Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, August 17, 1977, 0153Z

194979. Subject: PLO and Resolution 242. Reference: Beirut 3996² (Notal–being repeated to other addressees).

1. In your next discussion with Walid Khalidi, you should seek to disabuse him of idea that PLO would have nothing to show for its acceptance of Resolution 242. Suggest you discuss this matter with him along following lines:

—Given the lack of consensus among Arab governments, to say nothing of sharp differences between Arabs and Israelis, on the nature of a final Palestinian settlement, it is not realistic to think that this question can be resolved other than in the context of the Geneva negotiations. For the U.S. to endorse any particular solution would prejudge those negotiations and undermine our ability to play the honest broker role which both sides have asked us to assume.

—At the same time, our support of the “Palestinian homeland” concept represented a significant move on our part and, judging from the strongly adverse Israeli reaction, has been recognized as such by them. In taking this position, we have in effect recognized that the Palestinian question is not just a refugee issue but one involving the political status of the Palestinians. We have, in other words, added this issue as one of the co-equal core issues of a settlement to the two issues of peace and withdrawal which constitute the basic elements of Resolution 242.

—Furthermore, we have endorsed the concept that a settlement should provide for self-determination by the Palestinians in deciding on their future status. It seems to us that this should be recognized as a major new element in our position.

—Finally, we have said that if the PLO will issue an unambiguous statement accepting Resolution 242 and Israel’s right to exist, with reservations because 242 does not sufficiently deal with the Palestinian question since it does not refer to the need for a homeland, we would immediately enter into official contacts with it. We have understood that this has long been a major PLO objective.

—If the PLO insists on more than all of the foregoing before it will accept 242, it will risk seriously overplaying its hand and may end up with nothing and find itself on the outside looking in while the negotiating process goes forward.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–2465. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Atherton, approved by Habib, and cleared by James Thyden (S/S–O). Sent priority for information to Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.
2. In telegram 3996 from Beirut, August 16, Ambassador Parker reported that Whalid Khalidi, a professor of political studies at the American University of Beirut, informed him that he was working to “bring PLO leadership around to accept” the proposed U.S. statement regarding PLO acceptance of U.N. Resolution 242 with a reservation regarding a Palestinian homeland. Khalidi noted that the PLO might accept Resolution 242, but that PLO leadership would need assurances regarding U.S. “intentions toward the concept of Palestinian state.” He hoped that the United States would provide language in the same spirit as the Balfour Declaration or “consider some similar moral commitment to the idea of a Palestinian state.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–2159)