Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, November 23, 1977, 1606Z

19466. For the Secretary From Ambassador. Subj: Sadat’s Assessment of His Visit to Israel and Where Do We Go From Here? Ref (A) Cairo 19346, (B) State 280087.²

Summary: Sadat elated about his reception in Israel and in Cairo on his return. Calls trip his “greatest victory,” greater than Oct war. He liked Begin and Weizman, especially latter. Gave his pledge to Weizman there would be no more wars between Egypt and Israel and that “security” is factor which needs be taken into account in peace talks. Intends announce this in People’s Assembly speech Saturday.³ This does not mean he accepts Israeli concept of security requiring a territorial dimension. Implies talks confined to generalities with little focus on specific procedural details. He and Begin agreed follow up on two levels: discreet Tuhami/Dayan talks in Morocco dealing with political aspects,⁴ and Gamasy/Weizman talks in Romania (and later, subject Israeli agreement, in Egypt) on military (security) aspects. No date yet fixed for followup talks, but Sadat opined they should, if possible, be concluded by Dec 20 to allow convening of Conference late Dec or early Jan. Adequate advance preparations needed for Conference and USG should play positive, behind-the-scenes rule.

Thinking out loud, he asks for Pres Carter’s views re (A) desirability of announcing during his Saturday address to People’s Assembly that problem is a bilateral one and should be resolved in direct Arab/Israeli talks; (B) announcing at same session his readiness to invite all the parties to a conference in Cairo, not Geneva; and (C) idea of having an experienced Israeli diplomat discreetly assigned to AmEmbassy Cairo to conduct day-to-day dialogue on outstanding issues. AmEmbassy communications would be used. Also, he asks that President Carter send message to Begin seeking latter’s reaction to points B and C above.

Mindful of Israeli sensitivity to West Bank, Sadat still toying with idea of Palestinian state in Gaza to which he would be willing offer territorial additions in adjacent Sinai area. He professes be unworried about Arab neighbors’ reactions, saying they will come around. He does not wish USG to intervene with Syria or SAG lest our doing so be interpreted as at his behest. Emphasizes above ideals still preliminary and suggestions by Pres Carter or PriMin Begin would be welcome. End summary.

1. Met with Sadat today for about two hours. VP Mubarak was also present. Since Sadat has come down with a bad cold, meeting took place in upstairs apartment his Giza residence. Sadat wanted Pres Carter to have an immediate account of his impressions in Israel, as well as his thoughts on how to continue the momentum generated by his visit. He was somewhat rambling in his comments with frequent repetition. I have sought order his discrete observations into some kind of a logical format, which Sadat agreed was correct when I summarized the conversation for him at the end of our talk.

Visit to Israel:

2. Sadat was euphoric about his reception in Israel and in Cairo on his return. Both had exceeded anything he had imagined was possible. Young and old, men and women, had cheered him. As he put it, I have become the “national hero” not only of Egypt but of Israel as well. He repeatedly spoke of how touched he had been by the women of both Israel and Egypt who had welcomed him. He had made the trip because of Pres Carter’s personal letter,⁵ but had never dreamed that Israeli, Egyptian and world reaction would be so enthusiastic. Upon his return, four million cheering Egyptians had lined the streets. Even Nasser had never experienced anything like it. These past two days, he said at one point, have been his “greatest victory, even greater than the Oct War.

3. Sadat said he liked both Begin and Weizman, although it was clear from the rave notices that he gave Weizman that the latter made the greatest impression. Weizman had congratulated him on Egyptian successes in Oct War. Weizman had also asked that Sadat give him his word that there be no more war and no sudden Egyptian attack. He, Sadat, had given his word that there will be no more war between Egypt and Israel. They should sit down and settle the outstanding issues between them. Weizman had also indicated his wish to meet Gamasy, for whom he professed great respect. In his private talks with Begin, Sadat had said that Pres Carter told him about the Israeli PriMin. Begin had responded that Pres Carter had also told him about Sadat. As a result, Sadat said, his talks with Begin were warm and cordial and had achieved some positive results. Begin had broached his desire to visit Cairo, but had understood when Sadat pointed out why this is not feasible right now.

