Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

168. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Jerusalem, December 10, 1977, 9:30–11:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Secretary’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Prime Minister Begin
• Deputy Prime Minister Yadin
• Foreign Minister Dayan
• Defense Minister Weizman
• Yehuda Avner, Prime Minister’s office, notetaker
• United States
• Secretary Vance
• Ambassador Lewis
• Under Secretary Habib
• Assistant Secretary Atherton
• INR Director Saunders

The Secretary and Prime Minister met alone first for about 20 minutes.² Then a light snack was served in the dining room. The following were the only points of substance there:

V: . . . Mubarak is the only one Sadat tells everything to.

. . . Sadat told me about his meeting with Hussein. He found a great deal of common ground. Hussein supports Sadat’s visit and Cairo meetings and would like to attend them at an appropriate time. You may see some contrary stories from the press, but it was very satisfactory and Sadat was well pleased. Hussein told Pickering the same.

The meeting then moved to the living room where systematic discussion of the issues began:

B: I welcome you, my dear friend. We start now very important talks. The theme is peace. First, we will set the agenda for our talks tomorrow: 0930–1245 in Cabinet room; private lunch so the Secretary can have time with his colleagues; 1530–1830 afternoon meeting; 2000 dinner at King David. Perhaps after dinner some private talk. It will be a broader meeting tomorrow. Israel will have Dinitz, Burg, Horowitz, Evron, Ehrlich or one of his colleagues.

We would ask you to give us your impressions of Cairo.

V: First, I bring the warmest best wishes and friendship of President Carter and the admiration and respect of all Americans for what you and President Sadat have done for peace. The President wanted me to come and see how we can help. We welcome that there are now direct conversations between Egypt and Israel. We want to do what we can to help continue the momentum.

Now to report very briefly on my visit with President Sadat.³ He is relaxed and confident that the course on which he embarked is the right one. He is deeply moved and deeply convinced he is right. He feels he has the unanimous support of his people and his army. This morning, for instance, General Gamasy was talking with reporters at the Barrages while President Sadat and I were talking alone. He invited reporters to pick any military installation and they would be permitted to go there and talk to personnel and find out for themselves whether President Sadat has support in all levels of the military.

Sadat believes Hussein and Assad will follow his lead. He is not concerned about rejectionist outbursts. If the momentum is lost, however, things could change. His focus remains on a comprehensive peace. His objective is agreement on the concrete principles that will govern such a peace so that the parties to the peace can then negotiate the details of individual peace treaties. He believes the trip to Jerusalem gave Israel what it has sought for so many years—recognition and acceptance by its major Arab neighbor. As Begin knows, Sadat is committed to a just peace. He is determined not to lose the momentum generated by his decision. He is now waiting for Israel’s decision for peace. Sadat has asked that Israel make a declaration that would do two things:

1. State Israel’s readiness to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 with minor rectifications on the West Bank and

2. State Israel’s readiness to resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects.

Those are his exact words. One way to do this would be to make the declaration at a meeting in Cairo with Begin, Carter, Waldheim present. He hopes this would take place soon—in the next two weeks or so. Soon after, he hopes he could change the level at the Cairo meetings to the Foreign Minister level.

Sadat went on to say that certainly Israel will want to assure that its security needs can be met. He understands that and has discussed it in a general way with you. He believes a decision now would consolidate the peace process. He is confident that Hussein would join the peace process and Saudi Arabia would support it. He said he has taken a bold initiative in visiting Israel.

B: He did.

V: . . . and he does not want to see the opportunity lost. We discussed other matters. He brought me up to date on other conversations. He would like the secret talks to continue but would welcome bringing them “out into the daylight.” He would propose doing so after a Declaration.

In terms of the Cairo Conference, he sees it starting at the experts level . . . in the early stages trying to develop principles that would govern further discussions, resolve remaining procedural questions, include a later broadening of the discussions, and merge into the Geneva forum. He believed bilateral matters can be resolved and can move forward in parallel. But they must move forward in the framework of a broader agreement.

