208. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Komer) to Secretary of Defense Brown1
My reaction to Tuesday SCC meeting is that in light of Pak response to Brzezinski mission, we should lay off chasing the Pakistanis.2 Two broad alternative explanations of Pak conduct are: (1) they genuinely believe it better to rely on Islamic/PRC ties and not get too close to US; or (2) they are playing us to get more aid. Probably elements of both are involved. In either case, why not sit back a while and see if they come to us?
Though some reports (probably planted) talk about a third Pak option of “accommodation” with the USSR, I’d heavily discount this. The Paks have played this card before and found Moscow much more interested in 650 million Indians than in 75 million Paks (as in analogous Ethiopia/Somalia case). Moreover, Pak Army wouldn’t stand for it, and Chinese would be affronted. So basically Paks have nowhere else to go but in our direction, since neither China nor Islamic world can offer them enough security against USSR plus India.
Nor do I see much early military threat to Pakistan. By reaffirming the 1959 “commitment” we have already clearly told the USSR that Pakistan is under our security umbrella. This will serve as a deterrent. In any case, a direct Soviet push into Pakistan seems unlikely (as opposed to hot pursuit across the border or subversion in Baluchistan and/or Pathan areas—don’t forget Kabul’s favorite “Pushtoonistan” theme). Direct aggression (or even large scale military action on the borders) would further harden Islamic and other opinion against the USSR, confirm the US position about Soviet expansionism, and really worry India. Much better for Moscow to play a subtler game exploiting Pak minority problems, economic instability and Zia’s fragile political base.
If above is broadly correct, then a lot of heavy military equipment should not be high on our priority list of what Paks need. A guaranteed supply of Islamic oil at discount prices would be more immediately desirable—and should perhaps be made part of our economic aid [Page 582] consortium package). So too would be light internal security type equipment, not tanks and advanced aircraft.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217B, Box 14, Pakistan, 1 Jan–16 Apr 1980. Secret. Copies were sent to the CJCS, ASD/ISA, Gaffney, and Wolfowitz.↩
- The summary of conclusions of the February 12 SCC meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1977–1981, Box 108, SCC–270, 2/12/80, Iran, Afghanistan & Pakistan.↩
- Komer initialed “RWK” above his typed signature.↩