253. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
14781. Subject: Meeting With Sadat, June 11.
1. Met with Sadat today in Alexandria to discuss possibility of direct Egyptian/Israeli contacts and improving Egyptian West Bank/Gaza counterproposal along lines previously discussed with FonMin Kamel. VP Mubarak was present.
Sadat was an hour late in arriving, having just come from ten days in Suez Canal zone. He said he was exhausted after making six long speeches in as many days and looked it.
2. Direct contacts: On renewing direct Egyptian/Israeli contacts, Sadat said he cannot meet with Dayan in present circumstances. Any such meeting, he contended, will give Begin “breathing space” and enable the Israeli Prime Minister to claim everything is being discussed. This is especially undesirable when Dayan is unable to go beyond what Begin decides. For Sadat to receive Dayan now, the President insisted, will work against Egyptian interests. We went over this several times, but Sadat remained adamant.
3. Sadat was not rpt not averse to a meeting between Dayan and Egyptian FonMin Kamel. He suggested that President Carter might propose that the Egyptian and Israeli FonMins visit Washington to meet with Secretary Vance. Alternatively, they might meet at the United Nations or somewhere in Europe like Austria. Still another alternative venue might be in Al Arish as, Sadat recalled, he had on previous occasion suggested. (Sadat reference is to his earlier idea that Political Committee talks, if circumstances warranted their resumption, might meet alternatively in Al-Arish and Beersheva.) An Al-Arish locale, Sadat noted, would enable both Kamel and Dayan to report quickly to their superiors and obtain necessary instructions. Whatever the venue, Sadat said, the first two or three sessions could be between Kamel and Dayan alone and thereafter the two might meet with Secretary Vance.
4. Sadat stressed, however, the critical importance that he attaches to having USG “as a witness.” He reiterated his fear that direct negotiations without the USG being “near or present” will not work. The Israelis, he charged, are “liars” and Begin, Dayan and others have regu [Page 1154] larly distorted Egyptian positions. They will try to do so again unless there is an impartial “witness,” like the USG, present.
5. VP Mubarak interjected that since Weizman/Gamasy exchange (reported by Charge Matthews, but copy not immediately available to me), there has been a second message from Weizman. That message, sent in reply to Gamasy’s last message, indicated that Israeli Cabinet will shortly be discussing current Egyptian/Israeli impasse and that Weizman hoped further negotiations might be possible in near future. Message indicated Weizman will communicate again with GOE, hopefully this coming week.2 Sadat viewed this as evidence of continuing Israeli desire for direct talks, but emphasized that for Egypt the issue now is whether or not the Israeli response to our two questions on the future of the West Bank/Gaza are in fact positive. If they are not, we face a new situation. If they are, then a Dayan/Kamel meeting could take place along the above lines or another Gamasy/Weizman meeting could take place.
6. Egyptian counterproposal: On the Egyptian counterproposal, Sadat indicated understanding of the problem. He agreed that Egyptian side will look at it again with a view to considering how it might be improved. He hopes to give me a revised counterproposal in a few days. He wants to talk tomorrow, Monday,3 to Mubarak and Kamel about possible revisions.
7. Other subjects discussed will be reported by septels. Leave to Dept’s discretion whether to repeat this message to Tel Aviv.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1573. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
- These messages have not been found. In telegram 148162 to Cairo, June 11, Vance reported on his meeting with Gamasy, which included discussion of Gamasy’s recent talks with Weizman, noting that “Sinai issues are more tractable than West Bank issues but cautioned that further progress re Sinai depends on Israeli movement on the West Bank.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–2179) Weizman and Gamasy led the Military Committee, which first met in January.↩
- June 12.↩