Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 2, 1979, 1154Z

8271. Subj: (S) Party Document Suggests Real Strains in Soviet-Amin Relationship May Have Flowed From September 14 Shootout.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Summary: The leadership of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) has been circulating an “official” version of the events of September 14 for use in briefing party cadre. We have no doubt concerning the document’s authenticity, and its contents, therefore, should be regarded as current strongman Hafizullah Amin’s view of the “truth” surrounding September 14. The document’s clear condemnation of the Soviet role—in the person of now departed Ambassador Puzanov—in the affair tends to confirm widespread rumors here that there may be strains in the Soviet-Amin relationship resulting from the September 14 shootout. Moreover, the fact that Amin is virtually openly circulating the document among his party cadre suggests he wants to get a message to his Soviet mentors that he is wary of their past (and presumably future) intentions toward him.

3. On the domestic scene, various themes within the document echo theses which the current leadership has repeated often since September 14, most notably that it was the late President Taraki and his henchmen, and not Hafizullah Amin, who were primarily responsible for the repressive policies of this revolutionary government. Few Afghans appear to swallow this particular line, however, and Amin remains the generally perceived villain and despot. In fact, the picture of the Khalqi leadership which emerges from this party document resembles a group of thugs who could shame the Mafia, rather than an enlightened leadership attempting to establish “security, legality, and justice” in Afghanistan. End of summary.

4. The extraordinary and lengthy document (almost thirty pages in translation) essentially recounts the background leading up to the September 14, 1979, shootout between supporters of current President Hafizullah Amin and the late Noor Mohammad Taraki, as well as some details surrounding that event itself. Beyond this, however, the document’s direct charges that now departed Soviet Ambassador Alexander Puzanov (and his senior advisors) was instrumental in luring Amin into a potentially fatal trap, that the Soviet envoy was at the scene of the gunfight, and that the men allegedly plotting Amin’s death found a safe haven in the Soviet Embassy at one point during the drama, underscore why any existing tensions in the Amin-Moscow relationship may need some time to be dissipated.

5. Highlights of the document’s remarkable tale are:

—Taraki and his group of “henchmen” (former Defense Minister Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, former Interior Minister Sher Jan Mazdooryar, former Communications Minister Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoi, and former secret police chief Assadullah Sarwari; all military men now either dead, incarcerated, or at large) had hatched a plot to kill Amin. Ostensible reasons behind the plot were that Amin, from the beginning of the revolution, had resisted their plan to build a “massive cult of personality” around Taraki, and because the late Afghan President had become upset at Amin’s “growing popularity” among the people;

—Amin’s “repeated warnings” to Taraki about the anti-revolutionary machinations of the “Watanjar gang” went unheeded because Taraki wanted Amin eliminated permanently;

—Amin loyalists among the PDPA cadre learned of the plot to kill him, and Amin began arguing within the party that Taraki’s plots, spying, and repression were having adverse effects on the progress of the revolution;

—Amin was supposed to be killed at Kabul’s airport upon Taraki’s return from the nonaligned summit in Havana in early September, but an Amin informer, Aziz Ahmad Akbari (recently appointed Ambassador to Iraq) was a member of the Taraki entourage, and Amin, notified of the danger, was able to avoid the supposed assassins;

—a Taraki-Amin confrontation on September 12 led to heated exchanges, with Amin calling for a Central Committee plenum to mediate matters, and Taraki claiming that Amin had made a mess of the revolution;

—by September 13, Amin was afraid to go to Taraki’s office, since he believed the Watanjar gang and Taraki would kill him. On the evening of September 13, Amin received word that the Watanjar “gang of four” had been sent by Taraki to seek refuge in the Soviet Embassy, and Amin, with his heavily armed bodyguards, went to Taraki’s office where further accusations and threats were exchanged;

—Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and “three high-ranking advisors” arrived at the September 13 evening shouting match bringing an “oral message” from President Brezhnev stressing that “unity among Afghan leaders was in the interest of the revolution”;

