Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

267. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Kent, England, July 17, 1978

PARTICIPANTS

• Egypt
• Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Foreign Minister
• Ahmed Maher, Foreign Minister’s Chef du Cabinet
• United States
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Eilts, Cairo

Foreign Minister Kamel first conveyed to the Secretary the warm greetings of President Sadat. The Secretary asked that his greetings and respects be passed to Sadat. Kamel spoke of the special feeling that Sadat has for the Secretary and President Carter and indicated that he shares these feelings. GOE places great hopes in the United States, President Carter and the Secretary. He noted that Egypt has entered a new and more active phase which, hopefully, will achieve something. He asked about the Secretary’s talks with Dayan.²

The Secretary said that he had had good and serious talks with Dayan. He then asked how Kamel viewed the situation. He wanted Kamel’s thoughts on how to proceed. There are now two West Bank/Gaza plans on the table.³ There are points of commonality in several areas, but also sharp differences. Both plans call for five-year transitional periods. Both speak about self-government, although they differ about what the future should be. Both speak of security arrangements for the transitional period and afterwards. Kamel noted that he had not seen the latter in the Israeli plan. The Secretary noted that the Israeli plan talks about a transitional period. Both sides also talk about Jordanian participation if King Hussein is willing to come in. Although not in the plan, behind each is the belief that a true peace should be achieved in terms of normal relations between the countries.

Points of difference include withdrawal and the participation of the Palestinians in the determination of their future. The Secretary’s view, after talking with Dayan, was that the Aswan formula should resolve this last aspect. Thus the major difference is what happens after the five-year transitional period. That is the big question in terms of sovereignty and related matters. Despite these differences, there appears to be more common ground than the Secretary had believed was the case before the two plans were put forward. He was seeking to be pragmatic, without expressing opinions on how to approach the problem.

The Secretary thought that it would be useful during the two days of the Leeds conference to explore the areas of commonality as well as the differences. Discussions on the common elements might be helpful to define more clearly and to identify differences. There might then be a discussion of the areas of disagreement. He had asked Dayan if the latter would be willing to go first, which the Secretary knew Kamel would prefer. Although Dayan would have preferred that the Egyptian plan be discussed first, he had agreed to proceeding as the Secretary had suggested.

The Secretary thought that, so far as procedure is concerned and provided the Egyptians are agreeable, he should first have a talk with Dayan and then with Kamel. Thereafter there should be a trilateral plenary session with the full delegations. At that session Dayan would explain the Israeli views and Kamel could put questions. This procedure could then be reversed. Thereafter, it might be useful if a meeting were held with delegations on each side reduced to three people. This would make the talks less inhibited. Kamel agreed. He again expressed appreciation for the United States’ role. He doubted, however, that focussing on commonalities between the two plans would get us anywhere. The plans are based on different policies and objectives. The Israeli objective is annexation and staying on in the West Bank/Gaza. The Egyptian plan is based on withdrawal.

The Secretary noted that we must come to grips with this problem and proceed with the process he had outlined. Doing so will help the Administration. Kamel said he left it up to the Secretary, but reiterated his doubts that the procedure would lead anywhere so long as the Israelis deny the applicability of the withdrawal provision of 242 to the West Bank.

The Secretary emphasized that 242 must be the basis of any settlement. Kamel agreed, but noted that Sadat has no confidence in Begin or Dayan. Sadat is convinced that the Israeli objective is to drag the parties into details in order to buy time. The Israelis are likely to leak any points of agreement and suggest that those aspects of their plan have been accepted by Egypt. GOE has to bear in mind the situation in the Arab world. He hoped that the United States will come out with its proposal and asked whether this is still the U.S. objective. The Secretary assured him that it is and that the United States will do so.

Kamel noted that the Israeli answers to our two questions were not really answers.⁴ All of the Arabs believe this is the case. He alluded to the importance of bringing Jordan into the negotiations. Jordan, he noted, will be influenced by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are telling the Egyptians that they had predicted nothing will come out of the Sadat initiative and that it is time to stop that initiative. They note that this does not mean the Arabs wish to give up the peace process; it simply means that the Arabs must get together again and begin planning for a united Arab approach in the hope that this might have better results. The Saudis had only reluctantly agreed that Egypt might continue for a while longer, but without conviction that anything will come of it. Then the Israeli answers had come and the GOE was at a loss how to answer its Arab friends.

