Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

401. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 26, 1980, 2:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Christopher
  • David Korn, NEA

• Israel

  • Ambassador Evron

SUBJECT

• Delivery by Ambassador Evron of Letters to the Secretary from Prime Minister Begin

Ambassador Evron opened by saying that he had two letters to deliver to the Secretary from Prime Minister Begin, one replying² to the Secretary’s oral message of August 23 on the U.S. abstention in the August 20 Security Council vote,³ and the other on the oil MOA negotiations.⁴

The Secretary first read Begin’s letter replying to his oral message of August 23. The Secretary asked Ambassador Evron to tell the Prime Minister that he appreciated the Prime Minister’s warm words of friendship. With respect to the Prime Minister’s comments on the Secretary’s use of the phase “unilateral action” the Secretary said he wanted to make clear that he considers it the right of any country to determine where its capital should be established, but if there is a negotiating process going on in regard to that particular place many countries may be involved. In a circumstance such as this, unilateral actions are not helpful. It is obviously up to Israel to decide what Israel’s position in the negotiation should be. But on the issues that are the subject of negotiations, no party should prejudice the result by unilateral actions. The Secretary said that was all the phrase was intended to convey.

The Secretary recalled the remarks he had made before the Security Council on August 20 in regard to the unhelpful nature of the resolutions that had been introduced in the UN this year.⁵ We have said this and we will continue to say this. The only way we have to salvage the Camp David process, the Secretary continued, is to concentrate on the negotiations and discourage those who seek to undermine them through unhelpful Security Council resolutions or through unilateral actions, which pose a great danger to the Camp David process.

The Secretary said that when he spoke of unilateral actions he was not seeking to deny Israel’s sovereign rights. Israel has the sovereign right to go to war or to accommodate its interests to those of other nations. The Secretary said he did not contest the right of any country to determine where its capital should be. The problem, however, is that the Jerusalem issue must be resolved through negotiations. Speaking then in a more general vein, the Secretary commented that he realized that all these are hard questions. He wanted to make clear that our decision to abstain had not been an easy one. We had taken all of the elements into consideration. It is in the United States’ national interest to see the Camp David process succeed. We have invested much time and energy in Camp David, but we have other interests as well and we have to protect them.

The Secretary said he could understand that Jerusalem is an emotional issue in Israel and it is very difficult to vote against any law on it. He wanted to make clear, however, that in his view the Cohen bill did not add anything to Israel’s bargaining position in the negotiations—not one iota. The only effect of the bill had been to cause the Camp David talks to be suspended. In this regard the Secretary commented that he could not recall when his first class in physics had been, but he remembered clearly learning the law that for every action there is an equal reaction. This is what has occurred. The Secretary emphasized that the position he took at the Security Council was not hostile to Israel. In fact, his remarks had been supportive of Israel, and they were condemned by many Arab countries. The Secretary asked Evron to tell the Prime Minister that there was nothing personal in the position we had taken at the UN. He had had to give the President his best judgment, and abstention had been his recommendation. He did believe, however, that his remarks about the unhelpful nature of the repeated Security Council resolutions had had an impact on his listeners in the Security Council.

The Secretary said that as long as people think that by introducing UN resolutions that can interrupt the Camp David process and provoke Israel into steps that will further disrupt it, they will continue to do so. The objective of Israel and the United States must be to keep the negotiations going and maintain their credibility. The Secretary added that his only doubt about going to the Security Council was that his arguments in favor of Camp David might not seem credible in view of the fact that the talks were suspended.

Ambassador Evron said there should be no doubt in anybody’s mind about Israel’s dedication to the continuation of the Camp David process. Referring to the Secretary’s earlier comments, the Ambassador said he wanted to be sure what the Secretary meant when he spoke of “sovereign rights.” Evron asked if he could tell Prime Minister Begin that in the Secretary’s view the sovereignty of Israel in Jerusalem is not challenged by the United States and that Israel has the sovereign right to establish its Capital there. Evron said if he understood clearly, the United States does not deny Israel the right to have its capital anywhere within sovereign Israeli territory. The Secretary said this raises two points. First, whether East Jerusalem is part of the West Bank under Resolution 242 and thus not subject to any claim to sovereign rights by Israel. Second is the fact that it is agreed that the status of Jerusalem is an issue that has to be settled through negotiations.

Ambassador Evron said this raises a problem that he wanted to be able to report very precisely on. The Security Council called on all states with embassies in Jerusalem to remove those embassies. That involves not East Jerusalem but West Jerusalem, since all the embassies are located on the western side of the city. Ambassador Evron asked if he would be correct in saying that at least in regard to West Jerusalem Israel’s sovereign right in that part of the city is not in question. The Secretary pointed out that he had made clear in his Security Council statement that we do not regard the call for movement of the embassies from Jerusalem as being binding. Mr. Christopher said it was his understanding that the United States had taken the position at Camp David that the ultimate status of Jerusalem as a whole would be the subject of negotiations between the parties, which is the position the President repeated in New York recently. Ambassador Evron replied that he had not been at Camp David but he was quite sure that never once at Camp David had any question arisen regarding Israel’s sovereign rights in West Jerusalem. Mr. Christopher repeated that his understanding had been that the U.S. position is that the whole question is to be the subject of ultimate negotiations. He asked Mr. Korn if this was correct. Mr. Korn confirmed that such had always been our view, and pointed out that we have never formally recognized Israel’s claim to sovereignty in West Jerusalem.

