332. Current Analysis Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN AFGHANISTAN: LARGER IMPLICATIONS
Despite indications that the wisdom of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan may still be under debate in Moscow, there are no signs that Soviet resolve is weakening or that major changes are being considered. The size of the Soviet armed forces and of their weapons stockpile has allowed the USSR to field an 85,000-man force in Afghanistan without disrupting military deployments elsewhere or interrupting military aid programs. All evidence points to a long-term Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, with continued military improvements and some force increases opposite China, NATO, and Iran.
USSR: New Military Priorities
Soviet defense planning has been complicated over the past two years by the addition of new priorities to the traditional concerns with NATO and China.
—The Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979 led to significant improvements along the Sino-Soviet border and contingency planning for a second Chinese attack.
—The occupation of Afghanistan has required continuous supply, construction of permanent facilities, and troop turnover.
—Developments in Iran and the Persian Gulf have led to new force priorities in the southern USSR, heretofore a relatively neglected area.
—The Polish situation has imposed a new requirement on the Soviet General Staff to be ready to take military action.
Military developments throughout the USSR indicate that the Soviets are attempting to deal with all these contingencies, which continue to stretch both military and civilian resources.
We see no decrease in military aid to the Warsaw Pact and the Third World. Indeed, the Soviets apparently promised the Syrians more military aid during Assad’s visit in early October.
Afghanistan: The Military Situation
After 10 months of fighting, the Soviets still face significant opposition and serious military problems.
[Page 880]—The Kabul government does not control the provinces.
—The Afghan Army continues to deteriorate. Conscription schemes and local defense plans have failed.
—Soviet equipment and personnel losses have been relatively heavy, considering the poorly equipped and unorganized state of the resistance.
—Roads and cities are still vulnerable to attack, and logistical supply is still a major problem.
The Soviets, however, have chosen not to increase the size of their force. Rather, they are adopting new tactics built around more mobile ground forces and the heavy use of helicopter and aircraft strikes. The country has been divided into eight zones of responsibility, each with a senior commander and a combination of airborne, infantry, artillery, and air support.
In addition, the Soviets are building housing, stronger defense positions, and permanent logistic and support bases. During Babrak Karmal’s recent visit to Moscow, the Soviets pledged continued military support.2 The joint statement issued at the end of the visit reaffirmed that Moscow would not discuss the question of Soviet withdrawals until 1) hostilities had ceased and 2) guarantees that they would not resume were in place.
We conclude, therefore, that the Soviet military intends to support the Marxist regime and pursue the suppression of the resistance for an extended period of time. Recent Soviet emphasis on the time when the situation in Afghanistan returns to “normal” suggests that, for the moment at least, Moscow is not planning any major increase in its force in Afghanistan. At some point, however, perhaps next year, they may decide to increase the size of their force or mount a more aggressive campaign to seal the borders with Iran and Pakistan. We also do not rule out another cosmetic withdrawal for propaganda purposes.
The Domestic Scene
Since the coup in April 1978 that toppled Daoud, the Soviets have advised Kabul to build up its political base and infrastructure. Taraki’s and Amin’s failures or inability to implement this advice were largely responsible for the increase in the Soviet military presence and, ultimately, for the invasion last December. Over the last eight months, numerous CPSU, Komsomol, and government delegations have visited Afghanistan to help train their Afghan counterparts at the provisional and national level in party and government work. During the Karmal visit, the Soviets again emphasized the need to broaden the Afghan communist party’s base.
[Page 881]The effectiveness of the Soviet effort has been hampered by the continued insurgency and by the Khalq-Parcham feud. Nevertheless, the Soviets have expressed satisfaction with their progress. Whether they can or cannot eventually shift the struggle from the military to the political level, they seem reconciled to a protracted presence in Afghanistan. In time, Afghan institutions will be forced into a Soviet mold.
Soviet Diplomacy
Moscow’s refusal to enter into a dialogue on a political settlement and its continued adherence to the Afghan peace plan of May 14 probably reflect its assessment that its diplomatic approach is gradually succeeding. Poland and the Iraq-Iran conflict have pushed Afghanistan off the front pages, and the Islamic Conference’s initiative has faltered with Ghotbzadeh’s removal and Tehran’s preoccupations with the war with Iraq.3
As Brezhnev noted in his speech welcoming Karmal to Moscow, Pakistan remains the key to Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. The Soviets, therefore, will keep the pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting the resistance. The recent Soviet attacks on Pakistani border garrisons, as well as reports of Soviet contacts with Baluchs and members of the Pakistani opposition, probably are meant as warnings to the Zia regime that Soviet tolerance is limited. Thus, we do not rule out selected Soviet or Afghan military attacks against bases in Pakistan. The Soviets, however, probably would be reluctant at this point to see the conflict expand beyond Afghanistan’s borders for fear of regalvanizing Islamic reaction and alienating India.
- Source: Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 6, Soviet Strategy and Tactics in Afghan—Larger Implications. Secret. Drafted by Crocker (INR/PMT) and Limberg (INR/EEA), and approved by Baraz (INR/DDR/RNA).↩
- See Document 320.↩
- Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh was removed in August.↩