The Egyptian understanding was that the Leeds meeting would enable the U.S. to position itself. For this reason, GOE had agreed to attend. But before talks had even taken place, we had asked GOE to agree to another meeting at al-Arish.⁵ Kamel asked rhetorically what the GOE is to say to the Arabs about this when the Leeds conference has not even begun. If something positive comes from the Leeds conference, he would be willing to have a second, third or even other meetings. If nothing positive results, how can Egypt explain to its Arab friends the present meeting, let alone proposed future meetings. He had briefed Saud Bin Faysal about the possibility of a London conference. Saud had been skeptical. Kamel had emphasized to Saud that the conference will take place on President Carter’s initiative. Although Saud had accepted this, he remained skeptical. Kamel doubted that getting into too much detail at Leeds will help. This is what the Israelis want. It will drag Egypt into protracted talks and cause further divisions between Egypt and the Arabs.

The Secretary again recalled that we had agreed to provide suggestions and reaffirmed that we will do so at the appropriate time. He indicated that it would help us if, as a prelude, there were a direct discussion of the respective plans, their points of commonality and their differences. This would sharpen the differences and, hopefully, broaden the areas where the parties agree. The United States can then come in as an interested party, and as a friend of both parties, as it had done on previous occasions where an impasse had been reached. Such a procedure portrays the United States before its own people and the world as implementing what it said it would do. The United States is likely to have more support by following such a procedure than otherwise. Kamel responded that Egypt is most willing to help.

The Secretary emphasized that we do not want the talks to drag on. He planned to send Atherton to the area after the Leeds talks and would thereafter himself visit the area in early August. We could then see what the United States might put forward. Kamel endorsed the idea, provided that the United States consults fully with Egypt before it puts anything forward. Kamel observed that even if agreement is reached on 25 of the 29 points, it will not get us anywhere so long as withdrawal is refused. The Secretary noted this is very much in his mind. Kamel stressed that Egypt is prepared to provide security guarantees that go beyond 242. The Secretary noted that if Egypt did so and this could be put in our proposal, it would strengthen that proposal. Kamel qualified his comment by noting that when the West Bank/Gaza is being discussed, there is a limit to what Egypt can say about security. It is the Jordanians and the Palestinians who must eventually be involved. At such time as the Jordanians are engaged in the negotiations, elaboration of security measures can be attempted. But the initial effort ought to be to bring in the Jordanians.

The Secretary asked if this required a declaration of principles. Kamel responded that it requires an Israeli commitment to withdraw. Then security can be discussed and the Saudis can be asked to use their influence with the Jordanians. The Secretary noted that King Hussein had written to us about this.⁶ Kamel affirmed that the Jordanians have shown considerable interest. If the Israelis could be induced to agree to withdraw, the Jordanians would come “on the first plane” and broader security measures could be discussed.

The Secretary asked what can be done with the Saudis or through them. Kamel thought a great deal could be done. With Saudi support and participation, one could even think of radical changes in the Syrian position. The Secretary asked what the Jordanians could add in terms of security. Kamel recalled that the Egyptian idea is to link the West Bank/Gaza with Jordan. If the Jordanians are not present at the negotiations, it is difficult to discuss this. If they are there, the subject could be discussed along with other related security matters, i.e. border rectification, early warning station, demilitarization, UNEF, etc. But all of this, he emphasized, requires Jordanian and Palestinian participation.

The Secretary asked whether Jordan is still needed if one is thinking about Israeli troops remaining (in the transition period). Kamel said yes. The Secretary noted that Sadat is considering the possibility that Jordan will not join. Kamel agreed, noting Sadat had said this to Weizman.⁷ If the President thinks Jordan will not join, he is agreeable to Egyptian military participation, but this is difficult. It will expose Sadat. We should not tell this to Dayan. The Secretary suggested that the Egyptian delegation should speak seriously about what it has in mind with respect to security. This might be in terms of withdrawal in return for security. An unwillingness to discuss this could suggest that the talks are not serious. Kamel noted there are two phases to security. Egypt can speak in general terms of what might be done. If other parties are also engaged, then matters like rectification could be discussed. The Secretary emphasized that Egypt should talk about the principle of withdrawal in return for security. Kamel again agreed, but indicated that some matters will have to wait until others join the negotiations. Egypt will influence them and he was sure they will not object to rectification.

