Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

48. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Visitors to Israel

During the past week, Senator Javits had extensive discussions with Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Dayan. Ambassador Lewis also met with Begin, as did Arthur Hertzberg. The following are highlights of the reporting we have received.

Javits-Begin (July 4)

—Javits warned Begin of an erosion in support for Israel among the U.S. people and Congress. He noted that he had mustered 76 Senators to sign the letter of support for Israel in 1974.² Today that number would be nearer 66.

—On Lebanon, Begin emphasized that Israel had absolutely no territorial objectives in south Lebanon, but Israel regards the Christians in the south as a beleaguered minority and will not permit them to be destroyed.

—Begin stressed the desirability of a peace treaty, with articles which deal with each of the outstanding issues. He also reiterated his preference for “face-to-face direct negotiations.”

—On Geneva, Begin indicated that he will go with Dayan. Begin would make the opening statement and Dayan will remain to negotiate.

Javits-Dayan (July 3)

—Dayan stressed four points: (1) Israel is committed to all agreements of previous governments, including 242; (2) Israel wants to go to Geneva as soon as possible and is not trying to delay; (3) Israel wants a comprehensive peace but is willing to consider interim or separate agreements if necessary; and (4) There is no area which is non-negotiable.

—Dayan offered his view that in 30 years there has never been a better time to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Lewis-Dayan (June 30)

—They discussed the recent flap on the State Department announcement.³

—Dayan observed that a very well-known U.S. personality (presumably Hertzberg) had told him that the Mondale speech⁴ and State Department statement, if implemented, would spell “the end of Israel.” He referred specifically to the vagueness of pronouncements on peace and security guarantees for Israel.

—Dayan questioned the advisability of Secretary Vance coming to the Middle East so soon after the Begin visit and wondered if the next stage of negotiations might not better be held in the “more relaxed atmosphere in Washington.”

—Dayan indicated that the present government could not do less on settlements than the previous Labor Government. Lewis argued for a moratorium on settlements. Dayan said it could not be “put on ice.”

Hertzberg-Begin (July 1)

—“Begin will not be carrying a piece of the West Bank with him when he comes to the U.S.” (Presumably meaning he will not be prepared to make commitments on withdrawal.)

—Begin will be going to Washington “not just to negotiate, but also to educate.”

—Begin will probably press to return to the concept of 242, and ask the U.S. to drop the emphasis on “homeland” which 242 does not contain.

—Hertzberg is convinced that Yadin will join the cabinet.

In a separate interview in Israel, Hertzberg took vigorous exception to the Brookings Report and the Rogers Plan.⁵ (“U.S. Jewry will fight with all their strength, with all their heart and soul . . . to convince [them] that this is a bad plan.”)⁶ He also warned that if U.S.-Israel relations developed into a full confrontation, this would “push this region into another war.”

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Chron File, Box 132, Quandt: 7/1–13/77. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. An attached covering memorandum from Quandt to Brzezinski is dated July 6. In the memorandum, Quandt noted Brzezinski’s request for a “summary of recent reporting” and requested that he sign the attached memorandum to Carter.
2. See footnote 7, Document 38.
3. See footnote 3, Document 44. The Israeli Government issued a statement on June 28, in response to the State Department announcement, denying that Israel was unwilling to discuss the occupied territories in peace negotiations. (“Israelis Are Irked by U.S. Statement,” New York Times, June 29, 1977, p. 1)
4. See footnote 2, Document 40.
5. For the Rogers Plan, see footnote 9, Document 21. The Brookings Report refers to a 1975 report written a by a study group at the Brookings Institute. The report examined the requirements for achieving an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
6. Brackets in the original.