17. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
4018. Subject: Implications for U.S. Policy of Coup in Afghanistan. Ref: A. Tehran 4547, B. Kabul 3419 (Notal), C. Kabul 3666 (Notal).2
1. All the hard evidence that we have about Soviet activities in Afghanistan since the April 27–28 coup and about past relationships between the new Afghan leaders and the Soviet Union lead inescapably to the conclusion that under its new leadership, Afghanistan has fallen into the Soviet orbit. So far, we have only the words of the new leaders that they intend to pursue a nonaligned policy. Their growing acceptance of Soviet involvement in their political and military infrastructure does not support their words.
2. Moreover, I remain convinced that having achieved such a longstanding goal of incorporating Afghanistan into the Soviet sphere of influence, Moscow will do everything it can to keep it there. And, I see no internal or external factors at the moment which could thwart Moscow’s intention.
3. The psychological-political effects of this development are naturally being felt in other places, especially Pakistan, but also in Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere. I note a common theme in these other countries that they cannot count on the United States to prevent further Soviet advances in this part of the world. This despondency itself contributes to an atmosphere from which the Soviets can benefit, and which can encourage them to exploit further their bridgehead here.
4. Vital interests of the United States, especially in Iran and the Persian Gulf region, are involved in this situation. I would think that our credibility in Peking is also involved.
5. In the light of these considerations, I warmly second the recommendations made by Ambassador Sullivan (ref A).3 I think it is essential [Page 42] that we undertake a careful review of our policy towards this region, especially toward the regional CENTO countries, with a view to bolstering their political, psychological, and military positions. I also agree that we should consult with our European and Japanese allies, and with the Chinese, on what they, as well as we, can do in these regards. An early resolution of the nuclear reprocessing dispute with Pakistan is of fundamental importance.
6. I am certain we can devise ways for shoring up our friends in this region which will not be incompatible with a strategy of maintaining a relationship with Afghanistan which will provide the Afghans with some alternative to reliance on the Soviet Union, should they wish to have and/or be permitted by the Soviets to have such an alternative.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780207–0796. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, USLO Peking, Tehran, Tokyo, USCINCEUR (also for POLAD), CINCPAC (also for POLAD), and Jidda.↩
- Telegram 4547 from Tehran, May 14, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780209–1069. Telegrams 3419 and 3666 from Kabul are dated May 1 and May 7, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0714 and D780194–0609, respectively)↩
- In telegram 4547 from Tehran, May 14, Sullivan called for the United States to make a concerted and systematic effort to demonstrate to its allies in the region its commitment to their integrity and stability, lest the Soviets be further encouraged toward adventurism beyond Afghanistan. (See footnote 2, above)↩