203. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
567. Subject: The Afghan Situation as of February 9.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Begin summary: We have some strong indications that fierce infighting is taking place within the ruling party’s inner circles. It seems quite clear that there is little trust between the party’s Parcham and Khalqi factions. The reported intra-party squabbles may well have resulted in the wounding by gunshot of one or more Cabinet members this past week, including the regime’s number two man, Vice President Keshtmand. There is an unconfirmed report that the Parcham faction may be preparing to go underground if worse comes to worst. There are also indications that disaffection is spreading further in the Afghan military. Afghanistan’s foreign trade suffered another blow when Indian banks reported they required full deposit coverage for letters of credit. End summary.
3. The mood in Kabul: Some of our Afghan sources tell us that there is a growing expectation here that the rebel Muslim forces will soon move on Kabul. One such source, who is believed to have good contacts in People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) circles, says that some of his PDPA Parcham faction contacts claim that President Babrak Karmal is fearful that Gulbaddin Hekmatyars’s Muslim forces will sooner or later oust him. Some of the source’s other contacts say that the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen), with which [Page 573] Gulbaddin is reportedly closely associated, is gaining many adherents in Kabul, even to the point that the Brotherhood is “almost openly” issuing membership cards to those who wish to join this anti-Communist, pro-Islamic movement. (N.B. It will be recalled that the Brotherhood was a favorite bête noire of the Taraki-Amin era when the DRA media referred to it as the Ikhwan-ush-shayateen—Brotherhood of the devils.)
4. Meanwhile, adherents of Karmal’s Parcham faction and the Taraki-Amin Khalqi factions continue to feud among themselves, according to reports from Afghan sources having contacts with both factions. A source with Parchamist connections says that a fierce debate between Parchamists and Khalqis took place this past week when the dominant Parcham faction reportedly bowed to pressure from many of its rank and file who demanded Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister Sarwari’s removal from the government. The Parcham leadership decided to send Sarwari off to genteel exile as an Ambassador (just as Taraki and Amin had done to several Parcham leaders, including Karmal, in the summer of 1978). The Khalqis, however, according to the source, resisted in having Sarwari (linked to the Taraki sub-faction of the Khalqis) removed from the regime’s leadership circles since that would reduce Khalqi representation there. The debate reportedly turned to shooting on Wednesday or Thursday, with Keshtmand and some others falling victims of gunshots. Source was uncertain that Defense Minister Rafie was among the other gunshot victims. (Kabul Radio announced that Keshtmand left for the USSR on Feb. 7 owing to illness).
5. (Comment: Whether or not the foregoing report is true in all of its essentials, we believe that serious intra-PDPA strife is not only going on, but that it is logical to expect that it would take place sooner or later. There are simply too many old scores that various Khalqis and Parchamists have to settle with one another—the Soviet role in pushing for a united front notwithstanding.)
6. A Parchamist informant has provided yet another indication of intra-PDPA differences. He claimed that the PDPA’s Central Committee has instructed that all party offices, down to the ward level, turn in their files on Parchamists. The files reportedly include each party member’s picture, description and other identifying data. The informant said that the Central Committee is compiling a consolidated list of all Parchamists, but is destroying their individual files. The Committee is not doing the same for Khalqi members’ files, the informant said. (Comment: If this report is true—and it has not been substantiated—it might suggest that the Parchamists are preparing to go underground, if necessary, and let the Khalqis bear the wrath of the Muslim rebels should the latter gain the upper hand. It should be noted, how [Page 574] ever, that we have seen no convincing evidence that the PDPA’s rule in Kabul is about very much in control here and in key provincial areas. We have heard—the bickering, feuding and general incompetence that the present divided PDPA leadership is manifesting.
7. Further indications of disaffection in the Afghan Army: According to an Afghan source with relatives in the military, the commander of the Afghan unit at Karga (just outside Kabul) addressed officers and noncommissioned officers on February 6 and admonished them to support the “new phase” of the great Saur revolution. The commander praised Babrak Karmal’s leadership and expressed confidence that the Soviet military, who he said were defending the revolution against foreign imperialist intrigues, would soon leave. A sergeant reportedly spoke up and asked the commander what he really believed about the political situation here since he had earlier praised Taraki and condemned Karmal, then praised Amin and condemned Taraki, and he now praised Karmal and Taraki. The meeting is said to have broken up immediately thereafter, with many officers congratulating the sergeant for voicing a concern common to all. As of yesterday, the sergeant has not yet been disciplined, source said.
8. On the economic scene, Afghanistan’s foreign trade has suffered another blow. According to a local banking source, Indian banks have joined Japanese and U.S. banks in requiring a 100 percent deposit before issuing letters of credit to finance Afghan imports or exports. (Comment: This will particularly hurt dried fruit exports, which are Afghanistan’s main foreign exchange earner, since most exporters cannot afford such deposits.)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 7, Afghanistan: 2/9–10/80. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to New Delhi. Also sent for information to Islamabad, London, Moscow, CINCPAC for POLAD, and USICA. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