133. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin1
SUBJECT
- Telephone Conversation between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, November 12, 1978
President Carter: I have sent you a personal letter today by Secretary Vance.2
Prime Minister Begin: He will give it to me at the airport?
President Carter: Yes, as soon as he sees you.3 The essence of it is, in my own opinion in spite of all of the efforts that Vance and the negotiators have made, the prospects at this point of approving an agreement are quite remote. My own belief is that the deep feeling and demands on Israel on one side and Egypt on the other, without substantial courage and flexibility, are incompatible. We have tried to explore, as best we could, language that would be a reasonable compromise, and that would be fair to both nations and would carry out the commitments made at Camp David. We also realize very clearly that to translate the general language at Camp David into specific agreements is a major step forward and also very difficult. Secretary Vance met last night until about one-thirty this morning with your negotiators4 and I suggested yesterday that he bring them up with him to save your own time and to let you know what the tentative agreements are.
Prime Minister Begin: I don’t know yet what they discussed.
President Carter: I realize that you don’t. He’ll bring along the Israeli negotiators with him. We have just about reached the end of our ability, because on several occasions, as you know, including about three weeks ago when I personally met with both negotiators,5 once we reach an agreement here and it goes back to either you, the Israeli Cabinet, or President Sadat, the negotiated agreement is thrown aside and additional demands are made. I don’t criticize anyone for it, but it has [Page 456] been increasingly obvious that the divisions, instead of becoming resolved, are becoming deeper. My hope is that, within the bounds of your own principles and beliefs of what is best for Israel, that you look with favor on the present draft6 of the treaty and the other documents attached. They are not exactly as you would prefer, or President Sadat would prefer, but I hope that you, along with President Sadat will be as flexible as possible. I talked with President Sadat this afternoon7 just before calling you.
Prime Minister Begin: I will, of course, read with great attention your letter, but as I don’t know yet any news about the decisions that took place during the night. I can only say, Mr. President, that you didn’t tell me that the draft presented to me is, in my opinion, a deviation from the Camp David conference. I have told my friends that we hold true and faithful to the Camp David framework. We shall not deviate from it whatsoever. The demands brought by Mr. Ghali from Egypt are a deviation from the Camp David agreements. It is absolutely clear. I had heard that if the Government of Israel does not agree to set up a timetable corresponding to the time of withdrawal to the Ras Muhammad and al-Arish line, then the Egyptians will not fulfill their commitment to exchange resident ambassadors.
Ezer Weizman might have said something to General Ali, which was his right, but he does not decide the issues, as none of your representatives do, Mr. President. The Government of Israel decides. If the decision of the Government of Israel goes against any hints given by Ezer Weizman, then that decision stands. The Egyptians cannot say you broke your promise. We didn’t break any promises. The decisions are, in a Parliamentary regime, with the Government of Israel, not even with the Prime Minister. I am also one of the Cabinet.
At Camp David, the Israeli delegation had full powers of the Cabinet to decide. This is not the case. If the Egyptians threaten us with not sending ambassadors, then we shall ask them to agree that ambassadors will be sent before we start any withdrawal, after the documents of ratification come into force and the peace treaty itself comes into force, as actually it should be. The peace treaty is signed, confirmed, and ratified, then we should have normal relations as written at Camp David. We agreed to postpone it actually for ten months. This was a very great concession. Now we are threatened that there won’t be any ambassadors whatsoever if we don’t comply with their demands. So that is not the way to negotiate in good faith. We do negotiate in good faith. The draft letters about the changes that will take place with Egypt only, because Jordan does not join them, without the administrative [Page 457] council, is not in conformity with the Camp David agreements. We never talked about a timetable of five or six months. We cannot say because there is the PLO.
The people, Mr. President, who met your friend, Mr. Atherton,8 are threatened with their lives. We have to give them our protection. We are prepared, although Jordan does not join, to negotiate with Egypt alone the modalities, the responsibilities, and the powers. But we cannot sign a document in which it is plainly said the elections will take place in six months. They may take place in three months, and they not take place in nine months. We cannot say. We don’t have candidates. So, how can we sign such a document? I wrote a draft which was fair to everybody, although Jordan does not join. Notwithstanding this fact, we are prepared to negotiate within a month after the exchange of letters of ratification, everything which is written at Camp David, but do not ask us to sign a document that the elections will take place for the administrative council between five or six months. That is absolutely impossible. This I am going to explain to Secretary Vance.
Then, Mr. President, may I say a word about the financial issue. I had the broad idea that we should not ask for a grant at this time, but for a loan for twenty-five years. I was almost stoned in my country because of it. I do not make any exaggeration. Then there is the question of the two air fields. I read the last draft sent by Secretary Vance—just absolutely non-concrete. I don’t know what is the plan. Secretary Vance said he would talk to you and then you will talk to Congressional leaders. I also wanted to talk to Congress. They are my friends. Secretary Vance advised me not to talk to the Senate. Until now we don’t actually know anything. What can we do? The evacuation of an army of tens of thousands and installations which were built for eleven years is connected with a very serious expenditure. I didn’t want to ask for a grant, I asked for a loan. We shall repay it. But, we have no reply yet; and we don’t know.
