Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

152. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 6, 1978

SUBJECT

• Strategy for the Vance Trip to the Middle East (U)

My approach (unpoutful) would be as follows:

Key Objective (U)

—Signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and a letter on West Bank/Gaza negotiations by December 17. The failure to meet the deadline will be seen as an erosion of the Camp David agreement.² (TS)

—Alternatively, position ourselves so that our links to Egypt and moderate Arabs will be preserved even if the negotiations reach an impasse.³ (S)

Substance (U)

—Urge Sadat to accept treaty text as it now stands. (Fallback of minor change in Article VI, paragraph 2).⁴ (C)

—Rely on interpretive letters to explain that Egypt can honor collective defense commitments, or a strong unilateral Egyptian statement.⁵ (U)

—Side-letter on West Bank/Gaza negotiations with target date for elections by end of 1979. (Some variants may be possible; e.g., objective of concluding negotiations within nine months of ratification—to coincide with interim withdrawal—and holding of elections within three months thereof.)⁶ (S)

Tactics for Egypt (U)

—Prospect of expanding cooperation with U.S. as part of regional strategy. Would entail greater military assistance. (C)

—Our willingness to press Israel hard on target date and on settlements issue. (C)

—Forthcoming Presidential statement on Palestinians at outset of West Bank/Gaza negotiations. (We could repeat most of our previous statements and hint at willingness to expand direct contacts with Palestinians of various persuasions.)⁷ (S)

—Our willingness to lean on the Saudis now, and eventually the Jordanians, to gain their support for the peace process. (S)

—We should frankly explain that U.S.-Egyptian relations will be hurt if Sadat is seen in our public opinion as responsible for failure of negotiations. This is a political reality, not a threat nor a wild reaction. (S)

Tactics for Israel (U)

Our short-term problem is with Sadat, but our more fundamental problem is likely to be Israel’s unwillingness to agree to real powers for the self-governing authority. Begin needs to understand: (S)

—Whatever the treaty may say, the quality of the peace between Egypt and Israel, as well as our relations with Israel, will be influenced by how the full range of commitments at Camp David are carried out.⁸ (TS)

—We will oppose future settlement activity by reducing our aid budget by whatever amounts the Israeli government allocates to support of the settlements. We do not intend to subsidize illegal settlements and we will so inform Congress. We will also vote against them in the U.N.⁹ (S)

—A positive Israeli response on the target date will be followed by early agreement on bilateral economic assistance¹⁰ issues. Until this issue is resolved, we cannot make decisions on aid. Disbursal of aid will be conditional on actual progress on the West Bank/Gaza. (S)

—If Israel is seen as responsible for the deadlock in negotiations because of a failure to honor the spirit of the Camp David agreements, U.S.-Israeli relations will be adversely and tangibly affected. We would not be able to continue our intermediary role and the U.N. Security Council might be seized of the Middle East issue. (TS)

Summitry? (U)

In my judgment, Vance may be able to persuade Sadat to accept our proposal, but I am not optimistic. In any event, Begin is likely to refuse. Therefore, you may have to deliver the messages suggested here directly to both leaders. This argues for a summit. (TS)

You have credibility with Sadat. Begin would have to be told that decisions would have to be made on the spot if he came to Washington. He should not be allowed the excuse of referring back to his cabinet. If we pursue this course, the risks of failure will be substantial, and we will have to posture ourselves carefully to preserve our ties to Sadat and the integrity of the Camp David Framework.¹¹ (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 14, Middle East—Negotiations: (9/77–12/78). Top Secret; Outside System. Sent for information. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed “C” at the top of the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.
2. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
3. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
4. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “[paragraph] 5.”
5. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
6. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
7. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
8. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”
9. In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “OK.”
10. In the margin next to this word, Carter wrote: “?”
11. In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “OK.”