123. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
-
ISRAELI SIDE
- Menachem Begin, Prime Minister
- Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister
- Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister
- Aharaon Barak, Justice, Israeli Supreme Court
- Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
- Yehuda Avner, Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Reuven Hecht, Advisor to the Prime Minister
- General Avraham Tamir, Chief of Military Planning
- General Ephrain Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
- Nahil Kadeshai, Advisor to the Prime Minister
-
AMERICAN SIDE
- Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
- Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Ambassador at Large
- Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary, NEA
SUBJECT
- Meeting Between Prime Minister Begin and Secretary Vance: Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations, Bilateral U.S.-Israeli Issues
The Prime Minister opened by suggesting that the agenda for the meeting should cover the treaty negotiations including the proposed exchange of letters on what happens with respect to the West Bank and Gaza after the treaty is in force, and U.S.-Israeli bilateral issues.
Turning first to the proposed exchange of letters, the Prime Minister said he would have amendments to suggest. First, however, he wanted to make the following point: the situation now was different from Camp David. Then as Prime Minister he was empowered to take decisions. Now everything was ad referendum and must be decided by his Government. As Prime Minister, he had no powers to decide issues. What emerged from this meeting would be referred to the Cabinet Sunday2 and Acting Prime Minister Yadin would conduct the Cabinet meeting in his absence.
The Secretary said that he had authority to take decisions on some issues while others would be ad referendum to President Carter.
[Page 417](At this point the Secretary was called to take a phone call from the President. When he returned, he said the President was in New York and asked if the Secretary could bring the Prime Minister to Arthur Krim’s3 office a few blocks away at 1:30PM so that they could shake hands and greet each other. The Prime Minister said he would be pleased to do this.)4
Returning to the subject at hand, Begin read a proposed Israeli version of the side letter on the West Bank and Gaza (Attachment 1). The Prime Minister said Israel wants to preserve its adherence to the Camp David Framework and its proposed letter confirmed that Egypt and Israel will do so. Theoretically, they should wait until Jordan joins the negotiations, but Israel wanted to proceed. The letter should therefore make the point that although the Camp David Framework says there will be three parties to the West Bank/Gaza negotiations, Egypt and Israel will proceed on their own. It is indispensable to include this point in order to be faithful to the Camp David Framework.
The Secretary said if this was important to Israel, he would in principle go along and would try to get Egyptian agreement. His personal view, however, was that in the interest of getting Hussein to join the negotiations, it would be better not to mention Jordan.
On the form of the letter, the Secretary suggested there be an identical note.
The Prime Minister said there could be either two papers with one signature on each or one paper with two signatures, if the language was identical. If there were differences, Egypt and Israel could write different letters.
The Secretary asked if the Framework would be annexed to the letter. The Prime Minister said no; he had signed the Framework and did not want to create the impression that he had to again prove his adherence to it. The Secretary said this was important to Egypt and not a substantive issue; he urged the Prime Minister to agree. Begin said he would refer this question to his Government.
[Page 418]The Prime Minister read the language in the Israeli draft about Jordan. He then emphasized that the beginning of West Bank/Gaza negotiations must follow the exchange of instruments of ratification and not simply follow the signing of the treaty. The Secretary said we would need to see if this was possible under Egyptian procedures.
Begin said Israel wanted to add a reference to “related issues,” since other matters (e.g., security) were also covered in the Camp David Framework. Continuing, the Prime Minister said Israel was prepared to say that elections should be held “at an early date.” It is impossible to predict when they could be held; could take three months or seven months.
The Secretary replied that he wanted to make the counter-argument. The letter could say that negotiations would take place “with the objective” of holding elections by a given date. This would not fix a date but only set a target. It would demonstrate that all parties were serious about carrying out the Camp David Framework. It would have a positive effect on people in the West Bank and Gaza and encourage their participation which is important for success of the negotiations. It would have an important psychological effect in the region generally. President Carter had asked the Secretary to stress this point.
Begin said one cannot pick a date out of the blue; it may take six months. The Secretary asked why not say six months. Begin replied that the phrase “at an early date” means Israel is serious. The Secretary responded that it could do no harm to have a target date.
The Prime Minister said that “an early date” means months, not years, but it could take three months or ten months. It will be necessary to decide the form of the elections, constituencies, perhaps political parties. Specifying the number of months would mean nothing but if a time period were included in the letter and then not met, Israel would be accused of bad faith. There was no predicting, Begin said, whether the people would agree. The PLO may threaten them and force a boycott.
The Secretary said he would need to consult the President; he personally continued to think that naming the number of months was preferable and urged the Prime Minister to think further about our suggestion.
Barak suggested using the phrase “within a short period.” The Prime Minister said Israel cannot accept specifying the number of months but would consider any other phrase.
