257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
161699. Subject: Proposed London Foreign Ministers Meeting. Ref: Cairo 15733.2
1. You should inform Sadat that President Carter has asked you to convey the following to him in response to Sadat’s comments to you in your Saturday3 meeting:
—The President has considered carefully President Sadat’s suggestion that there be a meeting between him and President Sadat in Europe before announcement of decision to resume Egyptian-Israeli talks through a meeting of Foreign Ministers with Secretary Vance. The President appreciates President Sadat’s basically positive attitude toward our proposed scenario which would begin with such a Foreign Ministers meeting, and he understands the concerns which led President Sadat to suggest that this be preceded by a meeting between them.
—President Carter is concerned, however, that so long a delay before anything further happens with respect to Middle East negotiations would lose valuable time, during which pressure would continue to build up against any resumption of Egyptian-Israeli negotiating process and active U.S. role in that process.
—President Carter would therefore like to stay with the scenario Ambassador Eilts has described to President Sadat, looking toward an [Page 1163] announcement this week of London talks at his (President Carter’s) invitation on July 11–12.
—The President wants President Sadat to know that he is remaining personally involved in all the details of our Middle East strategy. He continues to have fully in mind and to stand by the understandings discussed with President Sadat at Camp David.4 He can understand the importance President Sadat attaches to having a full understanding of the U.S. position as we move into the forthcoming crucial phase in the weeks ahead. This would be a principal purpose of the contemplated visit to the area later in July of Secretary Vance and Ambassador Atherton, who are fully conversant with President Carter’s thinking and will remain in constant touch with him.
2. FYI. There are additional considerations which lead us to conclude that we should not seek to arrange meeting between the two Presidents in Europe and which you should have in mind for use in your discretion in elaborating on above message which you are delivering in President Carter’s name. If the President were to meet with Sadat, this would inevitably create public perception that we were not being evenhanded in our dealings with the two parties and that we were working closely with Sadat, to Israel’s disadvantage, in developing and carrying out our Middle East peacemaking role. There would inevitably be pressures for a comparable meeting with Begin. Net result would be to engage the President personally and prematurely—an engagement which we believe it is better to keep in reserve for critical moments further down the road. There is the additional practical consideration that the President’s schedule in Europe and his need to return immediately to Washington after the Summit would make it extremely difficult to make the time for the kind of meeting President Sadat has suggested. President Carter has already had to decline invitations for other meetings while he is in Europe. End FYI.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0118. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee. Drafted by Atherton; cleared by Quandt, Saunders, and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S–O); and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Tel Aviv.↩
- In telegram 15733 from Cairo, June 24, Ambassador Eilts reported on his talk with Sadat regarding the U.S. scenario for the London Conference. Sadat suggested he and Carter meet in Europe before a London Conference and then announce a meeting of Foreign Ministers Kamel and Dayan in London. Eilts observed that Sadat was “clearly anxious” to meet with Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1607)↩
- June 24.↩
- See Document 211.↩