Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

Washington, October 30, 1977, 0411Z

259812. For Ambassador from the Secretary; WH for Z. Brzezinski. Subject: Message From President Carter to Assad. Ref: Damascus 6626.²

1. You should request an appointment with President Assad as soon as possible to deliver the message from President Carter contained in paragraph 2 of this telegram.³ In delivering the message you should make the following points orally:

—Emphasize that the proposal made by the President in his message is an effort to move past the procedural issues and into active negotiations at Geneva. We understand the point made by President Assad in his October 21 letter⁴ that form is important to the extent that it is linked to substance. What we have tried to do is find a procedure that would create as few obstacles as possible while protecting the substantive interests of all the parties.

—The President’s letter refers to the selection of Palestinian members of the Arab delegation. You should explain to Assad that what we have in mind is an arrangement along the following lines: The Arabs would select the individual delegates, including the Palestinians, by whatever method they choose. They would then inform us of the identity of the Palestinian members of the united Arab delegation, and we will undertake to ensure in advance that Israel will not use the presence of these individuals as an excuse not to attend the Conference. In describing this arrangement, stress that this is not a means for giving the Israelis a veto on individual members of the Arab delegation. We will urge Israel to be reasonable and will do our utmost to keep this procedure in quiet diplomatic channels. The Arab parties should be aware that a unified Arab delegation whose Palestinian members are not described in terms of organizational affiliation, and whose official positions do not make such organizational affiliation obvious, seems to us the only practical way of insuring Israel’s participation in the negotiations.

2. Begin text: Dear President Assad: I very much appreciated the effort you made in your October 21 letter to find a formula that would get us to Geneva without becoming bogged down in procedural disagreement. In the same spirit, and encouraged by your response, I strongly believe that the time has now come for us to move boldly to reconvene the Geneva Conference.

The working paper that I sent you⁵ enabled us to achieve agreement among the parties on some key points, such as a unified Arab delegation, including Palestinians. So far as the text of the working paper itself is concerned, however, I do not frankly see any likelihood of reaching agreement on a paper acceptable to all parties, nor do I believe this is necessary. Keeping the concerns and desires of all the parties in mind I believe there is sufficient flexibility, and that we have provided sufficient clarification of our views, to meet your basic concerns, with the understanding that any remaining problems can be worked out at Geneva where each party will be in a position to protect its interests.

I appreciate that there are two issues of particular importance to the Arab parties: the representation of the Palestinians in the negotiations, and the structure of the working groups and their relationship to the plenary.

With respect to Palestinian representation, I believe the procedure Ambassador Murphy will describe to you for selection of the Palestinian members of the Arab delegation will make it possible for Palestinians to be chosen by the Arab side who will faithfully represent Palestinian views.

I understand, moreover, that Arab concern about Palestinian representation would be eased if there could be some assurance that the Palestinian question will be adequately addressed at the Conference. I would be prepared, if the Arab side agrees to the course of action I am proposing in this letter, to make an unequivocal public statement that the Palestinian question, as well as the questions of withdrawal, security, and peace, must be dealt with at the Conference with the aim of finding a solution. I remain convinced that a Middle East settlement must include a just solution of the Palestinian question.

So far as the functioning of the Conference is concerned, a continuing role for the Conference plenary is assured by following procedures agreed to when Geneva was first convened in December 1973. At that time, Secretary General Waldheim announced at the closing session that working groups would submit their reports to the Conference.

Furthermore, we have with difficulty achieved Israeli agreement that there will be a unified Arab delegation with Palestinian representatives included, and that the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the refugee question, will be dealt with in multinational groups whose membership will include not only the states concerned but the Palestinian representatives as well. Whatever differences remain over the composition and functioning of these groups should be possible to resolve at Geneva.

Finally, to ensure coordination on the Arab side with respect to issues dealt with in bilateral working groups, there is nothing to prevent the Arabs from stating that no agreements reached will come into force until agreement has been reached on all aspects of a peace settlement, including the Palestinian aspect.

With these understandings, I propose that I now proceed to work out with the Soviet co-chairman a call for reconvening the Geneva Conference. Specifically, I envisage following the procedure used in 1973, with a letter from the co-chairmen notifying Secretary General Waldheim that the parties have agreed to meet at Geneva. The letter would, in this case, state that the Arab parties have agreed to form a single delegation including Palestinian representatives; it would state that the Conference procedures followed in December 1973 should govern the reconvened Conference; and it would describe the working group structure as bilateral, except for those issues which it is generally recognized lend themselves to a multilateral approach.

I urge that you send me your private agreement to this procedure. If you will give me your help and trust by agreeing to the approach I have outlined with a view to reconvening the Geneva Conference in December, I will undertake the difficult task of obtaining Israeli agreement to this approach, which I have not yet discussed with them. I cannot emphasize too strongly that, if this approach is to succeed, it must be held in absolute confidence. Any publicity would clearly destroy its chances of success and probably any hope of reconvening Geneva this year.

I am convinced that we are now at a critical moment in the efforts my administration has been making since taking office nine months ago to chart a course that will lead to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I want to assure you again, with all the weight of my office and the strength of my personal convictions, that I intend to persist in the search for peace in the Middle East, however long this takes, and to use the influence of the United States to the fullest extent of this effort.

With my best wishes, Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0213. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner (NEA), cleared by Atherton and Quandt, and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to the White House.
2. See Document 135.
3. Telegram 259811 to Amman, October 30, transmitted a substantively identical letter from Carter to King Hussein. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840084–1880)
4. The letter is in telegram 6626 to Damascus.
5. See Document 131.