172. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1
SUBJECT
- SCC Meeting on Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf
PARTICIPANTS
-
State
- Secretary Cyrus Vance
- Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
-
Defense
- Secretary Harold Brown
- Ambassador Robert Komer
-
JCS
- Chairman General David Jones
- Lt. General John Pustay
-
CIA
- Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
- Robert Ames
- Charles Cogan
-
OMB
- Deputy Director John White
-
White House
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Hamilton Jordan
- Jody Powell
- Hedley Donovan
- David Aaron
-
NSC
- Colonel William E. Odom
- Captain Gary Sick
- Thomas Thornton
- Fritz Ermarth
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Dr. Brzezinski explained that the purpose today is to cover a number of points, not all of them for decision, but as information and recommendations to the President as a backdrop for the decision he will shortly be making about our policy toward Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. He noted the agreement about the strategic dynamics of the Soviet military move into Afghanistan expressed at the previous SCC,2 the consequences for Pakistan and Iran, and also the importance of Soviet influence in Yemen and Ethiopia.
Dr. Brzezinski also added that the Soviet publication “New Times” has issued a call for all Communist states and parties to seize new [Page 492] revolutionary opportunities created by the present political conditions in the world, disturbing evidence of present Soviet policy directions.
Military Assistance to Pakistan
Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Vance commented that the President’s meeting with Agha Shahi went as well as could be expected.3 Secretary Brown asked how we will deal with the situation if the Pakistanis insist they want $1 billion in aid while we only offered $400 million. Secretary Vance predicted that they will take our $400 million and complain, not reject our aid.
Dr. Brzezinski asked about the French willingness to sell the Mirage aircraft to Pakistan. Secretary Vance reported that the French will probably supply the Mirage. As a next step, it will be discussed at the Political Directors Meeting in London on January 24th. State will push France to make a decision by then.
Dr. Brzezinski raised the question of American A–7 aircraft for Pakistan. It was pointed out that the Pakistanis did not ask for them. Rather they asked that they be supplied with aircraft sufficient to protect themselves against the Soviet air threat, implying, of course, for the need for the US F–16 or the Mirage. The A–7, as Dr. Brzezinski pointed out, would be very useful in a ground support role along the Western frontier. Furthermore, because the U.S. has a large number, nearly 700, it can undoubtedly spare 30 or 40. Secretary Brown agreed the Pakistanis might be willing to buy some A–7s.
Military Consortium
Dr. Brzezinski asked for Defense’s proposal for a division of labor among the members of the military consortium. Secretary Brown submitted a paper showing which countries can produce what categories of military equipment. The issue of who pays remains to be solved, he added. Secretary Vance noted that according to Agha Shahi, the Saudis promised Pakistan $800 million for military purchases over a year ago but have not yet delivered. We should press the Saudis to make the promise good.
Concerning Japan, Vance has instructed Phil Habib to ask the Japanese for $400 million for the consortium. They may give less, but Vance feels we should ask for that much. We will get little from Britain and France, he continued, but the French should be willing to sell them aircraft and the British will certainly be willing to sell tanks and tank guns. Secretary Brown added that the U.S., France, and Germany can provide anti-tank weapons, much needed for insurgency and defense. [Page 493] It was also pointed out that the Pakistanis want foreign assistance for building a communications infrastructure on their western front.
Dr. Brzezinski asked if we need a big consortium figure for public and political effect such as $1 billion. Secretary Brown observed that one to one and a half billion dollars for equipment spread over three years could be absorbed effectively by the Pakistanis; therefore, Dr. Brzezinski’s figure is about right. Dr. Brzezinski added that we must avoid a figure which is so high that we are open to criticism that we are “saturating” Pakistan with arms the same way we did Iran.
Dr. Brzezinski added that we need a military equipment package and a concept for a division of labor which we can propose to the allies. Secretary Vance suggested that this be done at the upcoming Political Directors Meeting on January 24. Dr. Brzezinski agreed; we must supplement our delegation with technical teams sufficiently competent to make concrete decisions on both funds and equipment.