That is the essence. I can go into details if you wish.

B: I will explain what we are going to do. We do not want to lose time. We can achieve peace with those who want to make peace with us. His visit was an act of courage; we are a people who can appreciate courage. On the other hand, the act of recognition was by him and his country, but the Arabs at Tripoli⁴ were not ready to make peace. We have sympathy in Morocco. We don’t know about Saudi Arabia or Lebanon. Syria is our neighbor. Jordan is fluctuating.

So what we state today is: We want a comprehensive settlement. We don’t want to drive wedges between the Arabs. We responded quickly to his initiative. We received him warmly. But Sadat cannot make peace for Assad. Perhaps Assad will change his mind. But now he is not ready for peace. We want to maintain momentum. Let us work on it. What are we going to do?

Dayan will report on his talk with Tuhami on the problem of Sinai. In that conversation, we made a real contribution to the peace process. Now there is the question of the Palestinian Arabs. I will bring a plan for what I call “home rule for the Palestinian Arabs.” I cannot elaborate now. I will convoke our special Defense Committee. I hope the plan will be approved Tuesday.⁵ I would like to leave Wednesday morning for Washington to present it to President Carter. I would hope he could see me Thursday. I hope the President will accept my plan. It is not a Palestinian state but it is a dignified solution for the Palestinian Arabs. It is home rule of the inhabitants, by the inhabitants, and for the inhabitants.

If the President shall approve or suggest changes, we shall look at them again. I shall stop in London for a few hours on my way back to explain my plan to Prime Minister Callaghan. Then we can go immediately to Cairo—Dayan or I if I am invited. (Ezer Weizman is going to talk about “avoiding clashes.”) If everything goes well, we can have a breakthrough in several weeks.

We should not discount an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a beginning of the process. We did not press a separate treaty.

Now I will ask Dayan to report.

D: I know you got from Ambassador Lewis the paper I left with Dr. Tuhami.⁶ He was not in a position to commit his President. I didn’t know when he was speaking for Sadat and when he was just limited by his instructions.

We didn’t ask for changes in the international border. All military forces would be withdrawn. We asked for a belt under UN forces which could not be withdrawn without agreement of both parties. The only flag there in the zone would be the UN flag, but the UN is not a state so it wouldn’t become sovereign. Israeli settlers would be allowed defensive forces, e.g. no planes or tanks but mobile police units, anti-aircraft, anti-tank weapons. And all Israeli settlements would remain. It’s a very small number. The same thing about Sharm al-Shaikh. Israelis could come and go. The same with Egyptians at al Arish. Egyptians can interpret this as not giving one inch of Egyptian territory. This is based on two statements by Sadat to Begin:

1. No Egyptian forces east of the passes.

2. He would declare Sharm al-Shaikh passage an international waterway.

Tuhami repeated we should withdraw entirely. Israel would be paid compensation. I said forget the compensation, but we found water and oil through all of this area. There would be free movement of people. I said this is just a suggestion. We will have to take it to the Cabinet if Egypt gives a positive reaction. If not, let’s forget it. We are doing this to meet Sadat.

One of the interesting points was that he did not want to receive anything on the Golan. He read out a letter from Sadat asking us for a detailed working paper on the Sinai “meter by meter” and a paper on more general principles on the West Bank.

He wants to keep the Cairo Conference at a lower level for now.

We promised to provide a working paper. We will be ready by the end of the week if he wants to arrange another meeting.

V: That is consistent with what in effect Sadat was saying to me. He believes he could negotiate an agreement with Israel but he needs a framework of principles with each party going ahead with its own agreements. The West Bank has to be handled with some statement of principles.

D: Did you have the impression he would accept our paper as a basis for negotiation?

V: He thought it was a beginning. He thought something could be worked out. But he cannot proceed with an Egyptian-Israeli agreement except in a larger framework.

Weizman: I will be seeing Gamasy about preventing “accidental happenings” in the Sinai. I would like to reflect on security problems. Leaders come and go, so we must discuss security looking to the future.