Mr. Atherton made a very grave remark to Dayan during their talk that the question is being raised that we combine peace with money. I take exception to such a remark. We don’t combine any money with anything; but we put the facts before the Secretary. Without any answers, we are walking through darkness. We are not beggars, Mr. President. I go into the city of Jerusalem and look at the walls and read “Begin traitor”. I have a debate with my own friends all the time. We have to care for the security and the future of our people. We have made great sacrifices, Mr. President. You know very well that at Camp David I did not promise to remove the settlements from Sinai. I did it [Page 458] later for the sake of peace. I brought it to Parliament. My old friends were in revolt against it. I don’t think that the peace talks should be suspended. For every draft I will give another draft. This is the nature of negotiations.
President Carter: I think it is important that Secretary Vance explain to you personally at some length because some of the matters that concern you are not compatible with President Sadat’s position. He has never intended to reverse his commitment once it was made, as far as I know, on any issue. Although I went to him on the ambassadors, at the request of your own negotiators, who told me they would withdraw from al-Arish and the central part of the Sinai early, and on that basis I went to President Sadat and asked him for a one-month commitment on the ambassadorship exchange and that’s why he gave it to me.
Prime Minister Begin: Mr. President, may I interrupt you for a moment. But everything was ad referendum. The Government makes the decisions, not our negotiators.
President Carter: I understand, Mr. Prime Minister, but that proviso was not mentioned at the time that Dayan and Weizman and Barak all told me there would be an early withdrawal from el-Arish. But in spite of that, President Sadat told me this afternoon that he was not going back on his commitment to me to exchange ambassadors within one month.
Prime Minister Begin: I got this information from my own friends yesterday on the phone.
President Carter: Mr. Prime Minister, I just talked to President Sadat on the telephone. I think the time schedule for the elections and the establishment of the self-government are very important to President Sadat. I think here again Secretary Vance can explain what President Sadat’s position is. I think that he is not as interested in an exact number of months as he is in the certainty of the elections being held. But I think that he has one advantage. Once he tells me something through his negotiators, that it is a final and definite commitment, I don’t have to worry about it. I live in a democracy also in which I know that I have to refer agreements made to the Senate if they are in the treaty form. It is very difficult to negotiate over and over with the Israeli Government on the same issues once we thought it had been concluded.
Prime Minister Begin: No, sir, we don’t negotiate over and over. We found two points on which we did not agree. We proposed compromise proposals which were not acceptable by the other side. The Government has to take decisions. We don’t negotiate over and over again anything as far as we are concerned. When we got the draft letter, which was unacceptable to us, which Dayan told the Egyptian negotiating team, then again those five or six months are uncertain. We [Page 459] cannot accept. We have another draft. So, why should our draft letter be thrown into the basket and the other letter be the document? Because President Sadat wants it—you know I am his friend and I wish him well. How can we say that the elections will take place in five or six months? If the PLO comes with its pistols—we shall do our best to talk to them, to convince them. We invited Jordan. But we cannot force anybody either to join our peace-making process, or to come into our election process. We can only convince people. This is the point. I don’t think that we read about renegotiations of points. We have our point of view in the Cabinet. We have a real objection to including those words, “Noting, etc. . .”, taking them out of context. If that is taken from Camp David, why shouldn’t other sentences be taken. This is one of our objections. There was a decision by the Cabinet. The majority of the Cabinet decided not to make a precipate withdrawal. I wasn’t even there. We must obey by these decisions. What Ezer said wasn’t binding.
President Carter: I am not trying to reopen that discussion. It was not only Weizman; it was Dayan and Barak. But, that is not the main concern that I have. There is a limit to how much longer we can go on with the negotiations and I hope that you will read my letter very carefully within the bounds of your own commitment.
Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir. Surely I will.
President Carter: I hope you will be as flexible as possible.
Prime Minister Begin: Yes, I think I will write to you from Jerusalem, answering your letter.
President Carter: I think the answers can be accomplished in your discussions with Secretary Vance.
Prime Minister Begin: I will get back home on Monday9 in the afternoon. I will convene a session of the Cabinet on Tuesday or perhaps on Wednesday. During the week I will answer you. Believe me, Mr. President, we will do our best to have peace. We have done all our best. Sometimes we are not understood by some members of your Administration, Mr. President, with all due respect.
President Carter: I will tell Secretary Vance to discuss this again with you tonight and to explain the present draft document—by the way, which your negotiators have agreed to this. I hope you will also agree.
Prime Minister Begin: Yes, sir.
President Carter: Good.
Prime Minister Begin: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 15, Egypt-Israel Negotiations, 11/6–13/78. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke with Begin from 2:43 p.m. to 2:53 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter’s handwritten notes related to this conversation are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 2, Israel, 11/77–2/79.↩
- See Document 130.↩
- See Document 134.↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See Documents 96 and 98.↩
- See Document 131.↩
- See Document 132.↩
- See Document 75.↩
- November 13.↩