Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

12. Memorandum for the Record by Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, May 3, 1978

SUBJECT

• SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan

This morning I chaired an SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan. In attendance were NIO, David Blee, Rear Admiral Thomas from ISA, with Commander Zwart, and Peter Lande of State who was acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary.

I used the agenda attached as a focus for discussion.²

Most of the discussion was operational. The principal substantive matters that arose were:

—Diplomatic Recognition. Vance apparently wants to go ahead routinely with diplomatic recognition unless the Iranians urge strongly otherwise and even then he may rather keep in step with the OECD countries than with Iran. I said that you would want to have a voice in this and decide whether the matter needs to go to the President. Most of us at the meeting thought it would be wise to take fuller account of Iranian concerns and, if they felt strongly, attempt to slow down our OECD colleagues.

—Covert Action. There was no great enthusiasm for covert action, particularly on the part of CIA, which felt that it would be pointless. Blee’s informal estimate was that the greatest period of weakness would come in 6 to 12 months because of deteriorating economic conditions. We discussed this at some length and much against his will I instructed him to prepare a paper which looks at the possibility of covert actions in the short term.

—General Attitude. There was a general consensus that this regime will be bad news for us but that we should not take the initiative in breaking ties. We decided that personnel should not be withdrawn from Kabul on an accelerated schedule as proposed by the Ambassador.³ The one exception was the Station Chief whose life was considered to be in danger. The general consensus was that the new government should commit the first overt action. Our recommendations in this regard would of course change if we came to the conclusion that effective short term action could and should be taken against the regime. We also decided to resist Peace Corps who apparently have asked for permission now to increase their presence in Afghanistan as a result of the new situation.

The following assignments were given out:

1. A paper on recognition which could if necessary be sent to the President.⁴ If the Iranians are willing to move quickly on recognition this paper will not be necessary and we will go in step with them.

2. State is to ensure that all concerned agencies have current guidance on our attitude towards the new regime (for instance we want to avoid conjuring up a red menace). State will also meet with USIA to ensure that they have proper guidance.

3. State is to undertake more active diplomatic contacts, notably with the FRG and China.

4. CIA will prepare a paper on prospects for Afghan-Soviet relations.⁵ This will be a quick look at the subject to be followed later probably by a SNIE.

5. CIA will prepare a paper examining the prospects for successful covert action and the utility of black propaganda.⁶

6. DOD will ensure that some contact is made with Afghan military trainees in the United States. We will not be encouraging them to defect but need to show some interest in their welfare. In some cases their commanding officers are probably not even aware of the problem.

7. The intelligence community will revise its list of priority intelligence targets in Afghanistan. Particular attention will be given to information on possible Coup plotting in the Army. This will be done through Sam Hoskinson.

8. CIA will prepare a list of indicators that we should look for to determine the orientation of the regime (e.g. calling in East Germans to manage security operations).⁷

The first six items on this list are to be completed by Friday.⁸ The remaining two are of lower priority.

Based on the discussions we had I do not see any need for an SCC meeting in the near term. My main concern is that CIA is so unwilling to consider covert action that we will not get a fair paper out of them on this subject.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Brzezinski and Hoskinson. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum, May 3, from Thornton to Brzezinski which characterizes the memorandum as a “run-down” of the meeting Thornton chaired earlier that morning.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Eliot’s proposal was relayed in telegram 3453 from Kabul, May 2. Eliot cited “the emergency situation” in Afghanistan as justification for his proposal, although he emphasized that a drawdown of U.S. Government personnel should not be characterized as an “evacuation” because of the negative connotation the new regime might attach to that word. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780186–0713)
4. No paper was found. Instructions regarding de facto recognition of the new Afghan Government were relayed in telegram 110057 to Kabul on April 29: “In brief, the basic thrust of the Dept’s present approach is to play down question of recognition as much as possible with a view to avoidance of seeming to approve or disapprove the new government. Generally, once the situation has clarified, the new regime is effectively in control of the machinery of government and of the territory of the state in question, and other governments have begun to recognize or formally continue diplomatic relations, we find an appropriate opportunity to advise the new government of our intention to maintain diplomatic relations. Recognition is not mentioned but may be implied by USG continuing to deal with new government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780184–0669) The Embassy presented a note to the Afghan Foreign Ministry on May 6 stating “the intention of the Government of the United States of America to maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.” In telegram 3601 from Kabul, May 6, the Embassy reported that the protocol officer of the Afghan Foreign Ministry received the note “with a smile, and seemed relieved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193–0987) In his first conversation with the new Afghan President, May 6, Eliot informed Taraki that “we do not extend formal recognition but indicate, as we have done, that we want to continue normal diplomatic relations.” (Telegram 3619 from Kabul, May 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780193–1106)
5. See Document 13.
6. See Document 25.
7. Neither a list of priority targets nor a list of indicators was found.
8. Friday was May 5.