—Of course, we will want agreements on a favorable peace. But it will have to be a peace with such ingredients that the future will not be unsafe. So we have to look to the future. Sometime I would suggest Sadat be compromising on his own territory with our security problems in mind. There are 101 possibilities.

V: His problem is sovereignty. He is flexible on security matters.

Habib: He also recognizes he can’t have a partial solution.

W: We understand. There are various solutions.

Yadin: You can have a comprehensive agreement, but there are stages of agreement.

B: I completely understand Sadat’s need for movement. But as far as this declaration is concerned, we will have to include elements he has not even taken account of:

—peace treaties;

—negotiated boundaries;

—security measures.

I would rather publish a plan than a formula in a few words.

On the Cairo Conference, perhaps we may suggest that before Wednesday we agree there will be some opening statements and then we will discuss the principles of the peace treaties.

V: I’m sure that would be acceptable. The speeches can mention the importance of peace, . . . as a basis for negotiations, comprehensive peace. Sadat hopes there would just be one agreed spokesman. He would suggest that, after the opening session, the remaining sessions be closed. He would be happy to have principles discussed as long as this was not revealed publicly. No formal minutes will be kept.

D: Who will be the parties at Cairo? Siilasvuo? PLO?

V: At this point, Sadat expects no Palestinians. If it changes, they will let us know.

They raised a question. They would like to take a picture of the opening to show the other empty seats. They say they need it for public.

W: Including PLO?

B: They should write “delegation” or “spokesman of the Palestinian Arabs.”

Y: Or have empty chairs without signs.

D: There will be reporters asking questions. We would say: We knew Palestinian Arabs were invited, but if they say PLO we will not be there.

On a different level, do you think they would go on in separate meetings to work out agreement with us?

V: As long as it is in parallel with negotiation of an overall agreement. They expect another private meeting. Incidentally, they want Weizman to come to Cairo to see President Sadat before going to Gianyclis for his meeting with Gamasy.

B: Shall we hear from our friend, Philip Habib, on his trip to Moscow?

H: First, I told the Soviets we fully supported President Sadat’s initiative and the Cairo meeting. Second, we found their negativism unconstructive.

V: . . . and that we were unhappy with their conduct.

H: . . . and we hoped it would not continue. I met for eight hours with the Foreign Ministry one day and spent 1½ hours with Gromyko the next day. They objected to “obliteration of Geneva” and contradiction of our joint statement. I indicated this was no obliteration of Geneva and no American-cooked-up scheme . . .

Gromyko said there are a few people in the world who might believe that the US was not behind Sadat’s initiative. I said I hoped he was one of those few.

They make it very clear they don’t want to be excluded.

Then we had quite a lengthy discussion in which they were carrying a brief for the Syrian-PLO position and I was carrying a brief for the Egyptian and Israeli positions. I said I found it inconsistent that they should support the Tripoli group and still maintain their basic policy. If they went with the rejectionists they would be anti-peace. Their fundamental problem is they don’t want to be excluded from an area where they have important interests.

I told them: If you insist on PLO at Geneva there will be no meeting. The Israelis won’t sit with them.

We ended on the note that there will be a meeting in Cairo and the Secretary is going on his trip. We will talk with you when we get back.

They considered it a plot to produce a bilateral agreement. They spoke of the importance of all participants having the right to approve all agreements. We would want the co-chairmen to have the right of concurrence. I rejected that. They were very polite.

B: Do we have any idea how the Egyptians propose the Cairo meetings be chaired?

V: The Egyptians do not wish to chair. They asked about whether Siilasvuo could chair.

B: We will consider it tomorrow. Please tell the President: If people here call it an historic moment, it is President Carter who created it.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 108, 12/7–17/77 Vance Trip to the Middle East: Meeting Minutes, 12/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting took place at the Barrages Rest House. Vance visited Jerusalem from December 10 to December 12.
2. No memorandum of conversation has been found.
3. See Document 167.
4. See footnote 3, Document 163.
5. December 13.
6. Not further identified.