Mr. Christopher said what he understood Secretary Muskie to have said was that any country, for example Mexico, could establish its capital wherever it wants if it has the power to do so, but that governments that do this must take into account the consequences for an ongoing negotiation. Ambassador Evron responded heatedly that the United States appeared to be raising new issues here. The American Ambassadors have presented their credentials in Jerusalem, you fly your flag in Jerusalem, your leaders meet with our leaders there, he said. If a question is now raised about Israel’s sovereignty in West Jerusalem, Ambassador Evron said, this will become a big problem for our domestic relations.

The Secretary said he had not meant to say anything different from what he had said in his UN speech. Defining the present status of Jerusalem is a most difficult and complex question. To return to the main point, the Secretary said, when I spoke of unilateral action my point is actions taken outside of the negotiations in regard to issues in the negotiations that tend to disrupt the negotiations. That, the Secretary concluded, is really all I have to say. I was not trying to establish Israel’s sovereign rights in any part of Jerusalem, or anything else.

Evron said the result of the Security Council vote has been to cast doubt on Israel’s sovereignty in West Jerusalem. He had been surprised when the State Department Spokesman the previous day had said that he was not aware that the State Department was taking any position on the question of other countries moving their embassies from Jerusalem.⁶ We were taken aback by this statement by the Spokesman, Evron said. Mr. Christopher said the Spokesman’s statement was not inconsistent with our position as it has been stated at the United Nations. Christopher distinguished between the UN seeking to tell countries where to locate their embassies (which we opposed in New York) and the right of a country to decide on its own whether to move its embassy from Jerusalem (which we would respect). Evron asked what the United States would do to correct the impression that it does not care about the Security Council call for removal of the embassies from Jerusalem. Mr. Christopher said we have brought the Secretary’s statement, that we do not regard the Security Council call as binding, to the attention of those governments which maintain their embassies in Jerusalem. Evron urged that the United States find an opportunity “to denounce” the ultimatum given by the Arab countries to the countries that maintain embassies in Jerusalem. The call for removal of the embassies is “an abuse of Security Council power,” Evron said.

Evron then presented the second letter, on the oil MOA negotiations, and said that Israel urges the negotiations be resumed as quickly as possible. After reading through the Prime Minister’s letter, the Secretary said the President had agreed that there should be another meeting in September.⁷ Mr. Christopher cautioned that this should not be made public until we have agreement on dates for the meeting. Ambassador Evron agreed, and there was agreement that the two sides would be in touch to set a date.

The Secretary said he would like to end the meeting on a light note. Prime Minister Begin had said he was “astonished” by my abstention in the Security Council. Tell the Prime Minister I am never astonished by what he says. On second thought, the Secretary said that it would be better not to do so.

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Assistant Secretary’s Files—1973–1983, Miscellaneous Middle East Documents, Lot 83D340, Box 1, 1980 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Muskie’s office at the Department of State. Drafted by Korn on August 28; cleared by Christopher.
2. Begin’s August 25 letter described the U.S. abstention in the Security Council’s vote on the draft resolution concerning the Jerusalem law, particularly following the Secretary’s “strong speech,” as “incomprehensible to us.” Begin defended the Israeli naming of Jerusalem as the national capital, remarking on Muskie’s “repeated reproach concerning the so-called ‘Unilateral Action.’”Begin continued, “I am not ashamed to admit that I do not comprehend that complaint or accusation. The reason is simple. I am ready to ask any historian whether at any time in recorded history any nation, decided where its capital should be otherwise than by ‘Unilateral Action.’” “As far as Jerusalem is concerned the Israeli Nation is fully entitled to decide where its capital is,” Begin concluded, “as any other nation, old or new, has done.” (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 5, ES Sensitive August 1–30, 1980)
3. See Document 400.
4. The letter, dated August 25, discussed the lack of progress made in the talks to reach an agreement on the implementation conditions for the U.S.-Israeli MOA on Oil Supply which had been signed in June 1979 and stated that, given Israel’s current economic state and the relinquishment of the Sinai oil wells, it should not be “called upon to pay an average price [for oil] comparable to the highest marginal price the U.S. pays for oil imports,” a condition presented by U.S. negotiators in the latest round of talks in July 1980. Begin concluded: “In light of the above, I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to direct your delegation to reconvene with Israel’s representatives as soon as possible with a view to finalizing a practical agreement which takes into account Israel’s difficulties and deep concerns from the standpoint of our national economy and the heavy burdens we have assumed.” The text of this letter, as well as that of Begin’s second letter on the U.S. abstention, was sent to Tel Aviv in telegram 227501 to Tel Aviv, August 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880142–1009.
5. See Document 399.
6. The referenced comment was made by Department of State Director of Press Relations David D. Passage during the Department’s August 25 daily press briefing. The text of the briefing is in telegram 226192 to multiple posts, August 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800406–0887)
7. The same day, August 26, Carter commented on the U.S. position for the oil negotiations in a handwritten note to Brzezinski (with a copy to Mondale): “Re oil for Israel, I think we could change our proposal to substitute: top 10% to apply to the kind of oil Israel actually uses rather than to top 10% of most expensive imports. Also, if strict conformance to formula is assured, we might let the triggering be automatic.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 8/15–31/80)