscite—a national or an international authority? (S)

II. The Current Situation

Upon receiving Somoza’s counterproposal, the Mediators met in Santo Domingo to draft a response and also to draft a report to the O.A.S. As the cable at Tab C⁶ indicates, Obiols and Jimenez are angered by Somoza’s response and signed off on a letter which declares it unacceptable. Bill is officially awaiting our reaction before committing us to the response; he returned Tuesday night⁷ for consultations. (S)

In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have launched a couple of attacks, and these are indications that the business community may shut Managua down next week in protest to Somoza’s impeding the mediation process and in commemoration of the anniversary of the assassination of Chamorro. (S)

III. Options

I realize that your comments on the draft response suggest that you have already selected the first option suggested below, but I thought it would be useful to you to examine all three options which are available to you systematically, taking into account the arguments that have been made for and against each. (S)

(1) Seek a Compromise Between the Mediators’ Proposal and Somoza’s. This would probably mean negotiating a new national mechanism for running the elections with strict controls and a sufficient number of international observers in place during the organization of the plebiscite and during the voting. There are several problems with this option:

—Bowdler and Amb. Solaun believe that the other two mediators and the FAO will never accept it since they believe Somoza’s military and political apparatus throughout the country will make a free election impossible.

—If we try to dilute the Mediators’ proposal by accepting a national as opposed to an international authority to run the plebiscite, we run the risk of losing all credibility with the moderate opposition since this was the kind of mechanism we pledged to support to overcome their skepticism about a free election in Nicaragua.⁸

—Finally, even if the compromise is accepted, negotiating the specifics of a national authority will be extremely difficult and time-consuming, and it is doubtful whether we have that much time.

If we do pursue this option, I think the best strategy is to concentrate on the other differences between his counterproposal and the Mediators’ proposal, leaving the issue of national vs. international authority aside while we test Somoza’s sincerity on the other issues. If he holds up the mediation because of his position on one of the other issues, he will find himself in a much weaker, less legitimate position than if we fight it out on the big issue first. Moreover, the FAO will be encouraged by this prelimary strategy while we try to win their support for a national authority.⁹ (S)

(2) Support the Original Mediators’ Proposal; Reject Somoza’s. This, of course, was our original strategy. We had intended to place our full weight behind the Mediators’ December 20th proposal by sending Bowdler in after the Mediators’ report was sent to him to request that Somoza reconsider, and to inform him that we intend to withdraw our Milgroup, cut our AID mission, etc. if he doesn’t. This is the time of maximum influence on Somoza. It will be difficult to walk back to this point if we follow one of the other options. You have correctly identified a potential problem with this: it is possible that some countries and people will side with Somoza’s interpretation of the “sovereignty issue”, believing that a plebiscite should be run by a national rather than an international authority. (S)

(3) Let the Mediators Report to the O.A.S. that the Mediation Effort has Broken Down. We would accept this outcome and not try to press either Somoza or the FAO any further. This option relies on the vague force of international public opinion to solve the problem. It has the advantage of permitting us to walk away from Nicaragua without losing our credibility with the moderate elements in Nicaragua and in Latin America. (S)

Let me suggest that instead of making a decision, you discuss these options in a small meeting with Bill Bowdler, Cy, Pete Vaky (Assistant Secretary/Latin American Affairs), Bob Pastor and me this afternoon. I think we are at a critical point in the mediation effort where we could lose everything we have worked so hard to achieve. A meeting to discuss these options and issues could help you to think these problems through. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That I be instructed to put together a small meeting on Nicaragua this afternoon.¹⁰

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/1–16/79. Secret. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. Carter initialed the top of the page and wrote: “Zbig.” Pastor wrote “Jan 2, 1979” and “recd. this back—long after meeting,” at the top of the page. Pastor sent the memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 2, 1979, covering memorandum, noting: “After long conversations with Pete Vaky, and after feeling that our policy to Nicaragua is in complete disarray, at this time, I decided to write the memorandum at Tab I.—to place the current decision, which the President has apparently made, in a much broader context and to describe the possible consequences of such a decision at this time. I hope you will give this memorandum to the President and urge him to call a small meeting in the afternoon with Bowdler, Vance, Vaky, you and me to discuss these options and decide on our next steps. We are floundering now, and we cannot afford to let this mediation effort slip through our fingers.” (Ibid.)
2. Presumably a reference to telegram 7319 from Santo Domingo, December 31, (see Document 182), which includes text of the proposed NG reply to the PLN letter of December 26, 1978. No indication of Carter’s comments on the draft response of the NG have been found. On an undated and slightly revised version of a copy of telegram 7319, Pastor wrote “an excessive demand” beside the fifth paragraph, which stipulated “a plebiscite based on a simple question understandable to all the people; and the organization, control and supervision of the entire plebiscite by an International Authority, with the participation of the PLN and the FAO.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78)
3. Carter underlined “felt compelled” and “administered.”
4. Attached but not printed at Tab A was telegram 6687 from Managua, December 20, 1978. See footnote 4, Document 177.
5. An unknown hand crossed out the sentence: “(Bowdler’s analysis is at Tab B.)” Tab B was not attached.
6. Not attached. See Document 181.
7. January 1.
8. Carter underlined the words “we pledged to support” and added a question mark in the right-hand margin next to the point.
9. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “may be best.”
10. Carter indicated his approval and initialed. No other record of such a meeting taking place (on January 2) was found.