The Secretary then asked how specific we might be in the coming two days on security matters. If, for example, he were to put a theoretical question, such as assuming that withdrawal takes place, what kind of security arrangements would be envisaged? What could Kamel say? Kamel noted that he could indicate the six points that Sadat had already mentioned.⁸ These could be applied to the West Bank. Later when Jordan and the Palestinians participate, these could be elaborated. But in order to get Jordan into the negotiations, the Israelis must first commit themselves to withdrawal in return for security.

The Secretary noted that there is no change in our positions. The timetable is roughly what we had earlier indicated. It is important to have serious talks at Leeds on both commonalities and differences in the context of the Secretary’s coming to the area in a few weeks with the United States proposal. This would help us advance our proposal. The Secretary pointed out that he must have a reason to come out and table our ideas.

In terms of a possible statement, Kamel said he would rather not say that progress has been achieved unless this is the case. The Secretary noted that this need not be said. It should suffice to say that serious talks were held and that he planned to come to the area again to meet with the parties. In the meantime, Atherton would be sent to the area.

The Secretary indicated he would prefer to say we agreed on a subsequent meeting in which he would participate. He knew this presents certain problems for the Egyptian side, but asked that they think about it. Such a meeting would give us a forum in which to table United States suggestions. Kamel agreed that the Egyptians would think about it. The Secretary emphasized that any U.S. proposal should not look like an imposed solution. It should be based on the differences that have arisen.

Maher said the Egyptian side will not say anything. There need be no joint communique. The Secretary agreed, indicating that he would make the statement. His position would be that serious discussions have taken place and that he planned to come to the area in a few weeks’ time for a further meeting. At that meeting, the Secretary again told Kamel, our proposal will be put forward. Kamel again agreed to think about it, but contended that any further meeting should be the last. He would have to ask Sadat for instructions.

The Secretary again indicated that the Egyptian side should seek to explore areas of agreement. Kamel doubted that this would be useful. The Secretary urged that Egyptians be ready to talk, but should ask Israel for answers. Kamel said Egypt would put the American questions. Maher noted that the Egyptians could ask what security arrangements the Israelis have in mind. The Secretary reaffirmed that serious questions should be put, i.e. what do you want, why, how does this affect what you are ready to do, etc. He noted the Israelis have never spelled this out. The Egyptians should ask sharp questions and so would he.

Kamel noted that after the Israeli Cabinet meeting,⁹ Sadat had been irritated. The Israelis had spoken of a new Egyptian plan allegedly submitted to Weizman. Kamel and Sadat had had a general talk with Peres.¹⁰ But the Egyptian plan is what has been presented. GOE does not want to give the idea that it is going beyond what it has already presented.

Kamel asked whether the meetings would be informal. The Secretary answered in the affirmative. Eilts noted the difference between a joint statement as opposed to a statement by the Secretary, and the Secretary said he would like to speak to the press. Kamel again said he would not like to say the meeting has been useful if it has not been so. We could perhaps say the talks had been serious. The Secretary agreed that the talks could be described as serious, covering areas of agreement and disagreement. Use of the term “progress” could be avoided. He thought the Israelis would accept a statement along these lines. The talks had been serious, the differences and commonalities had been explained and willingness had been expressed to discuss the issues in the future.

Kamel asked whether, if the Secretary felt the following day and thereafter that the Israelis are not forthcoming in terms of answers, would another meeting still be needed. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, indicating he needs another meeting. Without it he would be accused in the United States of trying to ram United States ideas down the Israeli throats. Kamel noted that it might be possible to say nothing after the present meeting, but when the Secretary came to the area, he could suggest another meeting and the Egyptians would agree.

