Office of the Historian

61. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, September 8, 1979

SUBJECT

  • The establishment of an Afghan Liberation Front

The more over-extended the Soviets feel, the better off we will be and the less likely that they will undertake reckless future action. Afghanistan has all the earmarks of a situation in which the Soviets could become embroiled endlessly. The only thing that is missing is a sense of unity on the part of the opposition.

I therefore believe that we would derive great benefits if the various Afghan exiles, together with representatives of the tribal groups doing the actual fighting, could get together and proclaim an Afghan Liberation Front (ALF) analogous to the NLF, which was such an effective device for the Vietnamese. Like the NLF, the Front could be across a wide spectrum that would include women’s groups, Royalists—even avowed Communists. The stated aim of the ALF would be to rally world opinion behind the Afghan freedom fighters’ heroic struggle [Page 177] against the forceful imposition of an atheistic Soviet regime in their homeland.

Like the NLF, the Front should establish links to other similar groups and set up offices throughout the world. It should, if handled correctly, receive support from all the Muslims, from Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to Algeria, Libya and Iraq. Not least of all, it would offer many people in the United States and in Western Europe the opportunity to demonstrate their consistency in having opposed us in Viet Nam and in opposing a Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan as well.

Because of longstanding rivalry, it will be very difficult to get some of these groups to cooperate with each other. But with a little effort and a lot of money, it might be possible to bring this about. The one thing that should be avoided in an operation of this kind, of course, is the appearance that this is a US undertaking. I would therefore suggest that we approach the Chinese with this idea and determine whether they would be willing to carry the ball and work together with the Pakistanis and perhaps the Iranians to set up such an organization.

RECOMMENDATION

That I work with David in investigating what it would take in the way of US resources to help in the establishment of an ALF.2

Thornton concurs, but is not optimistic that Joan Baez and Jane Fonda can be persuaded to support the organization.3

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Top Secret; Sensitive; Outside the System. Sent for action. Attached but not printed is a September 11 covering note from Brement to Henze and Gregg asking “to get together with you on this ASAP.” Below Brement’s request, Gregg wrote a note to Henze reporting he had met with two CIA officials, September 12, who told him that a liberation front existed outside Afghanistan but was fragmented and not in contact with rebels in Afghanistan.↩
  2. Brzezinski placed a checkmark approving the recommendation and wrote: “Speak also to DG, PH” in the right margin; a reference to Donald Gregg and Paul Henze.↩
  3. An unknown hand, possibly Brement’s, wrote: “at least not together” underneath this sentence.↩