Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, March 16, 1978, 0334Z

67617. For Charge from the Secretary. Subject: South Lebanon.

You should see Prime Minister Begin urgently to convey following to him:

—We have been giving urgent consideration to the situation resulting from Saturday’s terrorist attack² and Israel’s military operation in South Lebanon,³ and to broader implications for our common objectives. We have sought in our public and private statements to show understanding of security problem posed for Israel by presence of Palestinian armed forces in South Lebanon.

—We appreciated message from the Prime Minister conveyed by Ambassador Dinitz through Atherton this evening⁴ that Israel has no intention of staying in Southern Lebanon and will withdraw when it has an agreement and arrangement to ensure that terrorists will not return to that area.

—As a practical matter, we do not believe that the kind of iron-clad assurances Israel seeks as a condition for withdrawal are feasible, although we will make every effort to obtain the best arrangements possible.

—As we analyze matters, an early Security Council meeting is a near certainty, in which there will be strong pressures for a resolution condemning Israeli military action and calling for unconditional withdrawal.

—It is our intention to respond by introducing a resolution calling for withdrawal and the introduction of United Nations peace-keeping forces into the area from which Israel withdraws.

—While we will oppose unilateral condemnation of Israeli action, we cannot veto a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal. For one thing, continued Israeli presence in Lebanon will put in great jeopardy Sadat’s ability to continue the negotiating process and can only strengthen those forces in the area, backed by the Soviets, who oppose present negotiating process. In addition, we cannot be seen to be weakening in our commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon even though Lebanese Government has been too weak to stabilize and exert its authority in the south. A final consideration is that we expect serious questions to be raised in Congress over the issue of Israeli use of U.S. arms on a protracted basis on Lebanese territory, and we will not be able to hold off long sending the required notification on this subject to the Congress.⁵

—For all these reasons, we must urge that Israel make a prompt decision to withdraw and announce this publicly. It would be far better, in our view, for Israel to do this before, rather than after a resolution calling for such withdrawal—a resolution which the United States will have to vote for.

—For our part, we intend to work vigorously for an outcome that can insulate the border on the Lebanese side against Palestinian armed groups through the introduction of an effective UN force which in turn can prepare the way for the gradual extension of Lebanese Government authority to that area.

—We have resisted urgings to issue public statement today about our position in order first to convey our views to Israel. We will need to say something tomorrow along following lines, “We trust Israel will be withdrawing in the very near future, and we are seeking arrangements that will ensure stability and security in the region following Israeli withdrawal.”⁶

—The President looks forward to his talks next week with Prime Minister Begin but does not believe the South Lebanon situation, with its potentially adverse consequences for the peace process, can wait until then to begin a resolution of this problem.

Vance

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 49, Israel: 3–4/78. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent immediate for information to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and USUN.
2. See footnote 2, Document 229.
3. On March 14, Israel responded to the March 11 attack with Operation Litani. Israel sent over 25,000 soldiers into Southern Lebanon just south of the Litani River with the stated objective of pushing Palestinian militant groups further north from the Lebanese-Israeli border as well as strengthening the South Lebanese Army, which operated as an ally of Israel. Over 1,000 Lebanese and 20 Israelis were killed during the operation.
4. Not found.
5. Vance’s letter to Speaker of the House O’Neill, April 5, reporting a violation of the 1952 U.S.-Israeli Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement is in the Department of State Bulletin, May 1978,pp. 46–47.
6. On March 16, State Department Spokesman Hodding Carter read a statement that expressed the U.S. Government’s expectation that Israel would withdraw from Southern Lebanon and that it had communicated this to the Israeli Government. Additionally, the U.S. Government sought “possible arrangements, including the idea of a U.N. role” with regard to settling the Southern Lebanon issue. (Department of State Bulletin, May 1978, p. 46)