Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

138. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 11, 1978

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua: Next Steps

Our Nicaraguan mediation effort is at a critical point. Our mediator, Ambassador Bowdler, is returning tomorrow for consultation, and we will be exploring with him his evaluation of the situation and what our next steps might be. I want to postpone my recommendation to you until after his return and after the PRC meeting set for Monday.² In the meantime, this memorandum is intended to give you a summary of where we are and what our various options appear to be. It describes the nature of the core issue in Nicaragua, where we are in the mediation, and the courses that now seem open to us.

I. THE CORE ISSUE—THE ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND:

What we face in Nicaragua is a most difficult and explosive political succession problem, one that threatens not only widespread violence in the country but the drawing in of other nations on one side or the other.

A generation ago the Caribbean basin area was largely ruled by despotic leaders relying on cruel measures to control their countries. The gradual succession from these leaders to non-family replacements and toward more open governments has resulted in a long series of crises which have regularly drawn the U.S. into the Caribbean and the Caribbean into U.S. domestic politics. In general, the outcomes have been positive—Venezuela and Colombia have become democratic; you contributed to another major step toward democracy in the Dominican Republic in May; gradual liberalization seems to be underway in Haiti, although an explosion is yet possible; only in Cuba has there been a foreign policy disaster.

In Central America the situation is tense, and Nicaragua is an explosive mixture. The 40-year old regime of the Somozas suffers from “regime fatigue.” Economic corruption has become more intense and visible since the 1972 earthquake. The rapid economic growth has led to the development of a generation of technicians, professionals and students who find one-man corrupt rule reprehensible. Our human rights policy has held out hope of change, and the disaffection and opposition has been growing and becoming more vocal.

Somoza has tried to appease both the U.S. and part of his opposition. He has made a series of small concessions, but he retains absolute control of power, and has created an organization in the National Guard and the Liberal Party loyal only to himself and his family.

Because Somoza has so personified public affairs in Nicaragua and so controls all power, the opposition of all stripes unites on one—and only one—point. The Somozas must go. Although guerrilla groups—the Sandinistas—are still relatively small, there is wide tacit support for them as the “anti-Somoza” force. The extent of current anti-Somoza feeling is shown by the declarations against his rule from virtually every organization outside his direct control, from the Church, the Chamber of Commerce to the Communist lining political groups. With the upsurge in feeling following the death of a respected opposition leader, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, this opposition has accelerated; with the violence of September, the bitterness and resentments have multiplied. The moderate opposition groups have tried general strikes and other pressures without success. They have put their faith in the mediation efforts. If those fail the responsible middle will be either discredited or radicalized.

Overhanging this issue is violence and external stimulation of it. The Sandinistas and some other elements favor armed struggle as the way to get rid of Somoza. The Sandinista guerrillas (broken into three factions) are Marxist oriented. They have had Cuban support in training and logistical help but probably no significant supply of arms. The largest and least ideological faction, however, has also been supported by Panama and Venezuela with money and arms. Receiving such international support, and staging out of Costa Rica (which the Costa Rican Government does not condone but cannot control) a Sandinista attack would have international dimensions and raise questions of “external invasion.”

In short, the mixture is highly explosive, passions are high, patience is running out, polarization is increasing. Fear, uncertainty and despair are growing and the pall of violence hangs over it all. Time is running out for a peaceful resolution of this internal crisis.

II. THE CURRENT SITUATION—THE MEDIATION:

Faced with this core problem, the bloody violence of September and the OAS call for nations to offer good offices,³ we helped organize the three-nation mediation effort to try and negotiate a reconciliation and recreate a national consensus. The mediators succeeded in energizing a broad coalition of opposition forces (FAO)—business, agricultural, labor, church, political parties—predominantly moderate and center. This group drew up a plan for a political transition to eventual democratic goverment providing for constitutional procedures and the preservation of the National Guard. A fundamental element of the plan is that Somoza relinquish power. In addition, the FAO has insisted on Somoza’s stepping down from power, or agreeing to step down from power, as a sina qua non to any further negotiation.

The mediators—and Ambassador Bowdler separately and privately—have told Somoza that he must face this basic issue of his tenure squarely, and that the future of the mediation process depends upon it. They have told him that they see no agreement with the opposition possible which does not depend upon that element of the FAO proposal.

On November 10, Somoza publicly rejected this demand. He countered with an offer to undertake various reforms, and suggested a plebiscite or referendum to test the strength of the various political groups and to share political power accordingly. The opposition has indicated it will not accept that offer. Frustration is now threatening the opposition coalition’s unity.

We are thus for the moment at an impasse. If this continues, the opposition coalition will abandon the mediation and probably disintegrate in the process. Large parts of it will support an early resort to violence by leftists guerrillas. International support of violence to overthrow Somoza on the part of Venezuela and Panama, and perhaps Cuba, and a possible counter-involvement by Guatemala and El Salvador, are likely.

