Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

70. Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs (Shulman) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, October 3, 1979

SUBJECT

• Afghanistan: Intelligence and Policy

Our confrontation with the Soviets over Cuba arose because of the premature release of intelligence into a highly charged, domestic political atmosphere. While Afghanistan is not Cuba, both countries receive substantial Soviet military assistance. In Afghanistan, even more than in Cuba, Soviet policy is dictated by security concerns and, therefore, is less susceptible to arguments that it should be altered for the good of US-Soviet relations. Of immediate importance, however, is the fact that in both cases the findings of the Intelligence Community can have a serious effect upon our relations with the Soviets.

The events of the last two weeks provide a graphic illustration. On September 16–17, Amin’s takeover in Kabul coincided with intelligence reports that a Soviet airborne division designated for service in Afghanistan was in heightened readiness.² The intelligence implied a threat of Soviet intervention and created a perceived need for a US response. In rapid order, we launched a campaign of high level press backgrounders, spokesman’s statements and diplomatic demarches which noted “increased Soviet military activity north of the Oxus” and repeated US opposition to Soviet intervention.³ Although the Intelligence Community admitted it had no direct evidence linking the unit’s activity with the Afghan power struggle, we acted because we could not take a chance that the Soviets might move.

Since the airborne unit was not deployed and now has apparently stood down, it might be argued that our action may have done some good and, at least, did no harm. However, this conclusion would ignore the impact on US-Soviet relations and on US credibility in general.

If the Soviets were not planning to use those forces in Afghanistan, they probably view our actions as yet another propaganda campaign and not as a serious initiative. Further, having raised the possibility of Soviet action with our friends, we have risked being accused of “crying wolf” or, worse, of being clearly aware of “the Soviet threat” without doing anything about it. With both our friends and the Soviets, we cannot raise the spectre of Soviet intervention too often without having our statements discounted.

In our consideration of the Afghan problem, we have had a sliding definition of “Soviet intervention.”

—In the beginning, we simply talked about “Soviet military intervention”; however, with a $275 million military assistance program in process and 3,000 or more advisors in the country, this has already occurred.

—Subsequently, we talked about “the introduction of Soviet combat units”; however, with the introduction in June 1979 of a security force of 400 Soviet troops at Bagram airbase, this has already occurred.

—Lately, we have talked about “large scale Soviet intervention”; however, with an earlier report of 3,600 Soviet military personnel in Kabul and a more recent report of 500–1,000 Soviet advisors arriving at two Afghan armored divisions nearby, this may also have occurred or be in progress.

Unless we are treated to a spectacular show of Soviet airborne units being airlifted en masse into Afghanistan, we may not know that large scale transfers of personnel have occurred. The Intelligence Community readily admits that it cannot monitor incremental increases and might not know of the existence of a large Soviet force until it was already in place. Should this occur, the parallel with the situation in Cuba would become obvious.

In response to a belated US discovery of a large concentration of Soviet forces, the Soviets would say that their personnel were simply advisors, not different in “kind or purpose” from those we had previously noted. It would then again be our word against theirs that the situation had changed.

An inter-agency working group has recently decided that “prevention of large scale Soviet intervention” is our primary goal in Afghanistan.⁴ Since we have no definition of “large scale” and have difficulties in monitoring Soviet activity, we may not know with any precision when and if this occurs. It would, therefore, be in our interest to begin thinking about how we will handle this situation in terms of US-Soviet relations, SALT, and the Congress in advance. Otherwise, an intelligence “breakthrough,” plus a press leak, or a Congressman’s statement about “Soviet brigades in Afghanistan” could put us right back in another US-Soviet confrontation.

At a minimum, we should try to ensure that any public announcement of such an intelligence finding be placed in the proper context. This would suggest an official spokesman’s statement that while we deplore Soviet intervention we see it as a sign of the failure of Soviet policy and not as a success.

Moreover, I recommend that you discuss with Stan Turner how to ensure that intelligence reports on Soviet military actions are not allowed to reach persons who might make them public in a sensational manner. In particular, we should consider ending our present practice of treating this subject in the NID and other publications which receive wide distribution. Instead we should work with CIA to develop a means of providing this information only to a carefully selected list of officials under stringent controls over further dissemination. We should also consider similar restrictions on cables from Embassy Kabul which deal with Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, Oct 1 thru 16. Secret; Nodis.
2. See Document 67.
3. See, for example, Harold Saunders’s September 29 statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the situation in Afghanistan in the Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, pp. 53–54. See also the Department of State Bulletin, December 1979, p. 43, which reprinted a Department statement to the news media, October 29, that “we are opposed to intervention by any country in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.” The reference to a diplomatic démarche is likely to instructions in telegram 250400 to multiple posts, September 23, to inform host governments of “disturbing signs of increased Soviet military activity north of the USSR-Afghanistan border.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790435–0449)
4. Not further identified.