288. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
1. Since the Presidential Finding of 28 December 1979, which instructed CIA to provide military equipment to the Afghan freedom fighters,2 CIA has ordered approximately $30 million worth of equipment of Soviet origin delivering it at a rate controlled by Pakistan’s ability to absorb and distribute it. Approximately $10 million worth of arms have been distributed through Pakistan to the Afghans. The remaining $20 million worth will be delivered prior to 30 September 1980. The attachment lists the weapons delivered and those still in the pipeline.
2. The delivery mechanism involves five nationalities. The arms originate in Egypt, are flown on USAF C–141’s to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where they are transferred to Saudi Air Force C–130’s for delivery to Islamabad, Pakistan. Finally, the arms are sent into Afghanistan by the Pakistanis primarily through eight Afghan exile organizations headquartered in Peshawar. Until recently the Pakistani distribution mechanism could only absorb one C–130 load approximately every five days. The Pakistanis now are able to distribute the material more quickly. CIA will supplement the existing mechanism with direct C–141 Cairo-Islamabad flights. This will represent about a 40 percent increase in delivery. Supplementary delivery systems via [less than 1 [Page 770] line not declassified] and/or by sea are also under investigation. We can deliver arms as fast as Pakistan can distribute them.
3. There are several indications of the effectiveness of the arms program:
—Sensitive [less than 1 line not declassified] and Afghan messages in mid-March 1980 began noting a significant upsurge in rebel landmine and anti-tank rocket attacks against Soviet armor. The [less than 1 line not declassified] description of the equipment was in part identical to that being delivered in our support program. [1 line not declassified] “A quantitative and qualitative increase in Afghan rebel activity started in late March and early April 1980.” This phenomenon coincides with predicted battlefield arrival dates for CIA-provided weaponry.
—A [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA source [less than 1 line not declassified] with an exile group actually saw weapons being funneled to the Afghans by the Pakistani military. The number and type of weapons distributed coincided with the report given to CIA by Pakistani liaison.
—The US Consul in Peshawar recently reported from his Afghan sources on the availability to the Afghans of many Soviet-originated weapons.3
—A separate CIA source also saw Egyptian-originated weapons being distributed from Peshawar to the Afghan exile groups.
In sum, independent evidence, plus developments on the battlefield, support Pakistani guarantees that the equipment is being delivered to Afghanistan. There is no evidence of Pakistani siphoning.
4. Our partners in the covert action program, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, are extremely sensitive to this program. The Saudis have commented favorably on the efficiency and security of the program; Saudi Arabia has never been mentioned in any press leak. The Pakistanis are less pleased because they have been mentioned. We have committed to them to protect the security of the program. We have generally briefed [less than 1 line not declassified] on the program and they have provided propaganda support. [less than 1 line not declassified] is aware that there is a general support program. There has been no discussion with [less than 1 line not declassified]. We believe the program can be generally reviewed with [1 line not declassified] as an indication of US commitment. We would discourage any discussion of mechanism amounts or partners.
[Page 771]- Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In a June 11 covering memorandum to Carter, attached but not printed, Turner wrote: “Attached is the memorandum you requested on Afghanistan.” Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner of Turner’s memorandum.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 107.↩
- The United States Consul in Peshawar was Douglas A. Archard.↩
- Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