Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

58. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

JCSM–95–78

Washington, March 21, 1978

SUBJECT

• SALT and Essential Equivalence (U)

1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been carefully evaluating the impact which the emerging SALT II agreement could have on essential equivalence, strategic stability, and, ultimately, the US deterrent posture. Their concerns stem primarily from past and projected force trends but are compounded by recent international events.

2. (TS) The period since the signing of the SALT I agreement has been marked by a fundamental difference in the manner in which the United States and the Soviet Union have approached force modernization within the letter and the spirit of negotiated arms control. The chart below summarizes the key trends:

STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION (1972–1977)

ICBM

USSR

— 4 new systems deployed

— Throwweight advantage further increased

— Megatonnage lead increased

— Accuracy substantially increased, reducing US advantage

— 5 new systems being developed

US

— MINUTEMAN III procurement terminated

— Hardening/accuracy improvements

— MX development slowed twice

SLBM/SSBN

USSR

— 1 new SLBM deployed

— 3 new SSBNs deployed

— 3 new SLBMs and 1 new SSBN being developed

— Marked increase in launchers

US

— POSEIDON deployment continued

— TRIDENT I and II SLBM developments slowed

— TRIDENT SSBN development slowed

BOMBERS

USSR

— Deployment of intercontinental-capable BACKFIRE begun

US

— B–1 canceled

— Cruise missile development accelerated

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

USSR

— Vigorous ballistic missile defense (BMD) R&D

— Modernized active air defenses

— Aggressive civil defense

— ASAT capabilities developed

US

— BMD site deactivated

— Moderate BMD R&D

— Active air defenses reduced

— Quiescent civil defense program

3. (TS) During the period 1972–1977, many of the qualitative advantages (e.g., MIRVed systems and accuracy) previously enjoyed by US Forces have been eroded. Past US restraint has failed to moderate the qualitative and quantitative pace of Soviet modernization. In fact, the latest National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11–3/8–77, projects a continuing Soviet momentum during the period of the anticipated SALT II treaty.² Projections into the 1980’s can be summarized as follows:

ICBM

USSR

— Continued deployment of new systems

— Accuracy comparable to US

US

— Continued development of MX (option to deploy)

— MK–12A reentry vehicle

SLBM/SSBN

USSR

— 3 new SLBMs deployed

— 1 new SSBN deployed

US

— TRIDENT I SLBM deployed

— TRIDENT SSBN deployed

— Continued development of TRIDENT II SLBM

BOMBERS

USSR

— New heavy bomber deployment likely

— BACKFIRE available in relatively large numbers

US

— Cruise missiles deployed (possibly range-limited)

— Cruise missile carrier option

— Continued reliance on aging B–52

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

USSR

— Continued vigorous BMD R&D

— Continued improvements in active air defenses

— Expanded protection of critical facilities/personnel

US

— Continued moderate BMD R&D

— Continued peacetime airspace surveillance and control (no “unopposed access”)

— Modest improvements in civil defense planning

4. (TS) There is a particular disparity in the projected improvements for the systems not included in the 1,320 sublimit. The Soviets have extensive modernization programs across the board, in contrast to very limited US activity in this area.

5. (TS) In summary, the NIE projects that Soviet strategic forces will become more powerful and flexible than they are today and, even under constraints along the lines now being negotiated in SALT, estimates that Soviet intercontinental offensive strength will grow in relation to that of the United States between now and the early 1980’s.

6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe these trends are very serious and merit particular scrutiny in the context of other Soviet behavior. Soviet intransigence on a variety of international issues is consistent with a growing Soviet perception of a shift in the relative balance of power in their favor.

7. (TS) The Soviets appear to be actively seeking such a shift. NIE 11–3/8–77 concludes, for instance, that one of their objectives is to “insure that their strategic forces and supporting elements . . . will support the perception that the strategic balance is continuing to shift in the USSR’s favor.” If this objective were to be attained, the framework of essential equivalence would be undermined. As you indicated in the Consolidated Guidance summary for the President, the consequences might well be attempted political coercion of the United States and/or US allies.

8. (U) In your annual report to the Congress on 23 January 1978,³ you specified the following four conditions for essential equivalence:

a. Soviet strategic nuclear forces should not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage;

b. Nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, should be maintained;

c. Any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets should be offset by US advantages in other characteristics; and

d. The US posture should not be in fact, and should not be seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.

9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that satisfying these conditions would preserve essential equivalence. They believe, however, that purely statistical measures of theoretical destructive potential should not be allowed to substitute for a more comprehensive assessment of the strategic balance, including offsetting capabilities, the role of perceptions, and differences in production base. Of particular concern should be the “breakout” potential of the Soviets to expand their strategic offensive and defensive capabilities rapidly in time of crisis.

10. (TS) Any SALT agreement must be viewed in the context of the above events and trends. In addition to adequate verification, which is fundamental to any SALT agreement, a most significant measure of the acceptability of a SALT agreement must be whether it provides a framework which allows both sides to exercise rights to maintain strategic stability. The emerging agreement generally provides this framework. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned with: the additive potential strategic contribution of BACKFIRE, which may not be counted in the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle aggregate; the adverse strategic potential created by the Soviet retention of the asymmetrical rights to heavy ICBMs; and the disparity in the respective US and Soviet modernization programs. The strategic nuclear equilibrium in the 1980’s can be made possible by an equitable and verifiable agreement, but such equilibrium can only be assured by continued force modernization under the terms of the agreement.

11. (TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the following:

a. Favorable resolution of key SALT issues in line with the views expressed previously in memorandums to you and the President.⁴

b. Reassessment of the Five Year Defense Program strategic force programs in light of the latest evidence of Soviet capabilities and intentions. These programs should be structured and paced in such a manner as to offset Soviet actions projected under a SALT II agreement.

c. Adoption of a strong administration position to modernize US strategic nuclear forces to the extent permitted and required to maintain essential equivalence as you have defined it, concurrent with continued negotiations for equitable and reciprocal reductions in nuclear arms.

12. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you support their views and forward them to the President.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

David C. Jones

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 11/23/77–4/20/78. Top Secret. The Special Coordination Committee met to discuss SALT II issues on March 6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 194.
2. National Intelligence Estimate 11–3/8–77, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1980s,” February 21, 1978, is in National Archives, RG 263, CIA Files, National Intelligence Estimates and Related Reports and Correspondence, 1950–1985, Entry A1 29.
3. See Document 48.
4. Attached but not printed is a list of references to prior memoranda.