Barak said since we don’t know how long the talks will take, we should think in terms of a period of time following the end of the talks rather than from the beginning of the talks. The Secretary replied that this would not help and that he would have to talk to the President. Dayan said Israel would consider it if the Secretary thought the phrase [Page 419] “within a short period” was better. The Secretary said this might be better; he would need to discuss it with the Egyptians.
In response to Dayan’s comment that Israel cannot commit itself to a number of months, the Secretary said it would be only a target. He was puzzled about what was wrong in setting a target. Dayan said that the date should be part of the modalities to be discussed in the negotiations. If we set a date in advance, this would have a negative reaction among the Palestinians who would see this as patronizing them; they would say that these are our elections and others are trying to tell us what to do.
The Secretary said let’s leave this subject; you reflect on it and I will talk to the President. Dayan responded that it would be important if agreement could be reached while the Prime Minister is here.
Barak commented that Israel would not want to say in a side letter that negotiations would start one month after ratification of the treaty. Israel did not want to give the impression that this matter is linked to the treaty. We should speak of x months after Camp David or “within a short period” after the exchange of letters, with the understanding that this meant one month. The Secretary said no, we cannot change this. Barak replied, let it stay as it is.
Turning to the treaty text, the Prime Minister read the third paragraph of the preamble beginning “noting that the aforementioned Framework...” The Israeli Government, he said, had decided unanimously to demand deletion of this paragraph. It took Camp David language out of context. One could also quote other parts of the Camp David Framework which were important to Israeli public opinion. Israel had accepted paragraph one of the preamble from the start although many of his friends had doubts about this. It is necessary, he said, to show that an Israel-Egyptian agreement is only the first treaty. Any addition out of context, however, is an insult to Israel. If the reason is Arab opinion, Israel’s problems are more serious than Sadat’s. Israel’s problems are internal. The Prime Minister therefore asked that this paragraph be deleted as detrimental in Israeli opinion and unnecessary. The Prime Minister then noted that the United States’ replies to King Hussein had been publicized in Ha’aretz; this was causing more problems.
The Secretary interjected that he was deeply concerned about the attacks on Mr. Saunders. He had spoken for the United States Government and these attacks must stop.
With respect to paragraph three of the preamble, the Secretary had two comments: without this paragraph there would be no treaty with Egypt; and both the President and he believe it is fair; it only repeats Camp David language and should be retained; we see no basis to change it.
[Page 420]The Prime Minister said he had never attacked Mr. Saunders personally. However, he wanted the Secretary to tell the President that the replies to Hussein5 had been the gravest matter in Israeli public opinion and in Israel’s future. If Saunders had said that Ambassador Yost’s speech6 was still binding, that East Jerusalem is occupied territory, this was a serious matter. The greatest wrong that had ever been done to a nation had been done in this case. Why should united Jerusalem not be recognized as the capital of Israel? The Prime Minister then recounted Jordanian actions in East Jerusalem and Prime Minister Eshkol’s message to Hussein in June 1967,7 despite which Hussein had attacked. There was now free access to the holy shrines and Israel had rebuilt the Jewish quarter, yet East Jerusalem was called occupied. This had been said in the middle of negotiations with Sadat. It makes Israel’s position difficult when Sadat hears what the United States says. The Prime Minister said he had not attacked Mr. Saunders but had spoken of the position of the United States which concerns Israel’s future. He had also been attacked, the Prime Minister said, and called a traitor by his friends, all because Israel wants peace. This hurt deeply.
Furthermore, the Prime Minister said, the phrase “whatever settlements remain” as applied to the West Bank implies that the Camp David Sinai Framework is a model for Judea and Samaria and for the Golan. This is wrong.
Turning to the preambular language (at “noting”), the Prime Minister expressed deep astonishment that this should be made a condition for the treaty. He could not change the decision of the Israeli Government, which must decide. Israel will consider this problem but he, the Prime Minister, could do nothing without the Government. Perhaps he could speak about it today to President Carter. The Secretary said he had discussed this very issue with the President that morning.
Turning to the language on Gaza in Article II, the Prime Minister said that the accepted forum is to say “without prejudice to the position of either party.” This was a simple issue. The Secretary agreed it was simple. Egypt wanted to remove some language and Israel wanted to add language. The Secretary said let’s leave the present language as it was agreed ad referendum. The Secretary said Israel’s additional language does not change the substance. The words “the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip” reflect Israel’s position. This is not worth arguing about and should be solved by leaving the language as it is.
[Page 421]After consulting his colleagues in Hebrew, the Prime Minister suggested leaving out the word “issue” and simply saying “without prejudice to the position of either party on the status of the Gaza Strip.” The Secretary said this would be even more difficult and asked what is wrong with the language as it stands.
