253. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
1348. Subject: Coordinating Relations With Afghan Regime. Ref: State 76559.2
1. (C—Entire text)
2. We share Department’s concern as expressed in reftel about how long we can continue to avoid diplomatic contact with the Babrak Karmal regime and still expect to function as a diplomatic mission in Kabul. We have already seen the kinds of pressure the DRA can apply to “encourage” us to move towards more normal diplomatic relations: when we were unsuccessfully seeking consular access to two imprisoned Americans we were told that “something might be done” if we took it up at the political level; and we and other Embassies which refrain from diplomatic dealings with the regime are being subjected to a more restrictive visa policy than “friendly” countries, and this could impact on our operations here.3 There are obviously many other similar ways the DRA could try to pressure us into upgrading our relations with it.
3. We have been discussing this problem with selected diplomatic colleagues and on April 13, after a false start or two, I got the UK, French, Italian, German and Japanese Chargés together for lunch to discuss it as a group. While everyone agreed that we are on thin ice here, all seemed to have different (and not very well thought out) notions of what we might be able to do to improve the situation. All are under general instructions to refrain from diplomatic contacts with the DRA. However, except for the UK Chargé, they are unwilling to exercise the slightest initiative in interpreting that instruction without referring back to their capitals. (The four EC Chargés have been meeting [Page 687] regularly twice a week to coordinate their activities in accordance with instructions from home, and some of them resent it if one of their number does something out of step with the others; see Kabul 1340/Notal.)4 My initial impression is that regular monthly meetings like Sunday’s will have some value in keeping one another informed of current thinking on these matters in our capitals and in coordinating our tactics locally to the extent allowed by national policies but will be of very little use in coming up with innovative ideas to help shape those policies. These meetings could be useful in reinforcing USG policy proposals which are also made in the respective capitals or to the Embassies in Washington, but my guess is that not much would come of trying to use the Kabul Chargés as a means of channeling USG suggestions to their governments.
4. The following summarizes the personal views of those at Sunday’s meeting on how we can best maintain our diplomatic presence in Kabul without undercutting our policy of nonrecognition and the avoidance of diplomatic contact. (Please protect the Chargés in any discussions with other governments.) The British Chargé believes that eventually, and probably sooner rather than later, we will have to expand our contacts with the regime somewhat beyond the current administrative and consular areas if we are to protect our interests here. He believes this can be done in an incremental, non-dramatic way and that if necessary enough disclaimers can be built in to assure there is no implication that we “recognize” or approve of the regime. The German, on the other hand, believes we ought not to increase our dealings with the DRA but wait the situation out. He thinks we should be able to find ways to reciprocate and make our displeasure known if the regime does something we can’t put up with, but he wasn’t able to suggest specific measures when various situations were posed. The French Chargé felt it was important not to do anything to jeopardize future good relations while waiting for the “very awkward” political situation to get better. (Most of the French Embassy staff here, the largest of any non-Communist country, is concerned with maintaining and improving cultural ties with France.) The Italian tended to agree with the British Chargé, while the Japanese didn’t offer an opinion.
5. My own view is that for the time being, at least, we can live with the present arrangement in spite of the difficulties we may increasingly face in our day-to-day operations and that it is probably worthwhile doing so for the sake of our overall objectives. (Not everyone in the Embassy agrees; some believe, as the British Chargé does, that if [Page 688] we want to continue functioning here we are going to have to offer something to the DRA in return.) In my opinion, the DRA and the Soviets need us here so they can continue to maintain that everything has returned to normal in Afghanistan (and the Afghans may also consider our presence a potentially useful hedge against total dependence on the Soviets), but they want us here on their own conditions or as close to them as they can get. They want a very small Embassy so we have a limited capability to do the things they know we are trying to do; they want to make it difficult for us to rotate TDY personnel in and out of Kabul because that increases their problems of surveillance and control; and they want to put obstacles in our way so they can trade the removal of those obstacles for U.S. concessions. But they do not want to push us so far that we pack up and leave, and we can use that knowledge to defend ourselves against their moves. While the Afghans are unpredictable and often illogical, they have shown that they understand and respond to firm counterpressure (witness their back-down when the Pakistani Chargé threatened reciprocal action on visas), and we should not be afraid to play tit-for-tat with them. Where there is no exactly reciprocal action we can take, as there is in the visa field, we should be able to find something else that hurts about as much. Our hole card is the threat to close down our Embassy and encourage others to leave as well, demonstrating to the world that claims of normalcy and legitimacy are pure hogwash. It goes without saying that we should not threaten this action unless we can afford to go through with it, and that is a judgment I cannot make from here. But if, as I believe, the Afghans need us here more than we need to be here, toughing it out is probably our best policy.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 9, Afghanistan: 4/10–18/80. Confidential; Sensitive; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- Telegram 76559 to Kabul, March 22, raised concern over how long the United States could maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul while avoiding contact with the Karmal government. The Department stated that U.S. policy on this matter should be coordinated with its allies. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800146–0501)↩
- In telegram 1103 from Kabul, March 24, the Embassy described the arrest and detention of Charles Brockunier, a U.S. citizen and rug buyer who was detained by Afghan police for alleged suspicious activity. The Embassy advised Brockunier to leave Afghanistan immediately because, as a private citizen, it could offer him no protection. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800149–0733)↩
- Telegram 1340 from Kabul, April 14, reported on the difficulty Embassy personnel were experiencing in obtaining exit visas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800186–1198)↩