Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

43. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Washington, May 12, 1977

I have just reviewed the proposed ten goals for foreign policy suggested by Zbig² and would like to make the following points. The proposals make a good deal of sense to me and I think will be of great value in guiding our policies and measuring our success. I believe they ought to be stated in public very generally, because they are ambitious goals and it will be difficult to fully succeed on all of them within the four-year time span.

I think it is important that our pursuit of human rights stand on its own ground. We pursue that course not for other political reasons, but because we believe in human rights. In Objective 4, we say, “We should match Soviet ideological expansion by a more affirmative American posture on global human rights,” and on Objective 7, we propose progress on human rights “in order to stem continental radicalization and to eliminate Soviet-Cuban presence from the Continent.” Both formulations suggest that a major motivation for our espousal of human rights is based on a tactical advantage against the Soviet Union. I think that is true, but I believe the basis of our support of human rights should be that we would espouse them and support them even if it were an asset to the Soviet Union, which, of course, it isn’t. I think that human rights, if pursued in a sophisticated but committed fashion, could be the most important contribution that the Carter Presidency will make to foreign policy. I think it is already showing fruits and I think you are the first President to be able to pursue this policy effectively without being charged with hypocrisy either personally or in terms of the American society.

I note the attached editorial in this morning’s New York Times,³ which is beginning to question our commitment. We cannot permit that to happen. (“Hands have no tears to flow”)⁴

The last phrase in Objective 10 worries me because, unless defined, it sounds like Viet Nam. It reads “to develop capabilities, to deter or counter the Soviet military intervention in the third world . . .”⁵ Of course we must. I am not arguing with the objective here, but I do think we should not mechanically pursue a global policy to counter Soviet intervention. Sometimes that intervention is more of a trap for them and an asset to us. As we have shown in Zaire, if we are careful, others will do it and, as we involve ourselves too much in some of these disputes, we undermine the capability of the indigenous forces to defend themselves. We look negative.

On page 6, we cast our definition of human rights by a way of remedies to nudge or force violating societies to improve, and I have no objection to that, but I think an equal part of our effort should be to honor societies which are making progress on their own, for example, Spain, Portugal, India, Peru. That aspect of our human rights policy is not reflected either on page 6 or pages 36 and 37. I think it should be.

I find the analysis of so-called “regional influentials” to be very interesting, but the separate analysis does not deal with the status of human rights and how the violation of those principles by some of those countries affects our relations, which I think is the really tough point. Unless we include that aspect in the approach, I fear we will be pursuing improved relations and implying a disregard for human rights at the same time—for example, Brazil.

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Mondale Papers, Office of the Vice President, Box 205, Memos from the VP to the President [2/3–6/30/77]. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Brzezinski.
2. According to Brzezinski’s memoirs, he had suggested to Carter in January 1977 that the NSC Staff produce a briefing book containing the 4-year goals of the Carter administration. Throughout the spring of 1977, the NSC Staff began preparing extensive documentation outlining the 10 primary foreign policy goals of the Carter administration, culminating in a 43-page paper. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 52–53) The paper is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. In an undated memorandum to the President, Brzezinski summarized the overall concept of the activity and listed the 10 major objectives. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiative: 4–5/77)
3. Not printed. Entitled “The Power and the Pity,” the editorial referenced Carter’s apparent restraint in either identifying specific countries as human rights violators or speaking out for the rights of dissidents. Noting Carter’s willingness to advocate for Welsh poet Dylan Thomas’ commemoration in Westminster Abbey’s Poet’s Corner, the Times editorial staff commented, “Washington’s present restraint on the subject of repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is an accommodation that Dylan Thomas would have understood.” (The New York Times, May 12, 1977, p. 26)
4. The “Hands have no tears to flow” line Mondale references is taken from a Thomas poem that Carter used as an epigraph in his 1976 book Why Not the Best?
5. The complete text reads: “To maintain a defense posture capable of deterring the Soviet Union both on the strategic and conventional levels from hostile acts and from political pressures. This will require the U.S. to modernize, rationalize, and reconceptualize its defense posture in keeping with the broad changes in world affairs that have already been noted, to improve NATO military strength and readiness, and to develop capabilities to deter or to counter Soviet military intervention in the Third World.” (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, undated; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 27, Goals/Initiative: 4–5/77)