Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, July 14, 1978, 1032Z

17026. Subject: Change in Sadat’s Tactics Toward Begin.

Summary. Sadat has apparently concluded no settlement possible with Begin and that he (Sadat) has nothing to lose by attempting to contribute to political ferment in Israel. Treating Begin with kid gloves seemed, in Sadat’s perception, only to make him more intransigent. View that no settlement possible with Begin also widely shared by other observers. Meeting with Weizman and London talks primarily tactical because Sadat convinced only U.S. can break impasse by presenting equitable proposal. Although Sadat recognizes he must continue to deal with Begin’s representatives, if not Begin personally, he remains exceedingly interested in personal characteristics and rivalries of Israeli leaders and is, perhaps wishfully, looking toward the day when Begin is replaced. End summary.

1. As Dept will have noted from Cairo press treatment of Vienna and London meetings, as well as earlier Sadat interviews, it is becoming increasingly apparent that Sadat has ruled out possibility of arriving at agreement with Begin. Earlier this year, largely at our urging, Sadat kept his misgivings about Begin largely under wraps in the belief that the political ferment within Israel should be given a chance. He still believes the latter is necessary, but has of late apparently decided that he has nothing to lose by attempting to contribute to it. Thus, his well-publicized meeting with Peres (admittedly at latter’s request), Salzburg meeting with Weizman,² direct and indirect praise for Weizman and Peres, criticism of Begin and Dayan by name (particularly via Anis Mansour), and direct appeals to the Israeli people such as his Yedi’ot interview of July 11 (FBIS TA 111143Y).³ We believe Sadat recognizes that such tactics could backfire by strengthening Begin, but has concluded that this course of action worth a try, since previous kid-glove treatment of Begin, in Sadat’s perception, did not lessen Begin’s “intransigence.”

2. The view that no settlement will be possible as long as Begin is Prime Minister is widely shared by knowledgeable Egyptians, foreign observers here and, we would note, American Jewish leaders, academics and other well-informed visitors who have passed through Cairo in recent weeks.

3. Sadat’s acceptance of President Carter’s invitation to send Kamel to London for talks with Dayan⁴ and his Salzburg meeting with Weizman are therefore primarily tactical. He does not expect any major breakthrough to emerge from the London talks, but is seeking to accommodate President Carter and assure him of his continuing commitment to a settlement. Sadat is convinced that the only way to break the impasse is for United States intervention in the form of presenting an equitable, disinterested proposal which, he hopes, even Begin would find difficult to reject.

4. In the meantime, through his talks with Peres and Weizman, he is hedging his bets for a possible future change of government in Israel, one which he hopes might be willing to pursue the peace process in less doctrinaire and biblical fashion. The Egyptians monitor the Israeli political scene closely and, while they like the Israelis see each other through somewhat fuzzy lenses, Sadat is moderately well informed on what is going on inside Israel. He is, however, more interested in the personal characteristics of the leaders and their rivalries, which reflects his own style of government, than he is in institutions. Sadat recognizes that as long as Begin is in power he must continue dealing with Begin’s representatives, if not Begin personally. However, there is little doubt that he is, perhaps wishfully, looking toward the day when Begin, either through health or internal pressures, leaves the scene.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2802. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Tel Aviv.
2. For a report on the Sadat-Peres meeting, see Document 264. For a report on the Sadat-Weizman meeting, see Document 265.
3. Not found. Yediot is an Israeli newspaper.
4. Vice President Mondale conveyed Carter’s invitation to Sadat to send Kamel to the London talks during Mondale’s July 3–4 visit to Cairo. (Telegram 168933 to Cairo, July 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2711)