Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

303. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Lebanese Truce Initiative (C)

At Tab A is a memorandum from Cy²—incorporating Bob Strauss’ views—to implement the discussion of the Senior Level Meeting on October 11.³ (U)

The approach contains two safeguards:

—the need to get Israeli support—or at least acquiescense—through a direct appeal to Begin. Otherwise, the effort has little chance of any success; and

—a low-key fact-finding trip by Phil Habib to the area (Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, Amman, Jerusalem, and the Vatican), so that he can take to Israel whatever Lebanon and Syria are prepared to do. We would then review developments, to determine our next steps. (S)

With Begin, Habib will stress four main points:

—we will not deal with the PLO; others would have to exercise leadership in this area;

—we will not try to do away with the militia enclave on Israel’s border;

—the need for Israel to improve its image by taking part in a truce effort (in the process, we will not try to make the PLO an equal with others); and

—humanitarian considerations. (S)

If you approve of this general approach, we would take the following steps:

—Ambassador Dean will talk with Sarkis and al-Hoss on our general thinking,⁴ and about their taking the lead;

—Habib will go to the area and find out how far Lebanon and Syria will go and, on that basis, what Israel is prepared to see happen;

—we will also be in contact with other parties, while keeping our role flexible (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, UK, France, Holland, Norway, UN, Vatican);

—close involvement of Waldheim; and

—further review here. (S)

This approach is not risk-free. But if we keep our efforts low-key at the start, and we are attentive to the need to gain Israeli support, we have the best chance of achieving at least some partial strengthening of the cease-fire. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Lebanese truce approach outlined above.⁵ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 83, Sensitive XX: 10/13–31/79. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski added a handwritten date “10-19 ’79.” Below the handwritten date, Carter initialed “C,” indicating that he saw the document.
2. Attached but not printed is Vance’s undated memorandum to Carter. In an October 19 memorandum to Brzezinski, Hunter stated that Vance’s memorandum was “largely drafted” by Strauss. (Ibid.)
3. See Document 301. A Summary of Conclusions from this Senior Level Meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 58, Lebanon: Senior Level 10/11/79 Meeting: 10/79.
4. Dean briefed Sarkis and al-Hoss on October 21 on the details of the administration’s action plan for Lebanon. The two meetings are summarized in telegram 5890 from Beirut, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2514)
5. Carter initialed his approval of the recommendation.