Office of the Historian

182. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

[cable number not declassified]
Washington, January 28, 1980, 2305Z

COUNTRY

  • Pakistan/Afghanistan

SUBJECT

  • Discussion among senior Pakistani military officers on how Pakistan military should respond to question of hot pursuit [less than 1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

  • [2 lines not declassified]

1. During a series of meetings at GHQ from 21 to 26 January 1980, President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and a group of senior Pakistani military officers discussed how the Pakistani military should respond if Soviet and Afghan forces cross into Pakistan in “hot pursuit” of Afghan insurgent forces.

2. Martial Law Administration Chief of Staff and General Zia’s personal staff officer, Major General K.M. Arif, led off the discussion by suggesting that a meeting should be arranged between President Zia and the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad to assure the Soviets that Pakistan will not aid the Afghan insurgents. If this assurance is not made, the question of “hot pursuit” will soon arise and the Soviet and Afghan forces will assuredly pursue the insurgent forces into Pakistan. In such a situation, Pakistan will be the “loser”, according to General Arif.

3. Lt. General Mohammad Iqbal Khan basically agreed with General Arif’s assessment, adding that only if Pakistan receives adequate military aid and assistance from outside sources should the Pak military respond strongly to an incursion into Pak territory.2 In the absence of strong support from the outside as well as adequate preparation by [Page 517] Pak forces, the Pak military should not overreact to any Soviet or Afghan incursion, and that any future skirmishes along the border should be limited to insurgents and Afghan or Soviet forces. (Field comment: This recent position taken by General Iqbal is somewhat different from a more hawkish position he held in early January as reported in [less than 1 line not declassified] from the same source.)3

4. Northwest Frontier Province Governor and corps commander General Fazle Haq did not venture an opinion on the question of hot pursuit. He did report, however, that the tribal chiefs in the tribal territories adjacent to the NWFP had given him assurances that the army would have complete freedom of movement in the tribal areas. General Fazle Haq also reported that as of 26 January there had been no confrontations between Pak and Soviet forces along the border.

5. (Field comment: A contrary view was provided by [1 line not declassified] who said on [less than 1 line not declassified] January that while no specific plans to resist Soviet/Afghan military attacks into Pakistan had been developed, President Zia had instructed senior commanders that if the Soviet or Afghan forces cross into Pakistan in a hot pursuit situation Pak forces must hit them with all possible force. Zia said that Pakistan must hit hard at the first incursion even if Soviets use superior forces. The Pak officer said it is difficult for Pakistan to respond to a Soviet-backed incursion without knowing the extent of U.S. backing but that Zia’s order would be obeyed.)

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. [less than 1 line not declassified] Dissem: [4 lines not declassified]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 6, Afghanistan: 1/27–28/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. An intelligence information cable prepared in the CIA, January 29, reported information [text and 1 line not declassified] regarding a special report on Pakistan’s defense needs, prepared for Zia by the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow. The report concluded that Pakistan would be unable to “meet a sustained military attack from the Soviets in the present state of readiness.” This shortcoming, according to the report, could only be reversed by U.S. aid, and the “best possible” way to assure U.S. commitment to Pakistani security would be the establishment of U.S. military bases in Pakistan. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–84–0056, Box 7, Pakistan)↩
  3. Not found.↩