Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

151. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, November 26, 1978, 0340Z

6111. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler—Caracas for Ambassador only. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 174: Next Steps On Plebiscite.

1. NG met this afternoon to take stock and decide how to proceed in the face of the negative responses received yesterday from Somoza² and the FAO³ to our plebiscite proposal.

2. In our analysis of the situation we identified these elements:

—Both sides are equally intransigent but each left the door open for further talks.

—The government fears going to a plebiscite of the type recommended by the NG because it believes it will lose (this was reconfirmed to Obiols this morning by sub Secretary Bodan who came to see him at Somoza’s instigation to say that the NG proposal was unacceptable and to ask that he (Obiols) push the NG, and especially me, to accept Somoza’s version of the plebiscite in the face of FAO instransigence.)

—The FAO is divided and has placed unity above cooperation with the NG on the plebiscite. The split is 9 to 3 with the minority under Alfonso Robelo calling the shots;

—Unfortunately, with the sole exception of Marxist labor leader Domingo Sanchez who has been disciplined by the CGT–I for his advocacy of the plebiscite, not a single leader of stature or organization has come out publicly in support of the NG proposal, and La Prensa has been negative;

—The local and foreign press (the latter despite my pointing out the openings which remain) have cast the responses of the government and FAO toward the NG proposal as a total rejection;

—The mediating effort, notwithstanding the limited gains in terms of restrictions removed and violence curbed, is increasingly regarded by the public here as a failure because their excessive expectations (departure of Somoza, end to stage of siege, amnesty, etc.) have not been met and because the moderate groups and the media have not had the conviction or courage to endorse the plebiscite and explain to the public why this vote would be different from any other held over the past 44 years.

3. In the face of this situation, and after making another effort with La Prensa this afternoon, my colleagues and I believe we should give Somoza and the FAO one more chance to reconsider their attitudes toward the plebiscite before giving it up as a lost cause. My colleagues, keenly attuned to criticism here and at home, want to meet with the two sides (FAO if they are willing to renew regular sessions) to answer their objections and urge reconsideration. In order to safeguard the NG’s public image they also want to issue a statement immediately following the two meetings:

—Explaining that the NG proposal contemplates nothing illegal or unconstitutional;

—Reiterating that the central issue remains the continued presence of Somoza in the country;

—Emphasizing that the solution must be a Nicaraguan solution and that the plebiscite offers the best way to accomplish this;

—Making clear that a grave responsibility falls on the GON, the FAO and all groups actively involved in the search for a solution if they do not take advantage of the mediation effort to avoid further deterioration of the situation;

—Indicating that the NG will wait another 48 hours for reconsideration of positions at the end of which, if forthcoming replies are not received, the NG would suspend its efforts and leave the country until our presence is again considered necessary.

4. I have gone along with this approach except for the last tick. On this, I have told them I would need instructions from Washington. Both Jimenez and Obiols understand my position but they are also firm in pressing this course if the NG is stymied on the plebiscite initiative. They argue, with logic, that the basic issue from the beginning has been the departure of Somoza, either permanently as part of a settlement or temporarily during the plebiscite. If one of these cannot be achieved there is no solution in sight and our presence in the country will become a wasting asset.

5. I believe we have come to the point where we need to deliver the strong message to Somoza contemplated in option two. The best time will be between Monday⁴ when we answer the document he gave us yesterday and the 48-hour deadline for a positive response.

6. Tomorrow morning (November 26) the NG convenes at 9:00 am to draft the statement referred to in paragraph 3. I will get it off to you as soon as completed. I will also send suggested talking points for the strong demarche to Somoza. We will be preparing talking points for Bill Luers to use with CAP in the hope we can enlist his influence with the FAO and La Prensa in this last effort on the plebiscite.

Solaun

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/23–30/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. In telegram 6107 from Managua, November 25, the Embassy reported that the Negotiating Group had met with Somoza on November 24 and that Somoza had given an “essentially negative reply” to the plebiscite proposal which he described as unconstitutional. The Embassy noted that Somoza stated that he “could not accept personalization of the plebiscite question” and that “trying to change the government” could “usher in a period of instability” or “lead to a military coup.” Somoza also gave the Negotiating Group a written response from the Liberal Party that rejected the plebiscite proposal describing it as “unconstitutional” and as involving a “coup d’etat.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 11/23–30/78)
3. In telegram 6104 from Managua, November 25, Bowdler reported to Christopher and Vaky that the FAO had issued a “non-committal reply” to the plebiscite proposal which amounted “to a tacit ‛no.’” Bowdler commented that the “two Robelos” had swayed the rest of the FAO against accepting the plebiscite proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2376) Telegram 6102 from Managua, November 25, included an English-language translation of the written FAO response to the plebiscite proposal. The FAO stated that “any national democratic process” was “impossible” with Somoza and his “relatives with military positions” still present in the country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780485–0602)
4. November 27