Agreed action:
—State will press France on the Mirage aircraft.
—The Political Directors Meeting will be reinforced with sufficient staff to discuss military assistance and funding.
—The U.S. will give an exemplary package to the Political Directors as a proposal for a division of labor.
—To fund the consortium, we will press the Japanese for $400 million and the Saudis for $800 million which, combined with our $400 million, should be above $1 billion.
—Britain and France will be encouraged to supply specific military equipment.
U.S. Assurances to Pakistan
Secretary Vance reported that we are still working out contingency scenarios to define circumstances under which we would come to Pakistan’s military assistance against foreign attack. Secretary Vance promised to have a paper by Friday or Saturday which spells these out in considerable detail for the President.
It was agreed, at Secretary Vance’s suggestion, that this is the next big decision issue which should be discussed with the President.
Contingency of a Soviet Invasion of Iran
Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the President mention in his speech that the United States has been committed to the independence of Iran for the past 30 years and remains so committed today.4 Secretaries [Page 494] Vance and Brown wondered if this does not so clearly imply our previous ties to the Shah that it will provoke Khomeini’s public rejection and fail to achieve the political effect in the region for which it is intended. Dr. Brzezinski observed that we must simply accept the cost of a possible Khomeini statement because our vital interests in the area are so great. Secretaries Vance and Brown suggested omitting reference to “30 years.” They accepted Dr. Brzezinski’s alternative language “as we have been” so that a sentence in the speech might read: “The U.S. remains committed to an independent Iran today as it has been in the past.”
Agreed action: The record of the meeting should solicit the President’s reaction to this proposal.5
[Omitted here is a discussion on regional military bases and Yemen.]
Afghanistan Insurgency
Secretary Vance reported that Agha Shahi calls the insurgency in Afghanistan “a dangerous lightning rod” and, therefore, a very difficult decision for General Zia. Dr. Brzezinski commented that a massive insurgency at present is probably not in our best interest. Rather a low-level and enduring insurgency is essential to keep the Islamic states mobilized against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Secretary Brown added that Agha Shahi’s comments were probably not meant to indicate that Zia will be backing out, but rather to keep the option open for the future.
Afghanistan Refugees
State reported that it is possible for the United States to provide bilateral aid for refugees in Afghanistan as well as aid through the UNHCR.
Agreed action: State was tasked to prepare a plan for providing at least a small part of their refugee aid through bilateral channels and present it at the next SCC on refugee support.6
Dr. Brzezinski observed that the large degree of consensus on all agenda issues today may negate the need for an NSC meeting with the President on the same topics. All agreed and Secretary Vance added that the next issue we need to discuss directly with the President [Page 495] concerns the contingency scenarios for Pakistan and the assurances we give that government.
Secretary Vance then added two additional items to the agenda.
U.S. Boxing Group to the Soviet Union
Secretary Vance reported that a boxing team is to depart for a competition in the Soviet Union in five days. All agreed that we should discourage them from going.
Agreed action: Secretary Vance and the Vice President, and possibly Lloyd Cutler, will discuss the matter directly with them to discourage their participation.
Backgrounder on Christopher Trip to Europe
All agreed with Secretary Vance’s proposal that Warren Christopher give a press backgrounder on his recent trip to Europe in order to prevent speculation and misleading reports. Christopher will emphasize the Afghanistan side of his mission because the allies were more forthcoming on that issue. He will deemphasize the Iranian side because the results were less encouraging.
Agreed action: Christopher will give a backgrounder.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book I. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig—These are very serious matters. The discussions are necessary but any proposal for contentious action must be submitted to me first. J.” For other excerpts of the summary of conclusions and a January 18 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter transmitting it to the President, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 42 and 43.↩
- See footnote 16, Document 152.↩
- See Document 163.↩
- Reference is to the President’s upcoming State of the Union speech; see footnote 2, Document 175.↩
- Neither the “Approve” nor the “Disapprove” option was checked, but to the left of the option lines, Carter wrote: “Covered on Meet the Press.”↩
- Not further identified.↩