When Ambassador Bowdler spoke privately to Somoza on November 10, he believed him wavering on the question of whether he should resign, although Somoza stated he had to remain to finish out his term. Bowdler’s interpretation is that he is less than resolute on this question, and that perhaps pressure may yet lead him to a different conclusion. Bowdler’s cabled account of his conversation is at Tab 1.⁴

We have also kept Latin American countries informed closely of our efforts and where we are. We have consulted in particular with Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Jamaica, Panama and Barbados. All have indicated they support what we are doing; and most said they would understand if we stepped up pressure to secure a resolution. I attach at Tab 2 some of these replies to give you the flavor of them.⁵

Faced with these realities, our alternatives are as follows:

1. Accept Somoza’s statement that he will not step down from power before 1981.

This would effectively mean the end of any possibility of negotiating a political succession arrangement with the opposition. This would in turn mean continued tensions, polarization and recurring violence. In these circumstances we would have to decide what our relationship to the situation should be. We could return to business as usual, continuing our ties and support to the Somoza regime, as a bulwark against the Marxist guerrillas. This does not seem a viable course, however, given our human rights policy, and our efforts in Nicaragua to date. Such a policy would appear to identify us with dictatorship and repression and put our human rights policy and our credibility in doubt for large parts of Nicaragua and Latin America.

We could on the other hand distance or disassociate ourselves from his regime. This would require the withdrawal of all our military and economic ties, including the withdrawal of our military missions and the cutting of the AID pipeline. Disassociation would not be credible if our missions remain and pipeline disbursements are continued. The difficulty with disassociation is that we in effect walk away from an explosive situation; and lose any leverage to influence events. Such an act might in fact stimulate violence and encourage extremism by appearing to isolate Somoza and weaken him.

2. Explore with the opposition Somoza’s offer (to the opposition, not to us) of a plebiscite/referendum to see if some acceptable arrangement could be worked out.

What Somoza proposed was not properly a plebiscite, but a registration of party voters to see who has the most strength. We can easily discuss with both sides the possibility of crafting some other plebiscite arrangement that might be effective, but there appears to be little chance of our succeeding. Our mediator, Ambassador Bowdler, does not believe that this can practicably be done, given the opposition’s great distrust and fear of Somoza, and its organizational and media disadvantage compared to the Somoza machine. There is a history of Somoza using “international observers” as cosmetics, so that the opposition distrusts totally any argument that international super vision would work as long as a Somoza Government presides. I attach at Tab 3 Ambassador Bowdler’s cabled assessment of Somoza’s plebiscite offer which is worth noting, especially his analogy to SWAPO and Namibia.⁶

3. Exert pressure on Somoza to change his mind and negotiate his departure under controlled circumstances, and the formation of a transitional and provisional government.

To be effective in forestalling violence and the disintegration of the opposition coalition, this would have to be done quickly and firmly. Given Somoza’s present state of mind, it is possible that an indication of firmness on our part would cause him to seek a plausible way out. An illustrative list of actions we might take for this purpose is attached at Tab 4.⁷

The argument for this course of action rests on the premise that only Somoza’s departure provides any chance for a negotiated peaceful solution to the political crisis, and that a negotiated settlement would provide a good chance to create a post-Somoza structure which could resist extremist take over. On the other hand, if he does not leave, the likelihood of violence will greatly increase and our capacity to influence events to avoid extremism will diminish. If a negotiated agreement is not reached based on his departure, we may soon be faced with the unpalatable choice between a repressive Somoza and Marxist-led revolt.

On the other hand exerting pressure to get Somoza to negotiate his departure is a politically difficult and controversial course, and would be opposed by many in the Congress. There is no guarantee that even exerted pressure would be successful in getting him to change his mind. And if he did depart, there is no guarantee that the negotiated structure designed to replace him would be viable or keep leftists from taking power. We might thus be accused of destabilizing a situation, removing an anti-Communist dike and creating a vacuum. Moreover, many of the individual measures we would probably have to use to demonstrate our seriousness are controversial in themselves in that they create undesirable precedents and politicize arrangements.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 11–12/78. Secret. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2. November 13; see Document 139.
3. See footnote 5, Document 100.
4. Tab 1 is attached but not printed; see Document 137.
5. Tab 2, attached but not printed, contains telegram 18706 from Mexico City, November 10, in which the Embassy reported that Roel said “that Mexico fully agrees that Somoza must go in order to achieve a peaceful solution to Nicaraguan situation.”
6. Tab 3, attached but not printed, is an excerpt from telegram 5778 from Managua, November 11, in which Bowdler wrote to Vaky that “we should approach the question of a ‛plebiscite’ with extreme caution.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2431)
7. Tab 4, attached but not printed, is an undated list entitled “Measures to Exert Pressure on Somoza.”