Maher observed that when points of agreement and disagreement are spoken of, the Egyptian side would add the reservation that withdrawal has not been agreed upon. The Secretary said this was agreeable. The results of the conference could be divided between the specifics of the five-year transitional period and the fundamental question of what happens afterwards. Eilts suggested that common points not be downgraded. Kamel expressed concern that agreement to another meeting would undermine Egyptian agreement with the Jordanians.

Eilts noted that Kamel should assume that Dayan knows what the President told Weizman. The Egyptian side should not say less than that. Kamel contended that he could not go that far. He could say that nothing specific could be agreed upon without the Jordanians or Palestinians present. Egypt could perhaps provide some security forces for Gaza, but not for the West Bank without Jordan and the Palestinians. The Secretary noted that the Israelis had asked about this many times. Kamel responded that, if the question is raised, he would argue that the Israelis should answer the American questions. Eilts suggested that Kamel could say what the President had told Weizman, coupling this with the need for withdrawal. Kamel expressed concern that the Israelis will distort this. He thought it was dangerous to couple the President’s idea with withdrawal. He also expressed his personal concern about Sadat’s meetings with Peres and Weizman. As Maher had pointed out, the Israelis had leaked what the President said to Weizman before the latter had even spoken to Begin. Kamel said the Egyptian side was willing to be helpful. This was the spirit in which it had been sent and these were his instructions. There were, however, some things he did not know about the American proposal.

Kamel indicated that he had told Sadat that he cannot go to al-Arish. Thereafter the President, after thinking about it, came up with the al-Arish/Mount Sinai enclave idea.¹¹

Eilts asked Kamel about his latest thinking on a bilateral meeting with Dayan. The Secretary thought this would be useful. Kamel responded that he could not say the same things that Sadat had said to Weizman. Sometimes the President gets himself into an embarrassing situation. He wants to show his readiness to go a long way to make peace. The Secretary noted that Weizman had reported the results of Sadat’s talks and that Dayan knows about them. Kamel reiterated that if the Israelis are willing to stipulate withdrawal, he could commit the GOE along the lines Sadat had suggested. Egypt is willing to take risks, but does not want to be indefinitely entangled in a problem. Peace would be possible in two years if the Israelis would implement 242.

Alluding to the Vienna statement,¹² Kamel said this had not been fairly handled. It had been distorted. Somewhat emotionally, he noted his concern for Sadat and charged that the Israeli method of proceeding is destroying the President. Kamel asked for the Secretary’s reaction if Dayan turned out to be more procedural than substantive. The Secretary thought Dayan would be prepared to engage in substantive talks.

He might say, however, that he cannot commit the Israeli Government to withdrawal.

It was agreed to meet again the following day.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East Subject File, Box 2, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978 Volume II [II]. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eilts. The meeting took place at Leeds Castle.
2. See Document 266.
3. For the Israeli plan, see the Attachment to Document 177 and footnote 6, Document 180. For the Egyptian counterproposal, see footnote 2, Document 259.
4. See Document 255.
5. According to Ambassador Eilts in telegram 16355 from Cairo, July 5, it was Sadat’s idea to hold Foreign Minister talks at Al Arish. Sadat believed “an Al Arish venue would demonstrate to Egyptians and other Arabs that Israel recognize Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai and are serious about negotiating withdrawal issues.” Eilts noted, however, that Kamel found the idea “galling to go to Egyptian territory which the Israelis are occupying.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2344)
6. The letter from King Hussein has not been found, but Warren Christopher met with Hussein on July 15 and described their meeting about the Middle East peace process in telegram 179560 to Amman. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780006–0287)
7. See Document 265.
8. See footnote 2, Document 259.
9. A reference to the July 9 Cabinet meeting. See footnote 2, Document 261.
10. See Document 264.
11. In telegram 8967 from Tel Aviv, July 16, Ambassador Lewis relayed Weizman’s description of the “enclave idea,” which Sadat raised at their meeting on July 13. According to Weizman, Sadat suggested an Egyptian enclave at Al-Arish and Mount Sinai where Sadat would build a “peace center.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2626)
12. See footnote 3, Document 264.