239. Annex From the President’s Daily Brief1
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PROBLEMS
[8 lines not declassified] provided Moscow with a frank and sober appraisal: they thought the solution lies in improving the effectiveness of the Afghan Government and military rather than in a substantial increase in the Soviet military commitment.
[2 lines not declassified] Moscow was told [less than 1 line not declassified] that the ineffectiveness of the Afghan Government and its lack of popular support was a major problem. The Babrak Karmal regime is “not governing” and has not extended its writ. [less than 1 line not declassified] also indicated there were continuing differences between the USSR and the regime.
The inability of the Afghan Army to carry the brunt of the fighting was also described as a basic problem. [less than 1 line not declassified] labeled the Afghan military “an army in name only” whose loyalty could not be [Page 647] relied on and whose troops were demoralized. The inability of the police and militia to carry out their everyday functions also troubled [less than 1 line not declassified].
[4 lines not declassified] They painted a picture of scattered, small Soviet units who face persistent supply shortages. They reported that flareups could come in any region [2 lines not declassified].
Recommendations to Moscow
[less than 1 line not declassified] stressed that the Afghan Army must be made capable of carrying the main burden of combat. They called for a quick buildup of the Afghan armed forces. [1 line not declassified] called for an increase of two to four divisions. They were concerned that, otherwise, Soviet troops would have to carry the brunt of fighting and perform police functions against “the people.” This threatens to involve the Soviets in a Vietnam-type conflict.
Apparently in response to such Soviet thinking, the Afghans earlier this month increased conscription [2 lines not declassified].
Although the Soviets did not urge military action into Pakistan, they did recommend closing the border. We believe they would be hard pressed to do this with the forces now available.
[less than 1 line not declassified] recommended that airmobile and airborne forces be kept in Afghanistan until the situation stabilizes. They also thought one additional Soviet division should be brought into Afghanistan and kept there until order is restored. (The Soviets have had two additional divisions staging on the Afghan border; we have seen signs that elements of one may be entering the country.) They also wanted more transport units to solve the supply problem.
Concern Over Future Role
[4 lines not declassified] voiced particular concern that a large additional Soviet commitment would be a costly drain on resources and have a negative impact on military morale. [1 line not declassified]
Implications
The new evidence confirms our general analysis of the nature and degree of the problems the Soviets have encountered in Afghanistan. It also suggests that [less than 1 line not declassified]. Moscow had not yet decided on how to proceed.
Even if the key recommendations [less than 1 line not declassified] were adopted, they would not be easy to implement. In particular, it seems highly unlikely that Moscow will be able quickly to reconstitute an Afghan military capable of assuming the primary counterinsurgency mission.
Although we had seen signs of reserve and even opposition to the Soviet intervention among some Soviet officials, the pessimism expressed [less than 1 line not declassified] could impact on policy debates in Moscow.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs. Top Secret; For the President Only. The full version of this President’s Daily Brief was not filed with this collection. The annex printed here was found in this form.↩