Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

93. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, October 18, 1978, 2145Z

23172. Subject: Sadat Message to President Carter. Ref: (A) State 263406,² (B) Cairo 23136.³

1. VP Mubarak asked that I meet with him 2000 hours this evening at his residence. He had just returned from Ismailia, where he had met with Sadat. Sadat had asked him to contact me immediately in order to convey the following to President Carter.

2. Sadat had received a report on President Carter’s meeting with Kamal Hassan Ali and Boutros Ghali (ref A). He had studied that report and wanted President Carter to have his thoughts. He had four specific points:

(A) What is going on now in Washington, namely negotiating a treaty only on Sinai, will isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Sadat believes that President Carter recognizes this situation. It had been discussed in Camp David.

(B) The Sinai treaty should refer to the need for a comprehensive solution.

(C) On the “main point,” namely diplomatic relations, Sadat agrees with President Carter’s views that the process should be completed as soon as possible, i.e. six months as President Carter has suggested. Sadat has received President Carter’s message that he could come for signature in late October or early November and is pleased. Sadat agrees with President Carter that there should be formal recognition of Israel and a quick exchange of diplomats. This should be begun immediately after conclusion of the first phase of Israeli withdrawal and should be put into the draft treaty as at the Charge level. (Sadat, Mubarak said, had mentioned that the U.S./PRC precedent might be applicable.) Sadat wants President Carter to know, however, that when the treaty is signed in President Carter’s presence, here or at Jabal Musa, he is prepared to accede to a request from President Carter that ambassadors be exchanged as soon as diplomatic relations are established. Mubarak made a point of saying that this concession is for President Carter and should not rpt not be mentioned to the Israelis, the Egyptian delegation or be included in the treaty. Moreover, Mubarak said, Sadat’s willingness to do this is contingent on a specific inclusion of Gaza in the treaty.

(D) On Gaza, Mubarak said Sadat considers it essential to include a reference to moving ahead on Gaza in the Sinai treaty lest failure to do so isolate Egypt in the Arab world. Sadat wants the self-governing body to be set up in Gaza without delay. The Israelis should withdraw their military forces to security points that are agreed upon without delay. Sadat would like these points included in the Sinai treaty, but Mubarak indicated that the President has an open mind on this subject—so long as progress on Gaza is synchronized with the progress on implementing the Sinai treaty. Specifically, if as President Carter has suggested, the Israelis have completed their interim withdrawal in Sinai in six months time, a self-governing body should by that time have been negotiated and established (perhaps on the last day or the day before Sinai withdrawal) so that “self-rule” is in effect in Gaza at approximately the same time as Phase I of Sinai withdrawal is completed. Sadat wants President Carter to know that if new leaders cannot be found in Gaza, the present ones would be acceptable for this purpose. Sadat is prepared, in accordance with his letter to President Carter, to begin negotiations on a Gaza settlement immediately and without waiting for Hussein’s or West Bank agreement, so that there can be synchronization between Sinai and Gaza. In making these points, Mubarak stressed that Sadat believes that he cannot go it alone in Sinai. There must be some parallelism between Sinai and a Gaza settlement. Sadat was confident that President Carter understands this from their talks at Camp David.

3. I told Mubarak that I would, of course, convey President Sadat’s views. I reminded him, however, that Sadat had agreed that there be no formal linkage between the two framework documents. President Carter has spoken of the need for an inter-relationship between the two sets of negotiations, but I doubted that the Israelis would agree to including Gaza in the Sinai treaty. A Gaza settlement, I pointed out to Mubarak, would be based not upon the Egyptian/Israeli framework document, but upon the comprehensive framework. Hence, while we also appreciate the need for an inter-relationship between the two processes, they are not part and parcel of the document under which negotiations are now taking place. Mubarak insisted that Sadat needs a specific relationship between the Sinai agreement and the establishment of a self-governing body in Gaza. He reiterated that Egypt is prepared to negotiate a Gaza settlement under the comprehensive framework, but that the establishment of the self-governing body in Gaza and related matters must be synchronized in point of time with the completion of the first phase of Sinai withdrawal.

4. Comment: Sadat and the Egyptians are feeling the heat at home and from other Arabs about the lack of any linkage between the two framework documents. Even Mubarak did not seem to know that Sadat had agreed that there need be no legal linkage between the two documents, which suggests to me that Sadat has done the predictable: he has suggested to his intimates that an understood relationship exists between the two. Since neither Hussein nor the PLO seems about to play on the West Bank, Sadat has concluded Gaza should be tackled separately if he is to proceed with Sinai without doing irreparable damage to GOE’s position in Arab world. As Mubarak had said earlier in the day (ref B), a Gaza settlement would help to put pressure on Hussein and the West Bankers.

5. Mubarak said that he will be meeting Usama al Baz on Sunday, October 22, in London for a report. He will at that time give the above instructions to al Baz for use by the Egyptian delegation. (Note: He will not rpt not tell al Baz of Sadat’s willingness to announce at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, in response to a request from President Carter, that diplomatic relations can be established at the Ambassadorial level.) Mubarak had no rpt no objection to our mentioning the above points (with the exception of the Ambassadorial level point) to the Egyptian delegation even before he meets with al Baz in London later this week. This would allow time to discuss Sadat’s ideas in depth with Egyptian delegation so that Usama al Baz can go to London with our thinking for use in his talk with Mubarak there. The point at issue seems to be that Sadat wants the “parallelism” that he spoke about in Rabat (after leaving Washington) to be concurrent in the case of Sinai and Gaza rather than sequential.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2689. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. Not found. Likely a mistaken reference to telegram 263466 to Cairo, October 18, informing Eilts of the substance of Carter’s October 17 meeting with the Egyptian Blair House delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2577) For a summary of the meeting, see Document 89.
3. In telegram 23136 from Cairo, October 18, Eilts reported that Mubarak, “at Sadat’s behest . . . this morning again urged that we and Israelis agree to including Gaza in present negotiations. According [to] Mubarak, Sadat had made this suggestion to President Carter in order to get the West Bank/Gaza negotiations going in the face of Hussein’s foot-dragging.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2681)