—after Puzanov and his entourage left the meeting, Watanjar ordered the army to move against Amin in order to protect Taraki, but unit commanders refused to obey such orders;

—on the morning of September 14, Taraki and Amin engaged in another shouting match, this one by phone, over who controlled the military, Taraki as Commander-in-Chief, or Amin as Minister of Defense. Taraki ordered Amin to come to the President’s office, but Amin’s closest advisors (the “martyred” Seyed Daoud Taroon, then police commandant, and Lt. Col. Yaqoub, now Chief of the General Staff) warned Amin it was not safe for him to go to Taraki’s office;

—on the fateful afternoon of September 14, Puzanov and his three advisors arrived in Taraki’s office and Taraki told Amin by phone that our “Soviet comrades” wanted Amin to come to the Palace for talks. Taroon advised Amin that the presence of the Soviets in Taraki’s office precluded Taraki and his men from opening fire on Amin;

—shortly thereafter, Amin, accompanied by his own guards, arrived at the Palace, was met by Taroon, and they proceeded up a staircase toward Taraki’s office. Taraki’s guards immediately opened fire killing Taroon, who was in front of Amin, instantly, while Amin rolled out of the line of fire leading Taraki’s men to think he had been hit. Amin and some of his guards successfully made their escape;

—on September 15th, Amin convened meetings of the party’s Politburo and the Cabinet, and on the 16th meetings of the party Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council. These meetings took the “necessary decisions” expelling Taraki from the party for hatching the plot to kill Amin and for other “unprincipled acts.” Watanjar, et al., were also expelled and Amin was elected to Taraki’s posts;

—the above decisions ended the era of “one-man rule and personality cult,” and opened a new chapter in the development of the party and the revolution.

6. Comment: Aside from giving some fascinating insights into the bloody ways “democracy” operates in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, this party document possesses other nuggets of potential political value. The fact that it is being circulated among party leaders with instructions to brief their cadre about its contents, indicates clearly that this version is the officially-sanctioned Amin version of what happened on September 14, and why. In this regard, the allegations that Puzanov and his senior advisors indirectly summoned Amin to Taraki’s lair in order to be gunned down, that the Soviets were unable or unwilling to prevent Taraki’s men from opening fire, and that the Soviet Embassy sheltered the men who were leading the plot aimed at Amin, tend to substantiate widespread post-September 14 rumors here that definite strains exist in Amin’s relations with the USSR, and that these strains will not be easily dispelled. Amin’s willingness to circulate a document containing charges along these lines strongly suggests that he wants Moscow to get the message that he is wary of their past (and presumably future) intentions toward him. Whether those strains led directly to Puzanov’s transfer is not yet known, but that possibility should not be discarded. Whatever the case, Puzanov’s newly-arrived successor, for several reasons, will have his hands full.

7. On the domestic front, the general themes of the story track with Amin’s overall theses he has espoused since his accession to power. For example, Taraki’s cult of personality and abuses of office had brought the revolution to the brink of collapse, Taraki’s excessive repression was in direct contrast to Amin’s alleged desire to adopt a legal constitution in order to guarantee “security, legality, and justice,” and the end of one-man rule paved the way for a “golden revolutionary future” in Afghanistan. Although Amin and his closest cohorts have played these themes repeatedly since September 14, few Afghans apparently discern much substantive difference between the goals and tactics of Taraki and Amin, and the latter, despite his loudest protestations, is still viewed by most as a cruel despot who has been the principal architect of this repressive regime. In fact, the picture of the Khalqi leadership that emerges from this particular party document resembles a group of political thugs using tactics that would shame Chicago of the 1920s in their high-stakes struggle for political survival.

8. For complete text of party document, see [1 line not declassified]. This document parallels in many ways the version of the September 14 affair which Foreign Minister Shah Wali reportedly gave to Eastern European Chiefs of Mission, and which this Embassy reported some six weeks or so ago. Having eliminated most of our files, we cannot give a reference number.

Amstutz

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790556–1065. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Sent for information to Ankara, Beijing, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, and CINCPAC.