18. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Belize
PARTICIPANTS
-
UK
- Edward Rowlands, Minister of State
- Hugh Cortazzi, Deputy Minister
- John Martin, Private Secretary to Rowlands
- Joe Millington, First Secretary, British Embassy
- William Squire, First Secretary, British Embassy
-
United States
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary Habib
- Assistant Secretary Todman
- Robert Pastor, NSC
- Donald C. Johnson, ARA/CEN (notetaker)
SUMMARY
Minister Rowlands reviewed the current state of Belize negotiations, and requested the Secretary’s support for a modified form of mediation. The Secretary agreed to support the modified mediation form, to contact Sol Linowitz regarding his availability to act as mediator, and seek to convince the Mexicans to accept an American mediator. The Secretary instructed Ambassador Todman to raise the mediation issue with the Mexicans during the week of January 16 when he accompanies Vice President Mondale to Mexico. He is also to discuss this with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina when he visits Guatemala during the week of January 23. The Secretary agreed he would see Rowlands and Molina when they meet in Washington on January 26 and instructed that information on sensitive aspects of the negotiations be held to the absolute minimum of persons. End of summary.
At the Secretary’s request, Minister Rowlands gave an analysis of the situation. British officials have had three conversations with Premier Price over the last 12 days, and he shows a great deal of flexibility. Rowlands gave the Secretary a memorandum reporting on these conversations, with the request that it be held very tightly.2
[Page 52]Price was under extreme pressure at home, partly because of press stories which were leaking out on the status of the negotiations. Such leaks were most unhelpful, noted Rowlands, and he pointed to the most recent news story which had appeared January 11. Secretary Vance asked Ambassador Todman about that press report. Ambassador Todman summarized it for him, and the Secretary instructed Ambassador Todman that he wanted information about current discussions to be limited to those present plus one other person.
Rowlands said Latin American countries were flexible and Torrijos of Panama and Perez of Venezuela were willing to be helpful. The Mexicans are “awkward.”
The Caribbeans have been tough in their opposition. Rowlands plans to visit the area during the week of January 16 to discuss Belize with Manley and the Barbadians. He hopes to neutralize their opposition to settlement by having them agree to mediation. He has also asked Price to come to Kingston for discussions.
Rowlands pointed out that there were three “fuzzy” areas at the present time. They are:
a. Mediation—Rowlands made clear that there was no way he could get Price to agree to a mediation in which the results were pre-determined, and repeated this point at several other occasions throughout the conversation. Price can be convinced to agree to a mediation formula in which the result is not pre-determined, and Rowlands indicated he could “guarantee” that Price would accept such a formula at his meeting with Rowlands in Kingston.
b. Financial Issue—Rowlands made clear that any development project which would be funded by the British as part of the settlement would have to benefit both Guatemala and Belize, and not be simply for Guatemala. It would be impossible to sell Parliament on a cession accompanied by payment to Guatemala. Rowlands suggested that the financial issue was one which could be put to mediation or which could be taken out of the present negotiations entirely and dealt with separately.
c. Draft Treaty Provisions—Rowlands stated that it was unclear whether the draft treaty which had been under discussion was required by the Guatemalans to supplement the outcome on territorial cession. Price has problems with a number of the draft treaty’s provisions, particularly those dealing with defense and security, on the grounds that these provisions would further infringe on Belize’s sovereignty. Rowlands warned that many of the draft treaty provisions might have to be shed.
Rowlands concluded his summation of the situation by saying that, given time constraints, in view of the Guatemalan elections, if there [Page 53] was no agreement on mediation by the end of January, the whole process could fall apart.
Secretary Vance asked whether a single mediator or several mediators were contemplated. Rowlands replied that only one person was required. Under Secretary Habib said Rowlands had previously mentioned Sol Linowitz to him. The Secretary asked whether Mr. Linowitz would be acceptable. Rowlands replied he thought Price would support Linowitz and that he did not see any problem from the Guatemalan side. The only objection might be Mexico’s.
The Secretary replied that if Rowlands wanted him to contact Linowitz and speak to the Mexicans about accepting an American mediator, he would do so. Rowlands accepted readily.
The Secretary then asked about the financial issue. Rowlands replied that Foreign Minister Molina of Guatemala might have some problem accepting a development project for both Guatemala and Belize.
Under Secretary Habib asked whether the cays would still go to Guatemala. Rowlands replied that from the British point of view the issue of territory would not be reopened, but repeated that Price views defense provisions of the draft treaty as infringement of Belizean sovereignty. Price would be unable to agree to a cession of territory in addition to the treaty provisions.
Rowlands then returned to the issue of mediation, stating it was his objective to get a mediation agreement before the end of January. The Secretary indicated his agreement with this objective. Rowlands repeated his promise to get Price’s concurrence on the modified concept of mediation.
Rowlands informed the Secretary that he and Molina would be meeting again in Washington on January 26. Ambassador Todman indicated that he would be seeing Molina on January 23 in Guatemala City, and the Secretary asked Ambassador Todman to raise the mediation issue with Molina at that time.3 In addition, the Secretary indicated he would be willing to meet with Molina again during Molina’s stay in Washington. Rowlands replied that he would “try to neutralize the Caribbeans,” during the intervening two weeks.
The Secretary reviewed for Rowlands his impressions of the December meeting in Washington with Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica.4 Manley and Jamaican Foreign Minister Patterson had come on very hard against territorial cession. After lunch, however, they [Page 54] appeared to have modified their position so as not to rule out the possibility of some variation.
In closing this portion of the discussion, Rowlands returned to discuss the political position of Premier Price, saying that he had to “take the pressure off Price.” Price cannot appear to be jumping to accept a solution until he can demonstrate clearly that the consequence will be a secure independence for Belize. Price could not be appearing to let down his supporters in the Caribbean.
The Secretary noted his agreement, and said we would go ahead with those aspects that relate to us, and would see him again on the 26th.5 Rowlands replied that the British were not losing their nerve, and that there was no reason to give up on prospects for a solution.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Nodis 1978 Memorandum of Conversation for Secretary Vance. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Johnson on January 12; cleared in P; approved by Anderson (S/S) on January 26. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 21.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 184.↩
- Vance’s next meeting with Rowlands occurred on February 1; see Document 24.↩