Begin said that the phrase “without prejudice” always refers to the positions of parties, not to issues. Egypt wants Gaza to be part of a Palestinian State. The Prime Minister said that he believed after five years Israel would seek sovereignty over Gaza. If this was not agreed, the autonomy regime would continue. Brzezinski had thought this reasonable. Israel wants to make clear that neither side’s position is prejudiced. The Secretary said the present language accomplishes that. The words “the issue of” were an Israeli proposal. Sadat wanted much more about Gaza. We are trying to hold him to this single reference. The Secretary said he was concerned what would happen if we opened the language. Barak suggested dropping the word “issue.” The Secretary replied that he would report this to the Egyptians; Begin said he would report to his Cabinet. The Secretary said it was best to leave this language alone; if the Egyptians sent it back to Cairo, this would open the whole thing up. The Prime Minister replied that he had no choice but to return it to the Cabinet. The Secretary said he was afraid this would open the whole issue with the Egyptians. Statesmanship could solve this problem and the Prime Minister is a statesman.
Turning to Article III, paragraph two, Barak noted that the word “anywhere” had been omitted from the first sentence. Rosenne said Israel had only included it in the second sentence but saw no problem with the Egyptians in adding it to the first sentence as well. The Secretary said, since it was not previously in the first sentence, if this agreed language was re-opened there would be a problem. If we keep changing agreed language, there will never be agreement. Begin said Israel would accept this language as presently written. The Secretary said “good.”
Turning to Article IV, Begin said the Cabinet had rejected the idea of a five-year review period. While the Cabinet had not changed its decision, he was prepared to accept the present wording and recommend this to the Cabinet. He had talked to Yadin who would support him. The Secretary again said “good.”
With respect to Article VI, Begin said the present title (The Relationship of Obligations) did not reflect the contents of the Article and suggested substituting “precedence” for “relationship.” Begin also said Israel still preferred its original text of this Article. The Secretary said he would raise with the Egyptians the words “precedence” or “priority.”
Rosenne then read Israel’s original text which said that this treaty would “prevail over” other obligations. Begin asked if we could con [Page 422] vince the Egyptians to accept the word “prevail.” The Secretary said no; the Egyptians had not even accepted the present language but we thought they could be persuaded to. Begin said he would recommend that the Cabinet accept the present text as written while the United States checked to see if the title could be changed. The Secretary remarked that we were making real progress.
Dayan noted that, in addition to the treaty text, we needed to complete the annexes and the appendix to Annex I. The Secretary said the Egyptians wanted an appendix, and we did not know if we could get them to move off that position.
Begin then noted that the Israeli Minister of Energy had come to the United States to deal with the oil problem. This was a serious matter, and he hoped the United States could help; Israel needs Egyptian oil at market prices. The Secretary said there would be no problem about market prices.
Dayan then commented that, leaving the annex aside, there were three problems which he thought could be worked out in Washington: the preamble, the Gaza language and the side letter. The Secretary said he thought the problem of the letter could be solved. Dayan said this still leaves two points. Egypt cannot simply say that if Israel does not agree to the present language, there will be no treaty. A further effort is needed to overcome these problems. The Gaza problem is meaningless. If the preamble is the only problem, we need to seek agreement on this. On the whole, Dayan said, we are not doing badly if the gap is down to one and one-half issues. The Secretary said this is real progress to which Begin replied “I came to make progress.”
Begin then turned the conversation to bilateral issues.
Begin began by noting that we are at a turning point in the history of the Middle East with the coming of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The parties will go on to the next stage in the peace process but nevertheless this is a turning point.
Israel must face what is going to happen with the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israeli troops from the Sinai and the relocation of installations in the Negev, Begin said. It is a matter of gravest concern if Israel cannot deal with the financial aspects of this move. He noted that he is not an economist, but he does understand the tremendous burden which will fall upon Israel as a result of these moves. “We don’t want to bring about a peace treaty which would be accompanied by complete bankruptcy.” It is not an objective possibility for Israel to bear the full costs of this move.
Israel has therefore decided to request from the United States a loan to cover these costs. Israel is not seeking a grant; Israel’s record on repaying its debts is perfect. In this case, Israel would seek a loan for 25 years at 2–4 percent interest. The total would be $3.37 billion, including [Page 423] $800 million for the airfields and $300 million for resettling the settlers. Begin apologized again to the President for mentioning that cost but said Israel had to do something in developing new homes for the settlers who will leave the Sinai. Parenthetically, he acknowledged that President Carter had “never used any pressure” on Israel about the settlers in the Sinai. Begin said he had weighed their continued presence against the opportunity of peace and made his decision.
