Before we take any new initiative, we need to ask ourselves some hard
questions about the developments surrounding the negotiations:
—Time is working against the Camp David approach. The longer the
negotiations go on, the greater the likelihood that any agreement
reached will only be a separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Our own
political realities must be taken into account.
—Neither party wants to appear overly anxious to conclude the talks. They
both know that we will be tempted to ask further conces
[Page 587]
sions from the more eager party. Sadat in particular fears that we will
turn to him as the more pliant of the two parties.
—Talk of a summit may have the effect of precluding progress at any other
level. Both Sadat and Begin may prefer not to play any cards
until they deal directly with you.
—Our refusal to discuss aid questions has not had the effect of softening
the Israeli stand. At some point we will have to decide how to respond
to Israeli aid requests. The more we commit now, the less we will have
to work with when the West Bank/Gaza negotiation gets underway.
—The situation in Iran has produced a greater degree of caution in both
Israel and Egypt. (S)
Within the very near future we will need to make fundamental decisions on
the substance, procedure and timing of another round of negotiations.
(C)
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter3
Washington, January 29, 1979
SUBJECT
- Status of Middle East Negotiations Following Atherton Trip
We are preparing a paper4 on
the options we have for pursuing the Middle East negotiations, for
discussion with you later in the week. Meanwhile, I want to give you
this assessment of where things stand following Atherton’s talks with the Israelis
and Egyptians.
It is our judgment that Begin
and Sadat both still want to
conclude the Treaty negotiations and have the political strength to
sell domestically whatever they may agree to, even though both are
under mounting pressures from elements of their respective political
constituencies who feel they have already gone too far. The more
time that passes, however, the greater is the danger that growing
second thoughts in Israel about Camp David will undermine Begin’s ability to have his way
with the Cabinet and the Knesset.
[Page 588]
While both leaders want to proceed to wrap up the Treaty, both are
having trouble with their respective political constituencies and
this fact has increased the perceived advantages for both in
bargaining hard over the remaining issues. In addition, events in
Iran have probably caused both sides to stiffen as they have
perceived increased risks in concluding a peace Treaty, resulting
from potential area repercussions of what is happening in Iran.
Israel is more concerned than ever about giving up Gulf of Suez oil
fields without ironclad Egyptian supply commitments. It is also more
determined than ever to ensure that Egypt will be firmly committed
to peace and normalization regardless of developments elsewhere in
the area, before giving up the security of its position in Sinai.
The Egyptians for their part stress increasingly that the peace
Treaty must not isolate Egypt and thus weaken its ability to play a
leading role for stability in the area. They therefore want the
Treaty package to include credible evidence that they are not making
a separate peace.
As a result of these perceptions, the “linkage” issue has taken on
even greater importance for both sides, with Egypt determined to
maximize, and Israel to minimize the linkage between their bilateral
Treaty and implementation of the Camp David Framework for the West
Bank and Gaza.
Following Atherton’s trip, it
is clear that both sides see all of the remaining issues, and not
just the West Bank/Gaza side letter and ambassadorial-exchange
question, as “linkage” issues which can only be dealt with and
resolved together, if they are to be resolved at all. This, more
than the intrinsic difficulty of any one of the three Treaty text
issues Atherton tried to
resolve, probably accounts for their unwillingness to make
significant headway during his trip. The linkage question is
fundamental to both sides, and they want to see how all of its parts
will be dealt with before trying to resolve any aspect of it. It is
also clear that, if these issues are to be discussed with any hope
of success, this must be done at the political level. Begin must be intimately involved
on the Israeli side, either through moving the talks back to the
summit or through ministerial-level talks in the area where
Dayan can have frequent
direct access to him.
It is also clear from Atherton’s talks that the Israeli Government is so
locked into its rejection of the proposals5 I took to Jerusalem
from Cairo last month that it cannot agree to any of them in their
present form. It is equally clear, however, that Sadat cannot agree to any major
departures from the substances of those proposals. The issues we
confront, therefore, are twofold: (1) whether we can find new ways
to
[Page 589]
package an overall
proposal for a solution of the remaining issues that will still meet
Sadat’s needs and yet be
acceptable to Israel, and (2) what negotiating format has the best
chance of bringing both Sadat
and Begin along. The paper we
are preparing for your consideration later this week will focus on
these two issues. As background for your review of our future
options, the following summarizes where matters stand on the three
paragraphs in the Treaty and on the oil question which Atherton discussed during his
visit (he did not, as you know, get into the West Bank/Gaza side
letter and ambassadorial-exchange issues or the aid questions
pending with the Israelis and Egyptians).
Article IV—The Egyptians still insist on
specifying that a review of Sinai security arrangements must be
undertaken “promptly” when requested by either side and must in any
case occur within a specified number of years. They are willing,
however, to use a synonym for “promptly” (e.g., “without delay”) and
to specify a six-year rather than a five-year review period. The
Israelis remain opposed to either concept, however expressed. I
still feel this is the least difficult question to resolve, but both
sides clearly want to hold off on any compromise until they see what
they can get on the other outstanding issues.
Article VI (2)—There does not seem to be any
way the Israelis can accept an interpretive note to this paragraph
of the Treaty, which the Egyptians want in order to make clear that
the phrase “independently of any instrument external to this Treaty”
does not mean they are making a separate peace. Both Begin and Dayan acknowledged to Atherton, however, that this issue
would have to be dealt with, and Dayan suggested that this might be done in the
context of the West Bank/Gaza side letter.
Article VI (5)—At the end of Atherton’s trip, as you know, we
were close to agreement with the Israelis on an ad referendum text
of a letter to them responding to questions they raised, as a result
of the legal opinion we offered the Egyptians, dealing with the
circumstances under which Egypt would and would not be justified in
joining hostilities against Israel under the Arab mutual security
and collective defense pacts. The Egyptians, however, have reacted
sharply to the idea of such a letter. This has raised the question
of whether, in the process of overcoming Israeli objections to the
legal opinion, we risk losing the Egyptians. Khalil suggested to Atherton that a way out of this
dilemma would be to drop from the Treaty package both the legal
opinion and the letter to the Israelis and to seek a brief statement
agreed to by both parties which would make clear that Article VI (5)
does not define any priority of obligations one way or the other
between the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty and other obligations of the
parties. Begin did not reject
this alternative approach when it was described to him by Atherton, al
[Page 590]
though we have not explored possible
formulations sufficiently to know whether it can be made to
work.
Oil—Khalil indicated to Atherton a possible opening for resolving the
problem of a supply commitment to Israel. On the one hand, he firmly
maintained the Egyptian position that, while Israel will be able to
purchase its requirements on a commercial basis from Egyptian
sources once there is peace, Egypt cannot put this understanding in
writing. On the other hand, he suggested that arrangements which
would assure a fixed supply to Israel could be made on a
company-to-company basis, with the Egyptian Government giving its
permission to the selling company (presumably AMOCO) to enter such an arrangement
with a company purchasing oil for Israel.