4. Primary Israeli concerns, Sadat related, were two: security and no war. In his talks with the Israeli leadership, they had agreed that there would be no more war between Egypt and Israel and that “security” considerations would have to be addressed. He and Begin had differed on what “security” requires, but this was after all their first meeting and further pertinent discussions were needed. As a result of his visit, the vicious circle of mutual distrust had been broken. As indicated in the joint communique,⁶ they had agreed to continue their mutual consultations with a view to moving toward a settlement.⁷

4. In this context, Sadat continued, agreement had been reached to hold discreet follow on talks at two levels: political and military. On the political front, Dayan will meet with Sadat’s special envoy, Tuhami, in Morocco. Sadat noted that Dayan and Tuhami had already met there and that Pres Carter is aware of this. On the military level, Gamasy would meet with Weizman as soon as the latter’s leg injury heals. It had been agreed that these meetings would take place in Rumania to please Ceausescu, but the thought had come to Sadat this morning that after the first meeting in Rumania, subsequent meetings might take place in Egypt. Weizman, he thought, is not that conspicuous in appearance and meeting could take place at the President’s guest house at Gianaclis. Changing the venue of the Gamasy/Weizman talks to Egypt had not yet been tried out on the Israelis. No time yet fixed for these meetings, but it had been agreed that they should begin soon. Sadat hoped there might be sufficient agreement on both the political and military (security) aspects by Dec 20 to warrant convening a multilateral conference either in late Dec or early Jan.

5. Begin had also given him a “dossier”, which he showed me, containing the Israeli peace plan which had earlier been given to us.⁸ He, Sadat, had not yet read it and, in my presence, turned it over to Mubarak. Begin had said that if Sadat does not agree to the points in the Israeli peace plan, they are open to discussion. Sadat had replied that he agrees on security and no war, but the theory of security borders is not acceptable and would be interpreted as expansion. This document will presumably be the basis of the two sets of bilateral talks.

6. His speech to the Knesset, Sadat recalled, had made the points about Arab requirements. Sadat subsequently felt it may have been a bit too harsh and Begin had made this point to him. Sadat had conceded the point, but noted it was the first time they had met and they had not yet had any private meeting. Nevertheless, his speech had been received in a “democratic” way and this already was achievement. His trip, he repeatedly stressed, had broken down the psychological barriers that have for so long existed. Weizman had in fact urged him to remain another 24 hours to sign an Egyptian/Israeli agreement. He had refused, insisting he had not come to sign an agreement, but to get things started once again for an over-all Arab/Israeli settlement. He had made the same point to the Israeli Min of Justice.

7. Note: Sadat said nothing about Palestinian respresentation or PLO involvement in a united Arab del. I tried to probe Sadat on what procedural arrangements may have been worked out, but got nowhere. I suspect talks dealt largely with broad generalities and specifics were ignored.

Maintaining the momentum:

8. His visit, Sadat said, “has put us in a completely new position here.” It must be followed up. He was not worried even though he had not yet read the Israeli peace plan. Pres Carter’s earlier personal message to him had triggered his resolve for some “bold, new initiative.” He recalled that he had earlier tried out on Pres Carter his idea of a conference in Arab Jerusalem, which he now called Fahmy’s idea, but that Pres Carter had considered this to be premature. Although he previously had not surfaced to us his thought of going to the Knesset, he had had the idea even before the “conference in Jerusalem” concept. After our rejection of the conference idea, he had reverted to his original plan.

9. Now, thinking out loud, he wanted Pres Carter’s counsel on whether it might be advisable publicly to announce in the PA on Saturday, Nov 26, that peace arrangements should be in the form of an Arab-Israeli agreement. “It is our problem”, Sadat said, “and we should not need guardians to handle this for us.” Although it would appear on the surface that this would mean dropping the super powers involvement, that would not be intended. The Sovs would doubtless react badly; however, if they wished to participate, he did not wish deliberately to ignore them. They could still do so. In any case, discreet US assistance in the background would always be needed. But this would not require the type of US “pressure process” that he had once thought necessary. US pressure on Israel no longer requires a US-Israeli confrontation. Here Sadat mentioned that he had not known, until Begin told him, of the “hot line” that the Israeli PriMin has with Pres Carter.

10. Sadat said he had still another idea. He is thinking of announcing in the People’s Assembly on Saturday that, after his visit to Israel, the Geneva Conf is really not needed any longer. Instead, he would be prepared to invite all the parties concerned to come to Cairo to negotiate peace. He had not discussed the idea with Begin, but thought the Israelis would be agreeable. If the other Arab confrontation states agree, everything should go smoothly. If they do not agree, they will be in the wrong in the eyes of the Arab and world public. There should be no objection to coming to Cairo, an Arab capital, for peace talks. Husayn, he was sure, would come. The Syrians and the PLO might balk. If they do, a “complete” Arab-Israeli agreement could still be worked out and initiated. This would then be sent to the Arab leaders to consider. Again, the Sovs might not be happy with such a procedure, but if Pres Carter agreed to come, then Brezhnev would certainly do so. Otherwise, if Gromyko cared to come, this was agreeable. He had not focussed on modalities, but thought invitations by the Geneva Conf co-chairmen would be one way to handle this. The President emphasized that this was a completely new thought which had come to him only this morning, and that he would welcome President’s Carter’s reaction.

