125. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- PRC Meeting on Nicaragua, Wednesday, October 31, 1978, 3:30 p.m.
There are four critical questions for the PRC to address today:
1. Is this the right time to deliver the message to Somoza that he had better accept the program proposed by the opposition or else the U.S. will withdraw its support?
[Page 333]2. What is the best way to deliver the message? By ourselves, with the other two members of the mediation, or some other way?
3. What should the message contain? (Suggested talking points are at Tab C.)2
4. What complementary actions do we need to take both within the U.S. Government (consultations with the Hill, economic and military aid decisions, EXIM Bank, OPIC, etc.) and with other governments (speaking to the Israelis and Argentines about arms sales, IMF, OAS)?
1. Timing
Bowdler and the State Department believe that the message has to be delivered by Thursday.3 (State’s arguments are at Tabs A and B.)4 I am sure that Vaky and Christopher will make the arguments on behalf of a Thursday demarche, but, in short, they fear that unless we move now, there will be further polarization, and that the mediation effort may collapse.
I think the timing is wrong for several reasons:
—First, it will look wrong for us to demand that Somoza completely accept the opposition’s program without giving him adequate time to respond. In fact, the opposition’s program has certain weaknesses in it—it is especially and dangerously vague on the issue of what to do with the National Guard—and Somoza no doubt will have some observations to make on it; I do not believe that all of his comments are likely to be wrong.
—Secondly, before delivering this message to Somoza, we should be absolutely clear that the rest of the mediation team (Dominican Republic and Guatemala) are firmly behind what we are doing; letters from Presidents of those two countries should be obtained.
—Thirdly, we should line up more international support for what we will do, and we should be in a position to tell Somoza that a number of countries stand behind our message.
—Fourth, to be sure we have this support, we need the proper international climate and I am not sure that we have it at the moment. I expect we will have that climate when the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is published, as we expect it will be in about 10 days.5
—Fifth, if the Sandinistas attack after we deliver this demarche to Somoza, Somoza and his allies in the United States will no doubt [Page 334] try to make it seem that our withdrawal of support from Somoza precipitated the Sandinista attack. The President will be criticized for destabilizing Somoza at a critical period, and also for making it easier for the communists to come to power in Nicaragua.
—Sixth, and by far the most important, next Tuesday6 will be the Congressional elections in the U.S. Anyone who reads the newspapers is aware that there is a strong conservative current that is flowing through the elections. We have been lucky that the President has not been attacked with any credibility on any foreign policy issue. If we move on Thursday, Somoza will unquestionably convey our message to the right in the U.S., and we cannot exclude the possibility that the Nicaragua issue will be injected into the campaign in a way which will hurt the President. For that reason, I recommend that you consider elevating the PRC meeting to the NSC level and give the President the opportunity to hear the give-and-take from his Cabinet on this issue.
It is not clear to me that we need to move this Thursday. It seems to me more worthwhile for us to try to hold off for about 10 days until the Commission’s report is released. In the meantime, we should instruct Bowdler to take some type of middle position with Somoza, telling Somoza not to put his legs in concrete, nor to reject the opposition plan as out of hand. We should recommend that Somoza address the substance of the plan in a constructive way, and should indicate to him that we support the general parameters of this plan.
2. The Modalities of Delivering the Message
I think it is extremely important that the message of international support for the opposition program be conveyed by all three mediators. At the same time, however, I think it is important for the U.S. mediator to stay behind after the meeting with Somoza and indicate clearly the extent and depth of U.S. support for the effort.
3. The Message (Tab C)
I think the talking points at Tab C are quite good. I have made a few changes, which you will see, on three points:
—(f) Instead of saying that it is not possible or desirable for Somoza to remain, I have said that it is possible, but undesirable for all the reasons which I indicate.
—(g) We should also tell Somoza that he can come to the U.S. if he wants.
—(new h) I have added an additional point on the necessity of obtaining Somoza’s help for a restructuring of the National Guard. I [Page 335] think that this is an absolutely critical issue, which we have not focused on sufficiently.
With these changes, I recommend that you approve the talking points.
4. Complementary Actions
a. In the U.S. Prior to telling Somoza, we need to consult with Congressional leaders, and get all the appropriate agencies to fully understand and support our position. If Somoza says no to our efforts, we should be prepared to cut off almost everything, including OPIC, EXIM Bank, economic and military aid. We should also contact private bankers. If Somoza accepts the plan, we should be prepared to turn on the spigots.
b. Internationally. Similarly, we need to get the mediation effort firmly behind us, to get the Israelis, Argentines, and others to stop all arms sales, and line up support in the OAS.