Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

137. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

• The Stakes in Afghanistan And How We Should React (U)

The events in Afghanistan are a major historical turning point. The Soviet invasion measurably raises the chances of US armed involvement in an entirely new region of the world. At one stroke, the chances of such involvement have now become far greater in Southwest Asia than they are, for example, in Korea, another possible flashpoint. In this regard we should firmly keep in mind that the two wars we have fought since the Second World War, both of them against Communist nations advised by the Kremlin, resulted from fundamental miscalculations by the other side as to our intentions. (S)

—North Korea would not have attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, if Acheson had not specifically placed Korea outside the US defense perimeter and thereby reinforced the Kremlin’s belief that we would not become directly involved on the Korean Peninsula. (S)

—The North Vietnamese would not have introduced the 320th and 324th divisions into South Vietnam during the fall of 1964 if they had anticipated a US introduction of 500,000 American troops to meet the challenge. It should not be lost sight of that in the autumn of 1964 we were engaged in a political campaign during which Johnson was tarring Goldwater as a warmonger and was stating repeatedly that American soldiers would not be involved in a land war in Asia. The Vietnamese took Johnson at his word—unfortunately. (S)

Afghanistan points like a dagger at both Iran and Pakistan. Nobody at this point can predict with certitude that the United States would not at some future point get drawn into a war which involved either country. (S)

Furthermore, the Soviets and their Afghan puppets are going to be extremely unpopular in Afghanistan for years to come. They will consequently be looking for a means to consolidate the regime and increase the popularity of Babrak or his successors. One way of doing this, which will certainly occur to them, is the promotion of Afghan national aspirations vis-a-vis both Pakistan and Iran. The impetus to the Kremlin for adopting a high-risk policy will be very great. (S)

The challenge to the United States by the Soviet invasion is a long-range one. It will be something which we will be facing over at least the next decade. It is essential in dealing with this challenge, that we think of it in global terms. We should respond to it by:

a. increasing defense cooperation with the Chinese up to, and including, supply of defensive weapons, training, and intelligence exchanges;

b. making life as difficult as we can for the Soviets and their Cuban and Vietnamese surrogates in such places as Angola, Ethiopia, and Cambodia;

c. moving ahead with our efforts to establish a viable base structure throughout the world;

d. expanding the Rapid Deployment Force;

e. establishing a commission to study our manpower needs in the expectation that the commission will recommend the reinstitution of the draft (General Odom would be my candidate for executive secretary of the commission);

f. establishing a firm security commitment to the Pakistanis;

g. shoring up the Turks;

h. using the invasion of Afghanistan as a means to pressure our NATO Allies to stand firm on TNF, to maintain the three-percent commitment, and to establish a working group to deal with threats to the peace outside the Treaty area;²

i. establishing as the first priority of ICA and our other information disseminators the exposure of the Soviet, the Soviet/Cuban, and the Soviet/Vietnamese threats to world peace;

j. removing various Congressional limitations on our ability to undertake covert action in Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere; and

k. most importantly, increasing the quality of our conventional forces to the point where neither the Kremlin nor any other government could have doubts as to our capability to project conventional power to any portion of the globe. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/80. Secret. Sent for information. In the top right corner, Brzezinski wrote: “I agree and am pushing for more items. ZB.” The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1979.
2. A reference to NATO’s 1977 decision to undertake a long-term defense program to modernize and standardize conventional and nuclear capabilities. The plan committed NATO members to fund the project, slated for 1979–1984, with a 3 percent annual budget increase. See “Final Communiqué” of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, Ministerial Session, Brussels, May 17–18, 1977. (NATO Press Communiqué M–DPC–2(77)6, May 18, 1977)