11. Then Sadat disclosed a third new idea. If President Carter thought it desirable and Begin agreed, an experienced Israeli diplomat could be discreetly assigned to the American Embassy in Cairo to resolve day-to-day problems between Egypt and Israel. He would be listed as an American and no announcement would for the time being be made that he was in fact an Israeli diplomat. Such an Israeli diplomat should use our communications channels, not separate Israeli channels. This thought had also come to him just this morning after reflecting on statements of Israeli leaders deploring the lack of day-to-day dialogue. He had not discussed it with Begin.

Message to Begin:

12. The President then asked that President Carter convey to PriMin Begin a message from Sadat. Depending upon President Carter’s reaction to his aforementioned ideas, the message should indicate two things: (A) that Sadat would welcome having an Israeli diplomat discreetly assigned to the American Embassy in Cairo to convey his messages to Begin, using our communications channels. This assignment would not be publicly announced. (B) How would Begin react to a public invitation by Sadat in his Saturday speech that, instead of convening in Geneva, all the parties be invited to come to Cairo to negotiate and sign a peace agreement.

13. If President Carter also wished to convey any of the other points he, Sadat, had mentioned, this was agreeable to him. In that case, however, the other points should come as a message from President Carter to Begin.

14. Although Sadat had not read Israeli peace proposal, he had some random thoughts about what such an agreement should contain. He had sensed that the concept of an independent Palestinian state did not appeal to Begin or Weizman. However, the Palestinians should not be ignored lest doing so enable rejectionist Arabs to use them against Sadat outside Egypt. As a compromise, he was toying with the idea of proposing that the West Bank be turned over to UNEF for, say, five years. During this time a plebiscite could be arranged for self-determination. In the next five years, many things will doubtless happen and the present Palestinian leadership will be “uncovered” (he meant changed). Neither Husayn nor the PLO would control that state. In the case of the Gaza Strip, this should be separate from the West Bank, but also under UNEF. A new Palestinian leadership could be prepared in Gaza. The “main weight” of the Palestinian state would thus be in Gaza, not the West Bank. He would even be prepared to give such a state part of Sinai, specifically, Egyptian Fafah and even Yamit. He had tried out these ideas on Begin, but recognized that it is a “headache” for him. He, nevertheless, hoped something along these lines can be worked out with the Israelis in the Tuhami/Dayan talks.

15. Sadat reiterated his strong view that good advance preparations for a comprehensive settlement are necessary. There should be no multilateral conference until adequate advance preparations are made through the Tuhami-Dayan and Gamasy-Weizman talks, which will soon get underway.

US role with Sadat’s critics:

16. Sadat asked Mubarak how Arab neighbors are reacting. Mubarak said Jordanians have calmed down, but Syrians and Iraqis still violently critical. Sadat dismissed them, saying they will sooner or later come to their senses.

17. Asked for his thoughts on what US might do to help mend the rift in the inter-Arab relations, especially with Saudi Arabia and Syria, Sadat opined that we should do nothing. After our last demarche to the Saudis,⁹ King Khalid had sent a message to GOE indicating we had made an approach and saying some nice things. Sadat did not like the inference that he had asked US to intervene with the Saudis and the Syrians. If we now approach the Syrians, they will announce that Sadat has asked us to do so and will seize on this to brand him as an “American stooge.” At some point, perhaps another visit by Secretary Vance to the area would be desirable to help persuade the Arab confrontation states to participate in a Cairo conference. This would have to be assessed as we move along.

18. In concluding, Sadat emphasized that none of the above thoughts are yet firm. If either we or the Israelis have any changes to suggest, he would welcome having them. In any case, as he saw it, arrangements were already worked out in Israel to continue the momentum of the peace process. Our behind the scenes help will, of course, still be needed and appreciated.

19. As I was leaving, Sadat asked that any comments President Carter may have on the several ideas adumbrated above be conveyed only to him or, if he is not available, to VP Mubarak. For the moment, Acting FonMin Boutros Ghali is not being brought into the picture, although he may be brought in at a later point.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2055. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. In telegram 19346 from Cairo, November 19, Ambassador Eilts reported on his November 19 meeting with Sadat prior to his departure for Jerusalem. Sadat reviewed his plans for his trip and noted that reports showed that 99 percent of the Egyptian people supported him. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2066) Telegram 280087 to Cairo, November 23, instructed Ambassador Eilts that he should inform Sadat at his November 23 meeting with him that the State Department wanted a briefing on results of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the opportunity “to consult closely with him on next steps with the parties to capitalize on momentum his visit generated.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850052–2242)
3. November 26.
4. Dayan and Tuhamy met secretly in Morocco on September 16.
5. The text of Carter’s letter is in Document 139.
6. See Document 152.
7. The following paragraphs are misnumbered in the original.
8. See Document 100.
9. See Document 143.