Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

182. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Tehran, January 1, 1978, 8:20–8:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with King Hussein

PARTICIPANTS

• Jordan
• King Hussein
• Court Minister Sharaf
• General Amar Khamash
• United States
• The President
• Secretary of State Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Ambassador Thomas Pickering
• Assistant Secretary of State Atherton
• Gary Sick, NSC Staff (notetaker)

(The first two minutes of the meeting were taken up by a photo opportunity. When the press had left the room the President summarized his private discussions with King Hussein which had begun at 7:58 a.m.)²

The President said that he had talked to His Majesty about the ultimate parameters of the West Bank and Gaza problem which have to be solved. Ultimately any solution must be in the context of Resolutions 242 and 338. His Majesty could accept some minor modifications in the western part of the West Bank, perhaps with some compensating arrangement in a corridor between the West Bank and Gaza. The President had mentioned that Sadat would possibly be willing to expand the size of the Gaza Strip into the Sinai to some extent. The King had agreed that it would be a mistake to create a completely independent Palestinian nation between Israel and Jordan. As far as what Jordan would accept, a disarmed and demilitarized West Bank or Palestinian entity with a United Nations presence would be acceptable as part of an overall settlement. The President had described the best side of Mr. Begin’s proposals. Begin is willing to defer the question of sovereignty on the West Bank and was willing to accept devolution of power to a West Bank entity from Jordan and Israel. Israel would be willing to withdraw to a few military cantonments and Begin said that he could accept such an outcome at the end of a three-year transition period. This could in fact provide an opportunity for peace. From the U.S. point of view we prefer self-determination which does not involve a completely independent state. How would Jordan join into this process? Jordan would require just two principles: first, withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries with some minor modifications; and, secondly, the right of self-determination in principle. At that point, it would then be appropriate for Jordan to participate in negotiations. But President Sadat may prefer to represent the Arab position alone. We do not know at this point.

King Hussein thanked the President for his summary. He noted that he had talked to President Sadat earlier. The King felt that as long as the principles of Arab sovereignty over the Arab part of Jerusalem, Resolutions 242 and 338, a settlement of the Palestinian problem, total peace, and a complete package—as long as these are used as guidelines, it is OK. The King noted that he is doing all he can to support Sadat.

The President noted that the King had told him in their private meeting that Sadat had accepted the principles which the United States had proposed earlier in the year.³ This came as a surprise to the President, since we had waited impatiently for an answer on those principles.

Secretary Vance wondered whether principles should be stated generally, such as Resolution 242, or whether they should be more specific.

King Hussein said that he needs as much as possible. If Jordan should move now, it would look like they were exploiting the situation and they would be subject to criticism. The President said that there are two crucial elements: first is withdrawal with minor modifications, and the second is a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all of its aspects.

Secretary Vance wondered if with two broad principles such as this, could King Hussein participate in the negotiations. Hussein said yes, he could.

Dr. Brzezinski said he saw Begin’s proposal as an interim solution for three to five years, with long-term objectives, and the devolution of authority from Israel and Jordan, Israeli forces withdrawing, a token UN or other presence in the area, and all of this subject to revision after three to five years. King Hussein wondered why there should be an Israeli presence at all. Dr. Brzezinski said there is an Israeli presence now. They must have something like this to let them begin getting out. Secretary Vance said that also a declaration of principles such as this provides a means of modifying Begin’s position.

King Hussein said he was concerned that the Jerusalem situation might stay as it is and never change. Dr. Brzezinski said that we want Begin to accept our version of his principles. That would be difficult if in three to five years it called for moving to self-determination. Secretary Vance said that Sadat and Begin are close to agreement on Palestine, although there was some trouble with respect to withdrawal. Maybe we could go back and get a general statement and then move toward a resolution of the issue.

The President asked the Secretary if he saw anything which King Hussein had said which was inconsistent with the position we took in Jerusalem or elsewhere. Secretary Vance said no, that if we could get the things back in Begin’s proposal that he mentioned in Washington, then perhaps we could go to the principles.

