Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon and the White House¹

Washington, July 26, 1979, 1443Z

193868. Special encryption for Ambassador Dean. Subject: Message to President Sarkis From President Carter.

(C) Entire text

1. Please deliver² as soon as possible the following message from President Carter to President Sarkis in response to the latter’s handwritten letter to President Carter of July 4.³ (There will not be a signed original to deliver.)

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply touched by your confidential and handwritten letter to me on July 4. I appreciate fully the friendship and concern which led you to write to me with such candor.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that I have been deeply troubled by the many tragedies which have befallen your country and your people, including the bombing attacks last Sunday afternoon.⁴ I grieve over the terrible toll in innocent human lives, and the suffering imposed on your nation. Like you, I am also very much concerned over the risk of further confrontations in the air between Israeli and Syrian aircraft, and about the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon. I agree with you that these dangerous trends must be reversed, and that the integrity of Lebanon must be restored and respected.

Mr. President, as I work to help bring about a permanent and comprehensive peace throughout the Middle East, the special tragedy of Lebanon is very much on my mind. I believe it is imperative to build upon the foundation that was laid at Camp David and which has continued with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. In the coming months, I will redouble my efforts to see that effort through to a successful conclusion. It is in that context that I foresee the best chance also for bringing an end to strife and bloodshed in Lebanon, and for making possible the reestablishment of your government’s authority over your entire country.

While the best hope for a final end to conflict in Lebanon may lie in the success of efforts to build a broader peace, so too these efforts themselves depend upon doing whatever is possible to reduce the spillover of conflict into your country. Since I received your letter, I have given new thought about the best means for achieving this vital goal. As a result, we will again approach Israel to stress the human suffering, the dangers of wider conflict, and the risks to the peace process posed by its continuing military actions. We will again do what we can to gain its restraint. At the same time, we will work even more intensely with the United Nations and the governments contributing troops to UNIFIL, as well as with Saudi Arabia and Syria. We will also be consulting with the Congress about the best course of action to take. Meanwhile, it will be important for us to persuade other quarters which contribute to the provocations and the cycles of violence to exercise restraint, and to cease terrorism.

Mr. President, all of these steps will take time and hard work; but I am committed to doing what I can to hasten the day when Lebanon will no longer be threatened by strife and conflict, and when you will be able to devote your energies solely to rebuilding your country and advancing the lives of your people.

I want to keep in touch with you, Mr. President, on these issues of great concern to us both. My heart will be with you as you shoulder your heavy responsibilities.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

3. For Ambassador Dean: Since you have to carry the message personally to President Sarkis, we believe you should either try to deliver it Thursday, July 26, or telephone Sarkis as far in advance as possible of your planned meeting-dinner with him on Friday, July 27, to say that you have a response from President Carter, explain that, under the circumstances, it would be better for us if we did not have to deal with an “open letter.”⁵ Say to Sarkis that we very much understand and appreciate the domestic political problems he is facing, and the need to be seen as doing something about the problems Lebanon faces. In this connection, you might note that the U.S. made a strong statement condemning Israeli air raids and has taken a firm stand—publicly and privately—against the recent series of Israeli ground incursions into UNIFIL’s areas of operation. Ambassador Tueini has also registered a strong message of protest over Israeli actions in the Security Council.

4. FYI. While we do not yet have report, we understand from secure voice telephone call with Tel Aviv that there may have been a useful exchange Wednesday, between Viets and Weizman on Lebanese situation.⁶ You may be able to draw on that exchange, we hope, to persuade Sarkis that we are really working hard, but wait for our review of Viet’s report. End FYI.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 117, 7/19–31/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Draper; cleared by Brzezinski, Saunders, Tarnoff, and William Rope (S/S–O); approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1591)
2. Dean delivered Carter’s letter to Sarkis while attending a dinner at Baadba Palace the evening of July 27 (Telegram 4215 from Beirut, July 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2476)
3. See footnote 13, Document 277.
4. See footnote 10, Document 276.
5. Dean met with Sarkis on the morning of July 27 and attempted to persuade him not to send a second letter to Carter. Sarkis replied that “too much publicity had already been given to the planned letter not to send it,” but assured Dean that the text would not be made public. Dean reported: “Sarkis agreed that whatever he had to say had already been set forth in his July 4 letter. He reiterated that he was merely responding to local political pressure.” Dean concluded that this second letter would likely receive a “courteous acknowledgement” and would “close the present exchange.” (Telegram 4189 from Beirut, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2474) Telegram 4216 from Beirut, July 30, conveyed the text of Sarkis’s second letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850029–2477) The Department conveyed Carter’s short reply, acknowledging Sarkis’s concerns, in telegram 207377 to Beirut, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1595.
6. In a July 25 meeting with Viets, Weizman “indicated he would seriously consider” a moratorium on Israeli air attacks in Lebanon and “probed possibility of speaking directly to Lebanese leadership.” (Telegram 16046 from Tel Aviv, July 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790351–0310)