Begin suggested that “we agree today” that Israeli Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich meet with Secretary Blumenthal on November 6, when Ehrlich could pass through Washington on his way to a speech in California.8
Secretary Vance said that he would have to discuss this with the President. The President in turn would have to discuss the subject with the Congressional leadership before responding to Prime Minister Begin’s request. The Secretary noted that the President would not be able to focus on this until he returns to Washington late November 4. The Secretary said he would report to the President then. Meanwhile, he said it would be a mistake to discuss this publicly at this point until the President has a chance to mention it to the Congressional leadership since the leadership could be offended by public discussion of an issue of which they had not been informed.
Foreign Minister Dayan said he hoped that Secretary Vance could at least agree that the Israeli Finance Minister should deal with this matter so that he could get it off his own agenda.
Secretary Vance repeated that he did not want to make any commitment until he had talked with the President. If we get to such a point, he said, then we could agree that the Finance Minister would handle the issue.
Defense Minister Weizman intervened to note that, when we sign the treaty there will be other issues to discuss like MATMON C.9 Secretary Vance suggested that we not try to solve that now.
Begin returned to the subject of the airfields, saying they would have to be operational in three years. Secretary Vance responded by [Page 424] reading the last sentences of Secretary Brown’s letter10 after Camp David to Minister Weizman. Begin noted in passing that the letter in the present negotiations on the exchange of ambassadors is satisfactory, and then he returned to the airfields. What happens, he asked, if it takes longer than three years to complete the airfields? He wanted an agreement that Israel would operate the two remaining airfields in the Sinai until the new ones could become operational. He felt this should be written as a protocol to the treaty.
Secretary Vance responded that he could not at this point agree that there will be such a protocol which would change the basic agreement. The Secretary said he could tell the Prime Minister that the United States will work with Israel and we have confidence that the airfields will be completed in time. The Prime Minister responded by asking again, “But what do we do with our planes if the airfields are not completed? Where will we put them?” Secretary Vance again quoted from the Brown letter the portion that states U.S. understanding for the special priority which Israel attaches to this and Israel’s position that it cannot leave the Sinai until the new airfields are completed. The Secretary said he could not commit the United States to any more at this point. Weizman suggested that the problem might be helped if Egypt were to acknowledge its understanding of the Brown-Weizman letter. The Secretary noted that the Egyptians had already received a copy.
Turning to the subject of aerial surveillance, Secretary Vance said the United States is prepared to continue providing such surveillance for three years. If there is to be any extension, it would be agreed by all three parties. The Secretary said the United States side would take up this subject with Egypt and noted that this was being done in response to an Israeli request. He summarized by saying that the United States is committed for three years. Beyond three years, the issue remains open.
The Secretary noted to the Prime Minister that the United States had given the Israeli Delegation a draft letter relating to the UN Forces. The Prime Minister said the letter is satisfactory and the Israeli Government accepts it.
Secretary Vance indicated his desire to move ahead quickly to complete Annex I to the treaty and suggested trying to do so in the next 48 hours.
Dayan reminded the Secretary that we had also agreed to review commitments under the disengagement agreements. The Secretary suggested that we wait until after completion of the work on the treaty. [Page 425] Prime Minister Begin agreed with that approach, saying that we needed to take our time to it.
The meeting ended about 12:30 p.m. with the Secretary and Prime Minister agreeing that they would meet in the lobby of the hotel at 1:20 p.m. in order to call briefly on President Carter who would be spending a few minutes at that time at the office of Mr. Arthur Krim.
- Source: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, NEA Front Office Subject File 1978–1984, Lot 85D251, Box 3, 1978 Memcons—Secretary. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Begin’s suite at the Regency Plaza Hotel.↩
- November 5.↩
- U.S. film studio executive and former chairman of the Democratic Party National Finance Committee.↩
- According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter talked with Vance from 10:23 a.m. to 10:26 a.m. on November 2. Carter greeted Begin at the New York residence of Arthur Krim at 1:32 p.m. before escorting the Prime Minister inside. Carter gave a short address, met with Vance, and departed the Krim residence at 2 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of the meeting between Carter and Begin has been found. Atherton reported the substance of the Vance-Begin meeting in telegram 280995 to Tel Aviv and Cairo, November 4, noting that Carter and Begin “exchanged warm personal greetings,” but that there “was no substantive or private conversation” between the two leaders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2351)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 91.↩
- See footnote 12, Document 64.↩
- For discussion of Israeli-Jordanian correspondence before the June 1967 war, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, footnote 2, Document 160.↩
- Ehrlich and Blumenthal met at the Department of the Treasury on November 14. A summary of their meeting was transmitted in telegram 295850 to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Cairo, November 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481–0844) The meeting followed a meeting of the U.S.-Israel Joint Committee for Investment and Trade in which the two officials participated. At the conclusion of the Joint Committee meeting Ehrlich and Blumenthal signed a summary statement of the meeting’s proceedings, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 292425 to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, November 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780475–0012)↩
- See footnote 7, Document 24.↩
- See Document 57.↩
- Secret.↩