The President noted that with respect to Jerusalem, Mr. Begin sees a triple administrative body comprised of Christians, Arabs, and Jews to oversee the Holy Places. King Hussein said that Jerusalem was an Arab city and an Israeli city at the same time. Jerusalem has now been extended to cover a greater area than ever before. It was hard to see how it could be absorbed. The President said yes, it is a matter of principle and religion. What we say here may never be accepted by Israel, but we need to find a way. King Hussein said he never saw why it could not be one city, a city of peace.

If he gets involved, and he hoped to get involved, he wanted to get involved, he already has the PLO against him. They will lose more and more, but the Soviets, Iraq, even Syria and Libya are shifting into line. Jordan is very exposed. Maybe the real targets are the sources of energy. The whole situation is coming to a head. Israel is finding it difficult to compromise. Jordan was also finding things difficult. Jordan needs as much help from her friends in the United States—on the ground—and the Saudis as she can get.

The President noted that eventually an agreement must be worked out which is mutually acceptable to Jordan, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. However, an agreement would not necessarily have to be acceptable to Syria, Iraq, and Libya in order to work. The President said he knows how recalcitrant Israel can be. It is a tiny country. When U.S. Jews are aroused about danger to Israel, they prevail in the media. The President hoped that King Hussein would exhibit maximum flexibility and not make his acceptance dependent upon Syria. King Hussein said he was prepared and willing to collide with Syria and Iraq, but to do so he needed to have the Gulf Arabs form a bloc.

Secretary Vance said he had a couple of questions. First of all, would it be preferable when the conference reconvenes in Jerusalem, to try to formulate a statement based on these two principles and then move on? King Hussein said absolutely. The statement of principles is needed. The Secretary asked if he would need to have these enumerated before he could join the negotiations? King Hussein said yes. The Secretary asked at what point it would be appropriate for any Palestinians to be invited, i.e. West Bank Palestinians? King Hussein said as soon as the principles are spelled out.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if these principles should be more specific than Resolution 242. King Hussein said there were too many interpretations of 242. Dr. Brzezinski said there were certain advantages of ambiguity. It lets you do things that in three to five years will give you what you want, and at the same time it lets Israel avoid a commitment to something it considers itself unwilling to accept. A specific enunciation of principles would be too specific to be accepted by Israel. King Hussein said “We will be on the firing line.” Secretary Vance understood the King wanted the principles to be as specific as possible but with some flexibility on the breadth of coverage.

Minister Sharaf noted that one issue was that of self-rule. He said this is easy for Israel to accept and hard for Jordan. Why ask Jordan to be involved? Dr. Brzezinski noted that Israel is conceding that both Jordan and Israel have claims to the West Bank. Minister Sharaf said that as soon as you raise the West Bank, the entire Palestinian question becomes an issue. Jordan cannot absorb all the Palestinian problems. Their opponents would say that Jordan is talking for other Arabs without permission. Jordan’s activities on the West Bank or with regard to the West Bank are much more sensitive than those of Egypt with regard to Sinai.

At that point the President said the Shah had arrived in the Palace and told the King that he must leave for the airport. He added, however, that Israel will never accept an independent Palestinian state. Everything else is negotiable. Minister Sharaf said that is why the Palestinians must be involved in the process, not Jordan only. He had the idea that the concept of a unified Arab delegation had been put aside. Secretary Vance said it was still possible to have that if they could get the principles established as we desired. We could reconstruct the formula. He wondered if King Hussein would see Sadat before January 15th. King Hussein said that if it is possible, he would like to.

As the meeting broke up Secretary Vance quickly summarized a number of points regarding FMS delivery. He told King Hussein that the 155mm mortars delivery would be accelerated. King Hussein would receive the very first of the 8” artillery that we make. He said he would speak to the Saudis with respect to FMS guarantees.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Subject File, Box 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978: Volume I [I]. Top Secret. The meeting took place at the Saadabad Palace. Carter visited Tehran from December 31, 1977, to January 1, 1978, as part of a nine-day tour of six nations, which began on December 29 in Poland.
2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
3. Presumably a reference to the U.S. working paper sent to leaders in the Middle East in October 1977. See Document 131.